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INTRODUCTION

The Rehnquist Court's federalism revival advances a single core purpose: the
reduction of national power-at least power exercised by national actors other than the
Supreme Court-and the concomitant increase of state power. Though reflecting this
single idea, the revival has been worked out across several constitutional loci: the
Commerce Clause,' Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, 2 and the Tenth 3 and
Eleventh Amendments. 4 As is well known, the spending power remains the notable
exception, its exercise still governed by the extremely generous 1987 decision in South
Dakota v. Dole.5 Consequently, many commentators, writing in this Symposium and
elsewhere, have proposed that Congress should respond to the Rehnquist Court's
states' rights decisions6 by using the spending power to circumvent those limitations on
congressional power.
We argue in this Article that the strategy urged by these commentators is a risky
one that might provoke the Court to abandon Dole in favor of something much less
hospitable to congressional power. Of course, that the Court couldtighten its spending
doctrine will be news to no one. Accordingly, those who advocate strategic recourse to
the spending power might respond in either or both of two ways. First, they may
contend that any change in Dole, though possible, is unlikely. The Court's "Nationalist
Four" (Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer), they might reason, will stand
by Dole, thereby requiring Chief Justice Rehnquist to abandon the test he authored if
there are to be five votes in favor of any change. Pride of authorship and Rehnquist's
commitment to the "greater includes the lesser" argument at Dole's core might seem to
make change doubtful.7 Second, they might argue, even if the Court abandons or
modifies Dole, so what? Those who favor relatively more expansive national power
can be no worse off for trying to exploit Dole, so long as it remains good law.

1.See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549
(1995).
2. See Morrison, 529 U.S. 598; Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356
(2000); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000); City of Boeme v. Flores, 521 U.S.
507 (1997).
3. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144
(1992). But see Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141 (2000).

4. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999); College Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary
Ed. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666 (1999); Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Ed. Expense Bd. v. College
Say. Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999); Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996).

5. 483 U.S. 203 (1987).
6. See Mark Tushnet, Alarmism Versus Moderation in Respondingto the Rehnquist Court, 78
IND. L.J. 47, 51-52 (2003).
7. See infra notes 129-30 and accompanying text.
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We think each of these contentions is mistaken. To be sure, a new spending
doctrine, even if only a tightening of the Dole test, is not inevitable. A majority of the
Court, including at least one of the "States' Rights Five," may well be prepared to live
with Dole. But this may depend upon what damage this majority (Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas) thinks the doctrine
does. We predict that not even Rehnquist's pride of authorship would commit him to
Dole if that test permits-as it very probably would-an unvarnished circumvention of
one of the majority's decisions limiting congressional power. And if Dole goes, it is
anybody's guess what may replace it. The replacement, however, might prove fatal to
spending legislation that would have survived Dole, and might even prove fatal to
legislation that already has survived Dole. In short, we believe that those who would
urge Congress to exploit Dole to check the Rehnquist Court's states' rights revival
might benefit from being more sensitive to the context-dependence of the creation of
judicial doctrine. Put another way, we are urging a greater sensitivity to the need for
strategic thinking.
Part I reviews South Dakota v. Dole and canvasses recent lower court decisions to
illustrate just how toothless the Dole test has been in practice. Part II shows why the
test is substantively and conceptually infirm. The upshot of this Part, of course, is that
Dole should be abandoned. The prevailing scholarly assumption, however, is that it
will not be. Indeed, it is precisely this assumption that drives recommendations that
Congress use Dole as a blueprint for circumventing the Court's more restrictive
federalism cases. Part III scrutinizes the assumption of Dole's durability, focusing in
particular on the possibility that the Court will soon review challenges to the Religious
Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 ("RLUIPA"), an act that, among
other things, uses the spending power as a lever with which to extend the free exercise
rights of state prisoners. We conclude that RLUIPA is unlikely to prod the Court to
overturn or even modify Dole. Consequently, Part IV turns attention to the
circumventionist strategy, showing just how Congress could exploit the Dole test to
get around several of the Rehnquist Court federalism decisions explored in this
Symposium. Part V argues that the Court is unlikely to tolerate this move. It raises the
specter, therefore, of perverse consequences: a too-clever Congress could push a
partially reluctant Supreme Court to curb the most important congressional power that
the Rehnquist Court's states' rights revival has thus far left untouched.
I. THE DOLE TEST

The Court's current spending doctrine derives from its 1987 decision in South
Dakota v. Dole, and is explicit that "objectives not thought to be within Article I's
'enumerated legislative fields[]' . . may nevertheless be attained through the use of
the spending power and the conditional grant of federal funds." 9 As applied to the
states, the Court's early rationale for this view was that "the powers ofthe State are not
invaded, since [such an offer] imposes no obligations but simply extends an option

8. For a general exploration of the strategic interactions among the Supreme Court and other
governmental actors, see William N.Eskridge, Jr., &Philip P.Frickey, The Supreme Court 1993
Term-Foreword:Law as Equilibrium, 108 HARV. L. REv. 26 (1994).
9. 483 U.S. 203, 207 (1987) (citing United States v.Butler, 297 U.S. 1,65-66 (1936)).
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which the State is free to accept or reject."' 0 Moreover, "[i]f Congress enacted [such a
statute] with the ulterior purpose of tempting [the states] to yield, that purpose may be
effectively frustrated by the simple expedient of not yielding.""
In 1936, the Court in United States v. Butler expressed concern that
[i]f, in lieu of compulsory regulation of subjects within the states' reserved
jurisdiction, which is prohibited, the Congress could invoke the taxing and
spending power as a means to accomplish the same end, clause 1of§ 8 of article I
total subversion of the governmental powers
would become the instrument for
12
states.
individual
the
to
reserved
At the same time, however, the Butler Court embraced Alexander Hamilton's view that
"the power of Congress to authorize expenditure of public moneys for public purposes3
is not limited by the direct grants of legislative power found in the Constitution."'
Unfortunately for proponents of federalism, the latter view has survived in modern
spending clause doctrine,' 4 while the former concern of the Butler Court has gone
largely unheeded.
A. South Dakota v. Dole
At issue in Dole was a federal statute that withheld five percent of federal highway
funds from any state "'in which the purchase or public possession... of any alcoholic

beverage by a person who is less than twenty-one years of age is lawful."" 5 Observing
that "[h]ere, Congress has acted indirectly under its spending power to encourage
uniformity in the States' drinking ages," the Court went on to hold the legislation
"within constitutional bounds even ifCongress may not regulate drinking ages
6
directly."'

10. Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 480 (1923); see also Oklahoma v. U.S. Civil
Serv. Comm'n, 330 U.S. 127, 143-44 (1947) ("We do not see any violation of the State's
Oklahoma adopted the 'simple expedient' of not yielding to what she urges is
sovereignty ....
federal coercion.") (comparing Mellon, 262 U.S. at 482).
11. Mellon, 262 U.S. at 482.
12. 297 U.S. 1, 75 (1936); see also id.at 74 ("Congress has no power to enforce its
commands on the farmer to the ends sought by the Agricultural Adjustment Act. It must follow
that it may not indirectly accomplish those ends by taxing and spending to purchase
compliance.").
at 66.
13. Id.
14. See Dole, 483 U.S. at 207 (quoting Butler, 297 U.S. at 66).
15. Id.
at 205 (quoting 23 U.S.C. § 158 (Supp. 1111982) (omission in original)); see also id.
at 211.
16. Id. at 206 (emphasis added). Even today it is uncertain whether Congress has the power
to regulate drinking ages directly in light of the 21 st Amendment. See, e.g., id. at 206 ("the
bounds of [the 21 st Amendment] have escaped precise definition"); 324 Liquor Corp. v. Duffy,
479 U.S. 335,346 (1987) (observing that the Court "has rejected the view 'that the Twenty-first
Amendment has somehow operated to "repeal" the Commerce Clause wherever regulation of
intoxicating liquors is concerned"') (quoting Hostetter v. Idlewild Von Voyage Liquor Corp.,
377 U.S. 324, 331-32 (1964)); see also Lynn A. Baker, ConditionalFederalSpending after
Lopez, 95 COLUM. L. REv. 1911, 1983-85 (1995) [hereinafter Conditional FederalSpending].
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Because a state always has "the 'simple expedient' of not yielding to what she
[considers] federal coercion,"1 7 the Dole Court concluded that the "Tenth Amendment
limitation on congressional regulation of state affairs [does] not concomitantly limit
the range of conditions legitimately placed on federal grants."'18 Although the Court
held that "[t]he spending power is of course not unlimited... but is instead subject to
several general restrictions articulated in our cases,"' 9 none of the stated restrictions
was portrayed as having much bite.
Thus, the first restriction articulated in Dole, that "the exercise of the spending
power must be in pursuit of 'the general welfare,"' 20 is subject to the caveat that
"courts should defer substantially to the judgment of Congress" when applying this
standard. 2' Indeed, the Court acknowledged that the required level of deference is so
great that it has "questioned whether 'general welfare' is a judicially enforceable
restriction at all."22 Second, the Court affirmed that Congress must state any conditions
on the states' receipt of federal funds "unambiguously[,] ...enabl[ing] the States to
exercise their choice knowingly, cognizant of the consequences of their
participation. 23 But it could cite only one instance in which it had found that an
24
enactment did not meet this requirement.
Third, the Dole Court noted that "conditions on federal grants might be illegitimate
if they are unrelated "to the federal interest in particular national projects or
programs, ' 25 but added that this restriction was merely "suggested (without significant
elaboration)" by prior cases.26 Indeed, the Court could cite no instance in which it had
invalidated a conditional grant of federal money to the states on this ground.27 Fourth,
the Court concluded that "other constitutional provisions may provide an independent
bar to the conditional grant of federal funds., 28 That is, Congress may not use its
powers under the Spending Clause "to induce the States to engage in activities that

17. Dole, 483 U.S. at 210 (quoting Oklahoma v. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n, 330 U.S.
127, 143-44 (1947)).
18. Id.
19. Id.
at 207.
20. Id.
(citing Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 640-41 (1937); United States v. Butler, 297
U.S. 1,65 (1936)).
21. Id.(citing Helvering, 30 iU.S. at 640, 645).
22. Id.at 207 n.2 (citing Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 90-91 (1976) (per curiam)).
23. Id.
at 207 (quoting Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981)).
24. Id.
Moreover, the import of the Court's holding in Pennhurstwas not to require Congress
to continue providing funds to a state that had failed to comply with an ambiguously worded
condition on those funds, but to deny relief to a third-party beneficiary of the funds who alleged
that the state of Pennsylvania had failed to comply with the federal condition that the Court
ultimately found to be ambiguous. Pennhurst,451 U.S. at 27-28.
25. Dole,483 U.S. at 207 (quoting Massachusetts v. United States, 435 U.S. 444,461 (1978)
(plurality opinion)).
26. Id. at 207 (quoting Massachusetts v. United States, 435 U.S. 444,461 (1978) (plurality
opinion)). For an elaboration on this prong, see infra Part V.B. 1.
27. See id.
at 207-08. The Dole Court cited Massachusetts v. United States, 435 U.S. 444,
461 (1978) (plurality opinion), and Ivanhoe IrrigationDistrict v.McCracken,357 U.S. 275,295
(1958). But the Court had not invalidated a condition on federal funds in either case.
28. Dole, 483 U.S. at 208.
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would themselves be unconstitutional." 29 But again, the Court could cite no case in
which30it had invalidated a conditional grant of federal money to the states on this
basis.
In addition, the Dole Court read the Spending Clause to impose limits on
Congress's ability to "coerce" the states in ways that it could not directly mandate
under its other Article I powers. 31"[l1n some circumstances," the Court observed, "the
financial inducement offered by Congress might be so coercive as to pass the point at
which 'pressure turns into compulsion.' 3 2 The Court concluded that a threatened loss
to states of five percent of their otherwise obtainable allotment of federal highway
funds did not pass this critical point, but did not suggest what percentage of these (or
any other) funds might.33
B. Dole in Action

In the fifteen years that Dole has been the law of the land, the lower courts, quite
predictably, have found little use for three of the five elements of its test. The courts
(and thus most litigants) have consistently viewed the first, "general welfare," prong as
a complete throw away, consistent with the Dole Court's own description.34 The
second prong, requiring a clear statement of the conditions imposed on the federal
funds, has seemingly had bite on several occasions, but only in the very limited context

at 210. Here the Court gave as an example "a grant of federal funds conditioned on
29. Id.
invidiously discriminatory state action or the infliction of cruel and unusual punishment." Id.
30. See id. at 208. The Court cited three cases, but in none of them had it invalidated a
conditional grant of federal money to the states on this ground. See Lawrence County v. LeadDeadwood Sch. Dist., 469 U.S. 256, 269-70 (1985); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1,91 (1976)
(per curiam); King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 333 & n.34 (1968).
31. See Dole, 483 U.S. at 211.
32. Id. (citing Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 590 (1937)).
33. See id. We explore the coercion prong in greater depth infra at Part V.B.2 and V.C.4.
34. Id. at 207 n.2. See also, e.g., West Virginia v. U.S; Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 132
F. Supp. 2d 437, 442 (S.D. W.Va. 2001) (concluding without further discussion that "Congress's
exercise of the spending power in this regard is in the pursuit of the general welfare"); Nevada v.
Skinner, 884 F.2d 445,448 n.3 (9th Cir. 1989) (concluding without further discussion that "[w]e
think it clear that the legislation is reasonably designed to serve the general welfare"). Thus,
litigants increasingly do not even raise claims under this prong of Dole. See, e.g., Michigan
Dep't of State v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 166 F. Supp. 2d 1228, 1233 (W.D.
Mich. 2001) (observing that "Michigan concedes that the statute is in pursuit of the general
welfare").
A rare exception is Stop H-3 Ass'n v. Dole, 870 F.2d 1419, 1427-29 (9th Cir. 1989), in
which the "general welfare" prong was a focus of litigation. Plaintiffs argued that the federal
spending legislation at issue was not consistent with the "general welfare" because the
"proposed highway is contained entirely within the state of Hawaii, and could only carry
vehicles from one point in Hawaii to another," and therefore "is of 'local' and not 'national'
interest." Id. at 1427. The Ninth Circuit disagreed, stating that the highway "was intended to
serve the general welfare" and "is part of an interstate highway system which serves important
defense functions." Id. at 1428. See also Hodges v. Shalala, 121 F. Supp. 2d 854, 873 (D.S.C.
2000) (challenging the constitutionality of federal spending condition on the ground that the
conditions "are not consistent with the nation's welfare").
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of conditional waivers of Eleventh Amendment immunity. 3" But even within that
context, many courts have applied the clear-statement requirement with extraordinary
leniency. Outside of the Eleventh Amendment context, one federal appeals court went
so far as to hold a "postacceptance" or "retroactive" condition on federal funds-"of
which the states were unaware at the time they accepted the[] funds"-to be
constitutionally permissible under Dole's second prong because the condition was
"unambiguous. 36
As one might expect, the "independent constitutional bar" prong of the Dole test
has rarely come into play. It did have bite, however, in one very recent case involving
the Children's Internet Protection Act. 37 The Act required public libraries to use
Internet filters as a condition for receipt of federal subsidies. 38 The federal district
court held the relevant sections of the Act facially invalid under the First Amendment,
observing that "the proposition that Congress may not pay state actors to violate
39
citizens' First Amendment rights is unexceptionable when stated in the abstract.,
Because the legislation was found to "induce public libraries to violate the First
Amendment," the First Amendment was held to provide an independent bar to the
Act's conditional grant of federal funds, consistent with Dole's fourth prong. 40 The
Supreme Court will decide the fate of the Act during the October 2002 Term.41
At the time Dole was decided, the potentially most promising provisions of its test
seemed to be its "relatedness" requirement and anti-"coercion" language. The former's
promise stemmed in large part from O'Connor's dissent in Dole, in which she claimed
that the majority misapplied their own relatedness test.42 She argued that a proper

35. This is an unusual context because many of the relevant courts have stated that the
challenged legislation was invalidated pursuant to the "clear declaration of waiver" requirement
of Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234 (1985)-a pre-Dole Eleventh
Amendment decision-and not pursuant to the second prong of the Dole test. See Coll. Say.
Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666,680-81 (1999); Pugliese
v. Ariz. Dept. of Health and Human Serv., 147 F. Supp. 2d 985,990-91 & n.8 (N.D. Cal. 2001).
Indeed, lower courts that have adjudicated challenges to federal grants conditioned on waiver of
state sovereign immunity have often viewed the clear-statement rule of Atascadero as the only
constitutional obstacle, failing even to acknowledge Dole's other requirements as applicable. See
Mitchell N. Berman, R. Anthony Reese & Ernest A.Young, State Accountabilityfor Violations
of IntellectualPropertyRights: How To "Fix" Florida Prepaid (And How Not To), 79 TEx. L.
REv. 1037, 1138-39 (2001).
36. Counsel v. Dow, 849 F.2d 731, 735-36 (2d Cir. 1988) (contending that "Pennhurst
cannot be read as broadly prohibiting amendments which add retroactive conditions to funding
statutes: at most, Pennhurstsimply requires a clear indication of congressional intent to impose
such conditions.").
37. Am. Library Ass'n v. United States, 201 F. Supp. 2d 401,406-07 (E.D. Pa. 2002),prob.
juris. noted, 123 S. Ct. 551 (2002).

38. Id. at 406-07.
39. Id. at 451.
40. Id. at 450. The only real issue for the Court was "what exactly a litigant must establish to
facially invalidate an exercise of Congress's spending power on this grounds." Id.
41. See 123 S. Ct. 551 (2002) (noting probable jurisdiction over American Library

Association v. United States, 201 F. Supp. 2d 401 (E.D. Pa. 2002)).
42. O'Connor explained that, "My disagreement with the Court is relatively narrow on the
spending power issue: it is a disagreement about the application of a principle rather than a
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application of the test would lead to invalidation of the legislation at issue in Dole.43
The promise of the anti-"coercion" provision was apparent in the Dole majority's
strong suggestion that a threatened loss to states of some significant (but unspecified)
portion of federal funds might well invalidate the relevant condition as being
impermissibly "coercive." 44 During the past fifteen years, however, the lower courts,
with few exceptions, 45 have read these two most promising provisions of the Dole test
to be toothless, even nonjusticiable, en route to sustaining a wide range of conditional
federal spending legislation.
Although no court has denied the existence orjusticiability ofDole's "relatedness"
requirement, nearly all have given it only cursory attention. In most instances in which
the requirement has been a focus of litigation, the court has done little more than
assert, without analysis or elaboration, that the challenged condition is "reasonably
related to the federal interest in the national program. 46 Thus, the lower courts have
had little difficulty upholding a wide range of funding conditions without a clearly
explained relationship to the underlying legislation, including the condition that the
state develop and maintain an automated child support enforcement system in order to
receive federal funds under the Temporary Assistance to Needy Families program,47
the condition that the state provide emergency medical services to illegal aliens in
order to receive Medicaid funds, 48 and the condition that the state comply with a

disagreement on the principle itself." South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 212 (1987)
(O'Connor, J., dissenting). She added that "the Court's applicationof the requirement that the
condition imposed be reasonably related to the purpose for which the funds are expended is
cursory and unconvincing." Id. at 213 (emphasis added).
43. "In my view, establishment of a minimum drinking age of 21 is not sufficiently related to
interstate highway construction tojustify so conditioning funds appropriated for that purpose."
Id.
at 213-14.
44. Id.
at 211 (citing Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 590 (1937)).
45. The few exceptions are Guillen v.Pierce County, 31 P.3d 628,651 (Wash. 2001), rev'd
in part on other grounds, 123 S.Ct. 720 (2003); United States v. Sabri, 183 F. Supp. 2d 1145
(D. Minn. 2002); and Comm. of Va. Dep't ofEduc v. Riley, 106 F.3d 559, 561 (4th Cir. 1997)
(per curiam) (en banc).
46. Kansas v. United States, 24 F. Supp. 2d 1192, 1198 (D. Kan. 1998). The Kansascourt
added by way of "elaboration," that "[tihe statutory requirements here at issue clearly
demonstrate sufficient relationship to the purpose of the federal funding so as to pass
constitutional muster." Id.See also,e.g.,
Litman v. George Mason Univ., 5F. Supp. 2d 366,376
(E.D. Va. 1998), affid, 186 F.3d 544 (4th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1181 (2000)
(providing one sentence "analysis" of the application of the relatedness prong: "The Court finds
that [the statutory provisions at issue] easily satisfy this requirement, and Defendant does not
argue otherwise.").
One lower federal court included the relatedness requirement when setting out the Dole test,
then completely ignored that requirement when applying Dole's restrictions to the facts at issue.
United Seniors Ass'n v. Shalala, 2 F. Supp. 2d 39,42 (D.D.C. 1998), arfd 182 F.3d 965 (D.C.
Cir. 1999). See also, e.g., Texas v. United States, 106 F.3d 661, 666 (5th Cir. 1997) (limiting
"analysis" under Dole to observation that the "federal law requires states to provide emergency
medical care to undocumented aliens only if the states voluntarily choose to receive flderal
funds from the Medicaid program").
47. See Hodges v. Shalala, 121 F. Supp. 2d 854, 877 (D.S.C. 2000), affd sub nom., Hodges
v. Thompson, 311 F.3d 316 (4th Cir. 2002).
48. See, e.g., California v. United States, 104 F.3d 1086, 1092 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied,
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heightened standard of free exercise of religion for prisoners and other individuals in
its institutions in order to receive federal funds for those institutions.49

To date, the most significant exception to this state of affairs is the Washington

Supreme Court's 2001 decision in Pierce County v. Guillen,50 which involved a
challenge to federal legislation that, as the Washington Supreme Court construed it,
conditioned federal highway-safety improvement funds on a state's making reports and
data involved in the preparation of applications for the federal funds privileged and
nondiscoverable. The United States Supreme Court decided Guillen in January 2003,
reversing the Washington Supreme Court. 5' The United States Supreme Court upheld
the challenged legislation on Commerce Clause grounds, and thus did not find it
necessary to reach the spending power issue.5 2 We discuss Guillen and what it might
signify for the near future of the Court's spending jurisprudence in Part Ill.A below.
The Dole test's "coercion" provision has fulfilled even less of its apparent promise.
In finding the provision essentially nonjusticiable, the lower federal courts have
repeatedly pointed to the difficulties in drawing the line between "financial
inducement" and "coercion," 3 the failure of other courts to invalidate any funding
condition on this groundt 4 and the ability of a state to avoid the condition by simply

522 U.S. 806 (1997); Texas v. United States, 106 F.3d 661, 666 (5th Cir. 1997); Padavan v.
United States, 82 F.3d 23, 29 (2d Cir. 1996).
49. See Mayweathers v. Terhune, No. CIVS961582LKKGGHP, 2001 WL 804140 (E.D. Cal.
July 2, 2001), aff'd sub nor., Mayweathers v. Newland, 314 F.3d 1062 (9th Cir. 2002)
(affirming lower court's denial of defendant's motion to dismiss); Johnson v. Martin, 23 F.
Supp. 2d 820 (W.D. Mich., 2002) (denying state's motion for summary judgment); Charles v.
Verhagen, 220 F. Supp. 2d 955 (W.D. Wis., 2002) (granting prisoner's motion for injunctive
relief); Freedom Baptist Church v. Middletown, 204 F. Supp. 2d 857 (E.D. Pa. 2002) (denying
Township's motion to dismiss); Gerhardt v. Lazaroff, 221 F. Supp. 2d 827 (S.D. Ohio 2002)
(denying defendants' motion to dismiss).
50. 31 P.3d 628 (Wash. 2001), rev'd in part, 123 S.Ct. 720(2003).
51. See Pierce County v. Guillen, 123 S.Ct. 720 (2003).
52. Id. at 732 n. 9.
53. See, e.g., West Virginia v. U.S. Dep't. of Health and Human Servs., 289 F.3d 281,288
(4th Cir. 2002) ("[T]he coercion theory is somewhat amorphous and cannot easily be reduced to
a neat set of black-letter rules of application."); id. at 289 ("These oft-mentioned 'endless
difficulties' in applying the coercion theory have led some courts to conclude, in essence, that
the theory raises political questions that cannot be resolved by the courts."); Kansas v. United
States, 214 F.3d 1196, 1202 (10th Cir. 2000) ("The boundary between incentive and coercion
has never been made clear ...."), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1035 (2000); Nevada v. Skinner, 884
F.2d 445, 448 (9th Cir. 1989) ("The difficulty if not the impropriety of making judicial
judgments regarding a state's financial capabilities renders the coercion theory highly suspect as
a method of resolving disputes between federal and state governments."), cert.denied, 493 U.S.
1070 (1990); John Doe v. Nebraska, No. 4:CV95-3381, 2002 WL 225907, at *7 (D.Neb. Feb.
14, 2002) (memorandum and order on defendants' renewed motion for summary judgment) ("l,
too, question the viability of the coercion theory."); Kansas v. United States, 24 F. Supp. 2d
1192, 1198 (D. Kan. 1998) ("The Supreme Court and other courts have recognized that the
judiciary should attempt to avoid becoming entangled in ascertaining the point at which federal
inducement to comply with a condition becomes compulsion.... These cases suggest that the
coercion test is ill-conceived and probably unworkable.").
54. See, e.g., West Virginia, 289 F.3d at 289 ("IT]he Supreme Court since 1937 has not
struck down a Congressional exercise of its spending powers, and we are aware of no decision
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foregoing the federal funds."5 Indeed, the lower courts have consistently failed to find
impermissible coercion,56 even when a state has demonstrated that either the absolute

from any court finding a conditional grant to be impermissibly coercive.") (footnote omitted); id.
at 290 ("[Mlost courts faced with the question have effectively abandoned any real effort to
apply the coercion theory."); Kansas, 214 F.3d at 1201-02 ("The Court has never employed the
[coercion] theory to invalidate a funding condition, and federal courts have been similarly
reluctant to use it."); Skinner, 884 F.2d at 448 ("The coercion theory has been much discussed
but infrequently applied in federal case law, and never in favor of the challenging party."); John
Doe, 2002 WL 225907, at *8 ("[S]tates have found little, if any, success with the coercion
theory in challenging Spending Clause conditions."); Michigan Dep't of State v. United States,
166 F. Supp. 2d 1228, 1236 (W.D.Mich. 2001) (observing that "the state fails to cite any case
invalidating Congressional action under the Spending Clause based on coercion"); West Virginia
v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 132 F. Supp. 2d 437,443 (S.D. W.Va. 2001) ("Since
Steward,no court has invalidated a funding condition as being coercive."), affd, 289 F.3d 281
(4th Cir. 2002).
Indeed, one federal district court has gone so far as to read the "coercion" test entirely out of
Dole. See Building & Constr. Trades Dep't v. Allbaugh, 172 F. Supp. 2d 138, 151 (D.D.C.
2001) (contending that "contrary to defendants' argument, in upholding spending clause statutes,
the Court does not address the question of whether a conditional spending grant is 'voluntary,'
or impermissibly 'coercive'), rev 'd,295 F.3d 28 (D.C. Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 123 S.Ct. 992
(2003).
55. See, e.g., Kansas,214 F.3d at 1203 ("IfKansas finds the ... requirements so disagreeable,
it is ultimately free to reject both the conditions and the funding, no matter how hard that choice
may be.... Kansas' options have been increased, not constrained, by the offer of more federal
dollars."); Jim C. v. United States, 235 F.3d 1079, 1082 (8th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 533 U.S.
949 (2001) ("[T]he Arkansas Department of Education can avoid the requirements of Section
504 simply by declining federal education funds. The sacrifice of all federal education funds,
approximately $250 million or 12 per cent of the annual state education budget.., would be
politically painful, but we cannot say that it compels Arkansas's choice."); Michigan Dep 't of
State, 166 F. Supp. 2d at 1236 ("This Court similarly finds the coercion theory without merit in
light of the clear choice presented to Michigan by Congress. Michigan has a free choice whether
to comply with the requirement that it collect SSNs on drivers' license applications and receive
federal funds or not."); Padavan v. United States, 82 F.3d 23, 29 (2d Cir. 1996) ("If New York
chose not to participate [in the federal Medicaid program], there would be no federal regulation
requiring the state to provide medical services to illegal aliens.").
56. Two courts have come close to invalidating a spending provision on grounds of coercion.
In United States v. Sabri, 183 F. Supp. 2d 1145, 1156 (D. Minn. 2002), a federal district court
considering the constitutionality of § 666 of the federal bribery statute, see infra note 133, stated
that "even if one could describe the federal funds disbursed.., as the 'financial inducement' by
which Congress bargained for federal jurisdiction over offenses traditionally within the purview
of state and local governments, that bargain surely is 'so coercive as to pass the point at which
pressure turns into compulsion."'). The Court went on, however, to conclude that "Section 666
plainly is not a 'condition' statute within the reasoning ofDole and cannot be justified under that
decision as a valid exercise of Congress's power under the Spending Clause." Id.
In VirginiaDepartmentofEducation.v. Riley, 106 F.3d 559 (4th Cir. 1997) (per curiam) (en
banc), the Fourth Circuit struck down a provision of the Individuals with Disabilities Education
Act ("IDEA") that purported to condition receipt of the federal education funds on a state's
providing free appropriate public education ("FAPE") to handicapped students expelled or
suspended for criminal or other serious misconduct wholly unrelated to their disabilities.
Adopting Judge Luttig's dissenting opinion in the panel below, the en banc court held the
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amount or percentage of federal money at stake is so large that it has "no choice but to
accept the [federal legislation's] many requirements."" It is not surprising that the
lower courts have increasingly questioned whether "there is any viability left in the
coercion theory, 58 given the courts' willingness to uphold conditions on Medicaid
grants, for example, "even where the removal of Medicaid funding would devastate the
state's medical system." 59
1I. WHY DOLE SHOULD BE ABANDONED

The prevailing view among "liberal" academics and judges seems to be that the
Rehnquist Court's "states' rights" revival is one giant wrong turn, and that Dole was
the Rehnquist Court's rare right move. 60 Our own views on resurgent federalism are

condition unconstitutional for failing Dole's requirement that the condition be unambiguous. Id.
at 561, 566-69. In dicta, however, the court explained that the statute also raised "[a] substantial
constitutional question" with respect to coercion, id. at 561, and strongly intimated that, were the
statute sufficiently unambiguous, it would have held that conditioning all IDEA funds on a
state's provision of FAPE even to handicapped students expelled or suspended for disabilityunrelated misconduct was unconstitutionally coercive. Id. at 569-71.
Interestingly, Congress amended the IDEA only months after the Riley decision to make
clear that IDEA funds were indeed conditioned on a state's ensuring that "[a] free appropriate
public education is available to all children with disabilities residing in the State between the
ages of 3 and 21, inclusive, including children with disabilities who have been suspended or
expelled from school." 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(l)(A) (2000) (amended by Pub. L. No. 105-17, §
612, 16 Stat. 60 (1997)). Although the Fourth Circuit has acknowledged that the ambiguity it
detected in Riley has been cured, see Amos v.Md. Dep't of Pub. Safety &Corr. Servs., 126 F.3d
589, 603 n.8 (4th Cir. 1997), to our knowledge that court has not been invited to unleash the
sword it had left hanging in Riley by holding the amended statute unconstitutionally coercive.
57. Kansas, 214 F.3d at 120. For an exploration of what it may mean for a state to have "no
choice but to accept" a conditional offer, see infra Part V.B.2.
58. California v. United States, 104 F.3d 1086, 1092 (9th Cir. 1997); see also, e.g., Virginia
v. United States, 926 F. Supp. 537, 543 (E.D. Va. 1995) ("[T]he Court has serious doubts
whether the coercion inquiry is a viable tool of spending power jurisprudence."), affd, 74 F.3d
517 (4th Cir. 1996); Kansas v. United States, 214 F.3d 1196, 1202 (10th Cir. 2000) ("[Tlhe
coercion theory is unclear, suspect, and has little precedent to support its application."). One
Court has further
seriously question[ed] the vitality of the coercion test in light of the Supreme
If [state] sovereignty is adequately protected by the
Court's holding in Garcia ....
national political process, we do not see any reason for asking the judiciary to
settle questions of policy and politics that range beyond its normal expertise.
Nevada v. Skinner, 884 F.2d 445, 448 (9th Cir. 1989) (citations omitted).
59. Kansas, 214 F.3d at 1202; see also, e.g., California,104 F.3d at 1092 (observing that
California "argues that while its choice to participate in Medicaid may have been voluntary, it
now has no choice but to remain in the program in order to prevent a collapse of its medical
system")(citation omitted).
Erwin Chemerinsky, Protectingthe Spending Power, 4 CHAP. L. REv. 89, 90,
60. See, e.g.,
93 (2001) (contending that the Court's recent federalism decisions were "misguided" but that
"the Supreme Court was right in South Dakota v. Dole"); Sylvia A. Law, In the Name of
Federalism: The Supreme Court's Assault on Democracy and CivilRights, 70 U. CIN. L. REv.
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somewhat more favorable, although not in complete agreement-either with each other
or with the Court. 6 1However, despite the various respects in which we disagree with
each other, and with the Court, over several of its recent federalism decisions,
however, we agree that Dole was a mistake of substantial import. Further, we are
persuaded that everyone should share this view, liberals and conservatives alike. In this
Part we explain why. In short, we argue that Dole has yielded, and will continue to
yield, normatively troublesome results, and is intellectually suspect as well.
A. Practical Infirmities
Our analysis begins with a consideration of a particularly important function that we
believe the judicial enforcement of states' rights-including meaningful judicially
enforced limitations on the spending power-serves. It provides "outlier" or
"minority" states protection from federal homogenization in areas in which they
deviate from the national norm, whether that deviation is to the left or right ofthe
political center. In serving this function, judicially enforced limitations on the spending
power increase and preserve diversity among the states within the realm of what is
constitutionally permitted,62 thereby ultimately increasing aggregate social welfare.
We go on to consider a core objection that might be raised to these arguments in
favor of judicially enforced state autonomy: that even if interstate diversity is more
likely to maximize the satisfaction of individual preferences, and therefore more likely

367, 391 (2002) (observing with approval that "[e]ven though the Court has sharply constrained
the power of Congress to act under the Commerce Clause and under Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment, many of the goals Congress seeks to achieve may still be pursued through the
federal spending power" under Dole). Of course, this view is not limited to those who would
self-identify as liberal. For a very recent, extended, critique by a distinguished Reagan appointee
to the bench, see JOHN T. NOONAN, JR., NARROWING THE NATION'S POWER: THE SUPREME
COURT SIDES WITH THE STATES

(2002).

61. For a sampling of our published views on federalism, see, for example, Baker,
Conditional Federal Spending, supra note 16; Lynn A. Baker, Conditional Federal Spending
and States' Rights, 574 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 104 (2001) [hereinafter
Conditional Federal Spending and States'Rights]; Lynn A. Baker, Federalism: The Argument
from Article V, 13 GA. ST. UNIV. L. REV. 923 (1997); Lynn A. Baker, Putting the Safeguards
Back into the Political Safeguards ofFederalism, 46 VILL. L. REv. 951 (2001) [hereinafter
Political Safeguards]; Lynn A. Baker, Should Liberals Fear Federalism?, 70 U. CIN. L. REv.
433 (2002); Lynn A. Baker, The Revival ofStates'Rights: A Progress Report and a Proposal,
22 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 95 (1998) [hereinafter Revival ofStates'Rights]; Lynn A. Baker,
The Spending Power and the Federalist Revival, 4 CHAPMAN L. REv. 195 (2001) [hereinafter
Spending Power]; Lynn A.Baker & Samuel H.Dinkin, The Senate: An Institution Whose Time
Has Gone?, 13 J.L. & POL. 21 (1997); Lynn A. Baker& Ernest A. Young, Federalism and the
Double Standard ofJudicial Review, 5i DUKE L.J. 75 (2001); Mitchell N. Berman, Coercion
Without Baselines: Unconstitutional Conditions in Three Dimensions, 90 GEO. L.J. 1 (2001);
Berman, Reese & Young, supra note 35.
62. As we discuss at greater length infra at Part II.A. 1, the interstate diversity with which we
are concerned is diversity "above" the baseline of what is constitutionally permitted. That is, we
are taking existing federal constitutional prohibitions as given, and are concerned solely with
diversity among the states in areas in which our nation has not yet arrived at a consensus that it
is willing or able (or deems necessary) to enshrine in the U.S. Constitution.
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to maximize aggregate social welfare, than is a homogenization of policies dictated or
encouraged by Congress, permitting Congress to press states to adopt certain policies,
is likely to result in policies that are more just or otherwise preferable as a matter of
political morality. We find this defense of Dole unpersuasive, and offer three reasons
why below.
Because Dole authorizes expansive congressional power, it may not be surprising
that, notwithstanding Rehnquist's authorship of Dole and Brennan's dissent, Dole is
today more loved by the (typically nationalist) Democrats than by the (typically states'
rights) Republicans. Frequently overlooked, however, is the fact that liking Dole with
a Democratic Congress, in which exploitation of the Dole loophole to circumvent the
Court's recent states' rights and other "conservative" decisions seemed plausible, is
not the same as liking it with a Republican Congress in which use of the spending
power to achieve socially conservative outcomes seems far more likely. Thus, we
conclude this Part by explaining why liberal "nationalists" too should dislike Dole 63
(and
celebrate limited federal power), despite their own protestations to the contrary.
1. Dole Reduces Aggregate Social Welfare
Our central thesis can be simply stated: in the absence of a nationwide consensus,
permitting state-by-state variation will almost always satisfy more people than would
the imposition of a uniform national policy, and will almost always therefore increase
aggregate social welfare. As Michael McConnell has succinctly demonstrated, stateby-state diversity will generally allow government to accommodate the preferences of
a greater proportion of the electorate, as long as those preferences are unequally
distributed geographically." And, as one of us has previously explained, this is likely
to mean that the imposition of national uniformity in the absence of consensus will
reduce aggregate social welfare relative to the existence of state-by-state diversity.65
Permitting subnational political communities to choose their own visions of the
good society affords individuals the freedom to choose from among various diverse
regulatory regimes the one that best suits the individual's preferences." Seth Kreimer
has recently illustrated the wide variety of situations in which Americans have invoked
this freedom at different points in our history:
Mormons moved from Illinois to Utah, while African Americans migrated from
the Jim Crow South. Rail travel and, later, automobiles and airplanes enabled

63. For an extended discussion of the larger topic of whether liberals should favor states'
rights more generally, see Baker, Should Liberals Fear Federalism?, supra note 61.
64. Michael W. McConnell, Federalism: Evaluating the Founders' Design, 54 U. CHI. L.
REv. 1484, 1494 (1987). Whether the accommodation of more people's preferences actually
increases social welfare, of course, depends to some extent on how both preferences and welfare
are measured and, in the end, on what the preferences arefor. A majority preference in a given
jurisdiction for slavery, for instance, would raise grave difficulties for any measure of welfare
based solely on satisfying the preferences of the greatest number. Our claim here is simply that
complications like this are often not present and that state-by-state diversity often will increase
welfare.
65. See Baker, Conditional Federal Spending, supra note 16, at 1947-51, 1970-72.
66. See id. at 1947-51.
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residents of conservative states to escape constraints on divorce and remarriage. In
the years before Roe v. Wade, women from states with restrictive abortion laws
sought reproductive autonomy in more sympathetic jurisdictions. Today, the
lesbian who finds herself in Utah, like the gun lover who lives in Washington,
D.C., and the gambler in Pennsylvania, need only cross a state border to be free of
constraining rules. These are liberties
that come only with the variations in local
67
norms made possible by federalism.
In sum, state autonomy to create diverse politico-legal regimes, combined with a
personal right of exit, is a critical way that American federalism promotes individual
welfare.
Because Dole's interpretation of the spending power is so generous, it enhances
Congress's authority to drive states toward a single nationwide policy, notwithstanding
the preferences of citizens of some states to have a different policy. To the extent that
Congress need respond only to the preferences of a majority of states in exercising its
spending power, its action may well be at odds with the preferences of a dissenting
minority of states.
There are at least three different, if not entirely discrete, scenarios in which some
states might seek to use Congress's spending power as an instrument for imposing their
preferences on other states. The first and simplest involves a situation in which people
in some states simply do not approve of certain activities that are legal in other states,
even though the activity in the other state does not otherwise affect them. When the
states of Arizona, New Mexico, Oklahoma, and Utah entered the Union, for example,
Congress required each, as a condition of admission, to include in its state constitution
a provision stating that polygamy is "forever prohibited., 68 As Justice Scalia has
pointed out, this requirement amounted to an "effort by the majority of citizens to
preserve its view of sexual morality ...against the efforts of a geographically
concentrated and politically powerful minority to undermine it." 69 The preferences of
polygamists in the new western states, however, did not "undermine" the marriage
laws of the majority of states in any substantial sense. Rather, the majority states most likely
acted out of a straightforward desire to impose their own moral code on others in the

67. Seth F. Kreimer, Federalism and Freedom, 574 ANNALS AM.ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCo. 66,
72 (2001); see also Baker, Conditional Federal Spending, supra note 16, at 1947-51 (discussing
the relationship between individual mobility and benefits of federalism); Richard A. Epstein,
Exit Rights Under Federalism, 55 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 147, 150 (Winter 1992) (observing
that "[flederalism works best where it is possible to vote with your feet"); McConnell, supra
note 64, at 1493-94, 1503-04. On the general importance of exit rights inthe American political
tradition, see ALBERT 0. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLINE IN
FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES 106-12 (1970).
68. See Arizona Enabling Act, ch. 310, 36 Stat. 569 (1910); New Mexico Enabling Act, ch.
310, 36 Stat. 558 (1910); Oklahoma Enabling Act, ch. 3335, 34 Stat. 269 (1906); Utah Enabling
Act, ch. 138, 28 Stat. 108 (1894). The complying state constitutional provisions-which are still
in force-may be found at ARIZ. CONST., art. XX, par. 2; N.M. CONST., art. XXI, § 1; OKLA.
CONST., art. I, § 2; UTAH CONST., art. Ill, § 1. Indeed, the Arizona, New Mexico, and Utah
enabling acts required that these provisions be "irrevocable without the consent of the United
States and the people of said State."
69. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 648 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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absence of a constitutional amendment reflecting a nationwide consensus on the
issue.7 °
A second scenario involves an attempt by some states to capture a disproportionate
share of federal monetary or regulatory largesse. 7' Any conditional offer of federal
72
funds is highly likely to make some states better off at the expense of other states.
Such an offer implicitly divides the states into two groups: (1) states that already
comply, or without financial inducement would happily comply, with the funding
condition, and for which the offer of federal money therefore is a gratuity; and (2)
states that find the funding condition unattractive and therefore face the choice of
foregoing the federal funds in order to avoid complying with the condition, or
submitting to undesirable federal regulation in order to receive the offered funds. One
would therefore expect such conditional funding legislation to be enacted only if a
(substantial) majority of states fall within the first group: that is, they already willingly
comply with, or favor, the stated condition, and the conditional offer of funds is
therefore no less attractive to them than a similar unconditional offer. For the states in
the majority (and their congressional representatives), a vote in favor of the conditional
grant is nearly always a vote to impose a burden solely on other states.
If most states have already set their minimum drinking age at twenty-one, for
example, then those states should find it attractive to impose a minimum drinking age
of twenty-one as a condition on federal highway funds offered all states. Such a
condition would bring about one of two possible results. Either outlier states with
minimum drinking ages lower than twenty-one will comply with the condition,
accepting the preferences held by the dominant majority, or they will forfeit whatever
amount of highway funds are tied to the condition. The latter result, of course, would
leave more funds in the general treasury and thus available for the benefit of all states.
The ability to impose spending conditions thus presents states in the majority with a
"no lose" proposition-"no lose," that is, except to the extent that such measures
undermine the autonomy of all states in the long run. 7
A final scenario arises when states-seek federal regulation in order to avoid certain
costs associated with regulating a particular subject at the state level. Consider, for
example, a not-so-hypothetical state of affairs under which a majority of the states

70. True, some opponents of polygamy in the rest of the Union may also have been
concerned that permitting polygamy in the new states could have a corrosive influence on the
institution of monogamy in their own states. But this desire to impose their own moral values on
others may very well have been a sufficient motivation.
71. See, e.g., Baker, Conditional Federal Spending, supra note 16, at 1939-51; Baker,
Spending Power, supra note 61, at 199-217.
72. For a more extensive discussion of this argument, see Baker, Conditional Federal
Spending, supra note 16, at 1939-51; Baker, Spending Power, supranote 61, at 212-17.
73. See Baker, ConditionalFederalSpending, supra note 16, at 1943-45, 1978-87.
74. Admittedly, the majority states that engineered this conditional offer could conceivably
lose in yet another way. If the majority norm confers upon the states that adhere to it a
competitive advantage relative to the minority in the competition for individual and corporate
residents and their tax dollars, and if the conditional funding offer causes the minority states to
adopt the majority norm, then the majority states will have lost their preexisting competitive
advantage. Presumably, then, states would employ the conditional offer strategy only when they
expect either that minority states would not comply with the condition or that compliance by the
minority would not undermine a competitive advantage enjoyed by the majority.
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wishes to discourage homosexual relationships. A solid majority of the citizens in each
of these states may share this preference and support state laws making clear that gay
partners are not entitled to family benefits, that gay couples cannot adopt children, and
the like. Nonetheless, the leaders of these states may know that many private
companies are more progressive on these issues, and that the minority states that refuse
to enact such laws will have an advantage in attracting corporate facilities to their
state. The states in the majority may thus seek to enact their antihomosexual social
preferences at the federal level, and a condition on federal funds offered the states may
be the path of least resistance. The primary goal here, unlike in the first scenario
discussed above, need not be the imposition of the majority states' moral code on the
remaining states, nor the preservation by the majority states' citizens of their view of
sexual morality against the efforts of a politically powerful minority to undermine it.
Although the federal legislation that the majority states seek may have these effects,
the states' primary motivation is to "level the playing field." Such antihomosexual
federal legislation will restrict the competition for residents and tax dollars that would
otherwise exist among the states on this issue, and will divest the minority states of any
competitive gains afforded by their preference not to enact similar antihomosexual
legislation at the state level."
The net result of conditional federal spending legislation in each of the scenarios
discussed above is a reduction in the diversity among the fifty states in the package of
taxes and services, including constitutional rights and other laws, that each offers its
residents and potential residents.76 Some individuals (and corporations) may no longer
find any state that provides a package (including the permissibility of polygamy, a
minimum drinking age of eighteen, or the availability of various family benefits for
homosexual partners) that suits their preferences, while other individuals and
corporations may confront a surfeit of states offering a package (including prohibitions
on polygamy, a minimum drinking age of twenty-one, and laws restricting various
family benefits to married couples of different genders) that they find attractive. In
many instances, this reduced diversity is likely to mean a decrease in aggregate social
welfare, since the loss in welfare to those with the minority preference is unlikely to
yield a comparable gain in welfare for those who oppose that preference.77

75. See Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory ofLocal Expenditures, 64 J.POL. ECON. 416
(1956). For commentary on Tiebout's classic model, see, for example, CLAYTON P. GILLETTE &
LYNN A. BAKER, LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 384-385 (2d ed. 1999);
Vicki Been, "Exit" as a Constraint on Land Use Exactions: Rethinking the Unconstitutional
Conditions Doctrine, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 473, 506-14 (1991) (offering critique and collecting
sources); Gerald E. Frug, City Services, 73 N.Y.U. L. REv. 23, 25-34 (1998) (offering critique of
"theory of public goods" including Tiebout's article).
76. One caveat though. As Evan Caminker reminded us, an exercise of federal spending
power could, in theory, be diversity-protecting if it conditions funds on a state's lifting diversitysquelching restrictions that the state would otherwise impose on local autonomy. For example, it
Would seemingly foster diversity at the local level were Congress to condition funds to the states
on each state's not preventing local governments from deciding for themselves the reach of
antidiscrimination laws. This is an important observation. See also Edward L. Rubin &Malcolm
Feeley, Federalism: Some Notes on a National Neurosis, 41 UCLA L. REV. 903, 919 (1994).
But federal conditions of this sort are sufficiently rare that their hypothetical existence should
not be taken to overshadow the arguments we make above.
77. That is, the mere existence of the last remaining state in which polygamy is legal, the
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Even if one is persuaded that inter-state diversity increases aggregate social welfare,
one might still doubt that judicial review is necessary to secure that benefit. That is, the
fact that the Dole doctrine permits potentially homogenizing use of the conditional
spending power may not be enough to indict that bit of judicial doctrine. "Political
safeguards" proponents such as Herbert Wechsler 78 and Larry Kramer 79 have argued
that state autonomy (and, therefore, inter-state diversity) is adequately protected by
various aspects of the federal political process and that judicial review-under Dole of
any other doctrine-is therefore not necessary to secure these benefits. As one of us
has shown at length elsewhere, however, such arguments are especially unpersuasive
when the concern is "horizontal" impositions on state autonomy of the sort described
above.80 Indeed, the particular safeguards identified by Wechsler and Kramer-the

minimum drinking age is eighteen, or homosexual couples are eligible for family benefits seems
likely to yield aggregate benefits for individuals with those (minority) preferences that are far
greater than the aggregate benefits that individuals with the opposing, majority preferences
would realize if there were fifty rather than forty-nine states with laws consistent with those
majority preferences. Indeed, for a gay couple, the last remaining state in which same-sex
couples are eligible for family benefits may well have a value beyond measure. Of course, the
precise measure and calculation of the actual welfare gains and losses in any of these situations
is not currently possible, so the above claim seems unlikely to progress any time soon beyond
the status of an open empirical question and a theoretical likelihood. See Baker, Conditional
FederalSpending, supranote 16, at 1970-71 & n.279.
78. See Herbert Wechsler, The PoliticalSafeguardsof Federalism:The Role of the States in
the Composition andSelection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543 (1954).
79. See Larry D. Kramer, Putting the Politics Back into the Political Safeguards of
Federalism, 100 COLUM. L. REv. 215 (2000).

80. In previous work, one of us has found it useful to distinguish between two different
potential threats to state autonomy that often are conflated in the federalism debate. One sort of
threat, termed "vertical" aggrandizement, involves efforts by the federal government to increase
its own power at the expense of the states. Such aggrandizement may occur, for example, when
the federal government takes over regulatory functions traditionally exercised by the states,
preempts sources of state revenue, or imposes regulatory burdens on state governments. The
substantive preferences of the states in these situations are irrelevant to the issue of vertical
encroachment. The defining characteristic is that the impetus for the expansion of federal power
comes from the federal government or from interest groups operating at the federal level, and not
from state governmental institutions or geographically based interests primarily concentrated at
the state level.
The focus of "horizontal" aggrandizement, in contrast, is precisely on the differences among
the states in their substantive policy preferences. Here the federal political process threatens state
autonomy insofar as that process is the means by which a majority of states may impose their
own policy preferences on a minority of states with different preferences. Horizontal
aggrandizement is typically overlooked in contemporary debates about federalism, but it raises a
distinct and potentially more serious criticism of the efficacy of political safeguards than
traditional critiques focusing exclusively on vertical issues.
For further discussion of this distinction, see Baker & Young, supra note 61, at 107-28;
Baker, PoliticalSafeguards,supranote 61, at 955-56. For an early discussion of the importance
of horizontal threats to state autonomy, see Baker, ConditionalFederalSpending,supra note 16,
at 1940 (demonstrating that conditional federal spending unfettered by the Constitution's
constraints is problematic because it allows "some states to harness the federal lawmaking power
to oppress other states").
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Senate and political parties, respectively-ironically are both more likely to threaten
than to protect state autonomy.8 '
Contrary to Wechsler's claims, the state-based allocation of representation in the
federal lawmaking process facilitates, rather than impedes, federal homogenization of
divergent policy preferences. Although the state-based structure of representation
facilitates congressional responsiveness to state-based interests and preferences, the
majoritarian nature of that process ultimately permits a simple majority of states to
impose its will on the minority. It is particularly ironic in this regard that it is the
Senate, celebrated by Wechsler as the preeminent safeguard of federalism,8 2 that
presents the greatest horizontal threat to state autonomy. Because the Senate affords
small population states disproportionately greater representation relative to their shares
of the nation's population, it ensures small population states a disproportionately large
slice, and large population states a disproportionately small slice, of the federal fiscal
and regulatory "pie., 8 3 This systematic wealth redistribution obviously disadvantages
the states that are burdened by, rather than beneficiaries of, this redistribution. In the
absence of such redistribution, the burdened states would effectively have greater

resources and, therefore, greater freedom of choice.8

An examination of the primary political safeguards Larry Kramer identifies-the
political parties-reveals that they fare no better than Wechsler's candidates as
bulwarks against federal homogenization. 5 Under Kramer's view, the modem political
party "link[s] the fortunes ofofficeholders at different levels" of government, fostering
"a mutual dependency that induce[s] federal lawmakers to defer to the desires of state
officials and state parties. 8 6 Although parties may therefore (sometimes) "guarantee
state official an influential voice in the [federal] lawmaking and budgetary
processes,,87 this seems likely to facilitate, rather than deter, the use of the federal

lawmaking process by some states as a means of imposing their majoritarian policy
preferences on the minority.
Kramer's own description of the modem political party gives potential outlier states
little reason to view political parties as safeguards against federal homogenizing

81. See Baker, Political Safeguards, supra note 61.
82. Wechsler, supra note 78, at 548 (observing that "the Senate cannot fail to function as the
guardian of state interests as such," and that "the composition of the Senate is intrinsically
calculated to prevent intrusion from the center on subjects that dominant state interests wish
preserved for state control").
83. Baker, Spending Power, supra note 61, at 199-211; Baker & Dinkin, supra note 61, at
24-42.
84. Baker, Spending Power, supra note 61, at 199.
85. Although Kramer acknowledges that "the parties' effectiveness in safeguarding state
government may have been compromised to some degree by twentieth-century developments,"
he contends that "these same developments have yielded new "political" safeguards that assure
and in some respects may even strengthen the states' voice in national politics." Kramer, supra
note 79, at 283. The primary such safeguard that Kramer identifies is the existence of
interlocking state and federal bureaucracies. Id. at 283-85. For a brief critique of the
effectiveness of this additional, "new" safeguard, see Baker & Young, supra note 61, at 117
n.197.
86. Kramer, supra note 79, at 278; see also Larry Kramer, UnderstandingFederalism,47
VAND. L. REv. 1485, 1523 (1994).
87. Kramer, supranote 79, at 284.
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legislation. According to Kramer, the parties' two "critical features" that have shaped
their role in American federalism are: (1) the fact that they "are not especially
programmatic," being "more concerned with getting people elected than with getting
them elected for any specific purpose;, 88 and (2) the fact that they are "basically noncentralized" with their "most conspicuous features [being] flabby organization and
slack discipline."8 9 Taken together, these features suggest that political parties have
neither the interest nor the ability to protect a90 minority state in Congress against
majoritarian encroachments on its sovereignty.
In the end, the issue is not whether the federal political process taken alone is likely
to afford some protections for state autonomy. It almost certainly does. 91 The issue
rather is whether judicial review is necessary to maintain and reinforce these political
safeguards. We contend that substantive judicial review of federalism issues, including
conditional federal spending, is necessary both to remind Congress of its own
obligation to restrain itself, and to catch any instances of federal overreaching that slip
through the system's political and procedural checks.
2. An Objection Considered
The discussion thus far should not be read to suggest that we believe that increased
diversity among the states, even within the realm of what is constitutionally permitted,
is always a good thing. We acknowledge that federal homogenizing legislation may
sometimes increase aggregate social welfare by impeding welfare-reducing interstate
races to the bottom, 92 or by reducing the costs that disuniformities may impose on

88. Id.
at 278-79; Kramer, supra note 86, at 1524.
89. Kramer, supranote 79, at 279; Kramer, supra note 86, at 1527.
90. For an extended critique of Kramer's arguments, see Baker, PoliticalSafeguards, supra
note 61.
91. See id. at 972; see also Bradford R. Clark, Separation of Powers as a Safeguard of
Federalism, 79 TEX. L. REV. 1321 (2001); Ernest A. Young, Federal Courts: Constitutional
Avoidance, ResistanceNorms, and the PreservationofJudicialReview, 78 TEX. L. REV. 1549,
1609 (2000) ("[T]he ultimate political safeguard may be the procedural gauntlet that any
legislative proposal must run and the concomitant difficulty of overcoming legislative inertia.").
92. The most obvious examples are laws concerning environmental regulation and poverty
relief. See, e.g., WILLIAM J. BAUMOL & WALLACE E. OATES, ECONOMICS, ENVIRONMENTAL
POLICY, AND THE QUALITY OF LIFE 75-79 (1979) (giving a classic depiction of environmental
pollution as an uninternalized externality); PAUL E.PETERSON, THE PRICE OF FEDERALISM 121-

24 (1995) (arguing that devolution of welfare responsibility to the states induces a "race to the
bottom" because of interstate competition to avoid becoming a "welfare magnet"); Sherryl D.
Cashin, Federalism, Welfare Reform, and the Minority Poor: Accountingfor the Tyranny of
State Majorities, 99 COLUM. L. REv. 552, 552 (1999) (arguing for "a more aggressive
framework of national [welfare] standards or incentives that would insulate the disadvantaged
poor from the tyranny of the advantaged majority") (alteration added). See also Baker,
ConditionalFederal Spending, supra note 16, at 1951-52 n. 186 (discussing "race to the
bottom" in various contexts); Richard L. Revesz, RehabilitatingInterstate Competition:
Rethinking the "Race-to-the-Bottom" Rationale for Federal Environmental Regulation, 67
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1210, 1210-11 (1992) (footnotes omitted) (observing that "the race to the
bottom has been invoked as an overarching reason to vest regulation that imposes costs on
mobile capital at the federal rather than the state level, and has been cited as one of the bases for
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corporations and individuals seeking to act in more than one state.93 But partisans of
Dole, and of expansive federal power more generally, often seem to be driven by a
different sort of objection. Sometimes this objection takes the form of a claim that
there are "right answers" to questions of social policy, which makes inter-state
diversity of questionable value. 94 Other times it takes the form of an argument that
Congress is more likely than the states to enact "good" social policies, ceteris
paribus.95 Underlying both claims, however, is a core belief: Even if interstate
diversity is more likely to maximize the satisfaction of individual preferences, and is
thereby more likely to maximize aggregate social welfare, than is a homogenization of
policies dictated or encouraged by Congress, permitting Congress to press states to
adopt certain policies is more likely to result in policies that are more just or otherwise
preferable as a matter of political morality. We find this defense of Dole unpersuasive
for three reasons.
First, it is not clear that this contention is cognizable from a perspective internal to
American constitutional law. Our nation has enshrined certain policy choices in the
United States Constitution, thereby declaring these to be consensus "right answers" on
the relevant social issues. These "right answers" have a unique political legitimacy and
morality within our constitutional system. State laws that violate no federal
constitutional provision but which nonetheless express a moral preference that some
find reprehensible-for example, laws making the death penalty available, 96 providing
free abortions to indigent women, 97 or providing legal recognition of same-sex
marriages or "domestic partnerships" 98 -denote areas of significant moral

[federal environmental statutes and for] the New Deal.") (alteration added).
93. The costs imposed by such disuniformities are among the arguments frequently made in
favor of the federal reform of tort law. See, e.g., Gary T. Schwartz, Consideringthe Proper
FederalRole in American Tort Law, 38 ARIz. L. REv. 917 (1996).
94. For more extensive discussion of this claim, see Baker & Young, supranote 61, at 13357, and sources discussed therein.
95. See, e.g., Rubin & Feeley, supra note 76, at 935 (contending, interalia,that "the United
States is a single, functioning nation, and that it generally defines good policy through a national
decision-making process"); see also Baker & Young, supra note 61, at 133-57 (discussing this
claim), and sources cited therein.
96. See, e.g., TRACY L. SNELL, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 1999, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS
BULL. (U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE), Dec. 2000, at 3 tbl. I (listing capital offenses, if any, by state).
97. See, e.g.,
Right to Choose v. Byme, 450 A.2d 925, 935, 938 (N.J. 1982) (under New
Jersey law, state must provide funds for all medically necessary abortions) (interpreting N.J.
Stat. Ann. § 30:4D-6.1 (West 1997)); see also Doe v. Maher, 515 A.2d 134, 143-45 (Conn.
Super. Ct. 1986) (same result under Connecticut law) (interpreting Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 17134b (renumbered as § 17b-261), and holding invalid regulation limiting funding to those
abortions necessary to save the life of the mother). See also Lina M. Vanzi, Freedom at Home:
State Constitutionsand MedicaidFundingforAbortions, 26 N.M. L. REv. 433, 441-45 (1996)
(discussing state constitutional challenges to state statutes restricting public funding for
abortions).
98. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15 § 1202 (Supp. 2000) (authorizing establishment of a "civil union"
by individuals who are "of the same sex and therefore excluded from the marriage laws of this
state" and who meet various other criteria); see also Carol Ness, Couples Flock to Vermont,
Only Legal Placeto Get Hitched: Vermont Gays' State of the Union, S.F. EXAMINER, Aug. 7,
2000, at A1,availableat2000 WL 6166744 (observing that of the first 263 couples whose civil
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disagreement within our society. These are issues on which we, as a nation, have not
yet reached a consensus. They are therefore precisely the areas in which interstate
diversity is most valuable and federal homogenization through conditional federal
spending will therefore most greatly reduce aggregate social welfare. 99
Should our society reach a substantial consensus that interstate diversity in some
area is no longer acceptable, concerned individuals and groups may seek to formally
amend the United States Constitution to prohibit the practice(s) agreed to be immoral.
Although the amendment process is concededly difficult, '00 history does offer several
examples of our willingness and ability to amend the Constitution to reflect such shifts
in our moral sensibilities: the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments'
prohibitions against slavery and race-based and other discrimination;' 0 ' the Eighteenth
and Twenty-First Amendments' imposition and repeal, respectively, of prohibition; 02
and the Nineteenth and Twenty-Sixth Amendments' extension of voting
rights to
03
women and to all citizens eighteen years of age or older, respectively. 1
Second, even insofar as the Constitution, as amended and properly interpreted,
permits policies that are suboptimal on some plausible, even persuasive, account of
political morality, advocates of national power often give too little weight to the value
of self-governance by state political communities. A state's freedom from federal
interference, like an individual's freedom from governmental restrictions on expression
or private choices, is a freedom to make choices, not just a freedom to choose
wisely. 1' 4 That is, federalism, including judicially enforced limits on Congress's

unions had been registered with the Vermont Vital Records Office, eighty-four were from
Vermont and 179 were from other states).
99. Some nationalists, most notably Ed Rubin and Malcolm Feeley, do seem to understand
this point. See, e.g., Rubin & Feeley, supra note 76, at 912 (contending that "the point of
federalism... is to allow normative disagreement amongst the subordinate [governmental] units
so that different units can subscribe to different value systems.").
100. For recognition of occasions on which the Constitution has proven surprisingly difficult
to amend, see Baker, ConditionalFederalSpending, supranote 16, at 1950 n. 182 (describing
failure to adopt Equal Rights Amendment even though from 1972 to 1982 "a majority of
Americans consistently told interviewers that they favored this amendment to the Constitution,"
quoting JANE J. MANSBRIDGE, WHY WE LOST THE ERA 1 (1986)). See also Lynn A. Baker,
Constitutional Change and Direct Democracy, 66 U. COLO. L. REv. 143, 152-53 (1995)

(discussing difficulties posed by supermajority requirement for constitutional amendments).
101. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § I (prohibiting slavery; adopted 1865); id. amend. XIV, § 1
(guaranteeing all persons due process and equal protection of the laws; adopted 1868); id.
amend. XV, § 1 (prohibiting race-based discrimination in voting rights; adopted 1870).
102. Id. amend. XVIi, § I (prohibiting the manufacture, sale, or transportation of
intoxicating liquors within the United States; adopted 1919); id. amend. XXI, §§ 1-2 (repealing
the Eighteenth Amendment; adopted 1933).
103. Id. amend. XIX, § 1 (prohibiting gender-based discrimination in voting rights; adopted
1920); id. amend. XXVI, § I (guaranteeing the right to vote to all citizens eighteen years of age
or older; adopted 1971).
104. Federalism, however, has generally been deplored for the ends to which certain groups
in our history have sought to use state autonomy-specifically, as a sanctuary for slavery and
segregation. This identification of federalism's intrinsic value with the ends to which it has
sometimes been employed is particularly noteworthy in light of the enthusiasm with which
liberals are willing to embrace guarantees of many individual rights, notwithstanding the fact
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spending power, seeks to create a space within which a subnational political
community can make choices about how to govern itself without interference from the
national government. This is out of respect not for the autonomy or dignity of states
qua states, but for the capacity of communities at a subnational level to exercise
political self-governance. Indeed, in this respect, civic republican values are in keeping
with the liberal political tradition, which has not normally equated the appeal of liberty
with the normative appeal of what the individual chooses to use it for. Instead,
contemporary liberalism distinguishes "between the 'right' and the 'good'-between a
framework of basic rights and liberties, and the conceptions of the good that people
may choose to pursue within the framework."l 0 5 Just as, say, freedom of speech does
not prescribe what the individual shall do within this protected sphere of liberty, so too
federalism does not dictate that a state political community make any particular
substantive choice within the range of options permitted it.
Finally, even putting aside the value of choice to subnational political communities
and individuals, and focusing solely on the political morality of policy outcomes, we
think that partisans of Dole are at once unduly pessimistic about state policies and
overly sanguine about national ones. There have always been areas of social policy in
which certain states have been more "progressive," more "liberal," than the federal
government, and those areas are particularly marked today. For example, many states
currently provide constitutional and statutory protection against various forms of
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation, while federal law does not.' 0 6 Other

that those rights will often protect individuals and activities that they consider unattractive, even
evil. In areas such as the freedom of expression guaranteed by the First Amendment, or the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendment rights of due process, liberals have long been eager to defend their
enemies' rights in the name of a higher principle of broad applicability. Most famously, in 1977,
the "liberal" American Civil Liberties Union ("ACLU") defended the rights of uniformed neoNazis to march in Skokie, Illinois, a city with a large Jewish population, including many
Holocaust survivors. See, e.g., Martin Finucane, A CL U to Represent Group thatAdvocates Sex
Between Men and Boys, AP NEWSWIRE, Aug. 31, 2000, available at 2000 WL 25992549
(observing that the "ACLU has long accepted unpopular clients and despised causes, including
Ku Klux Klansmen and neo-Nazis. In 1977, the ACLU defended the right of Nazis to march in
Skokie, Illinois-home to many Holocaust survivors. Thousands of ACLU members quit and
contributions plunged."). For further elaboration on this point, see Baker, Should LiberalsFear
Federalism?,supra note 61, at 442-49; Baker & Young, supranote 61, at 133-62.
105. Michael Sandel, Introduction to LIBERALISM AND ITS CRITICS 3 (Michael Sandel ed.,
1984).
106. CompareCONN. GEN. STAT. § 46a-81e (1995) (prohibiting discrimination on the basis
of sexual orientation) and HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. § 368-1 (Michie 1999) (same) with 42 U.S.C.
§ 3604 (1994) (prohibiting housing discrimination only on the basis of "race, color, religion, sex,
familial status, or national origin"-the reference to "familial status" referring not to sexual
orientation but to "one or more individuals (who have not attained the age of 19 years) being
domiciled with (1) a parent or another person having legal custody of such individual or
individuals; or (2) the designee of such parent or other person having such custody." Id. at §
3602(k)). Compare CAL. LAB. CODE § 1102.1 (West 1989 & Supp. 2001) (prohibiting
employment discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation) and HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. §
368-1 (Michie 1999)(same) with 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1988) (prohibiting employment
discrimination only on the basis of "race, color, religion, sex, or national origin") and29 U.S.C.
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areas in which some states have been more "progressive" than the federal government
include: the right to use marijuana for medical purposes,107 welfare rights,10 8 and
freedom of expression.'°9 By ignoring the benefits of federalism, nationalists increase
the risk that each of these areas of state law will fall victim to federal homogenization
by a less "progressive" Congress, whether through conditional federal spending,
preemption, or direct regulation.
At the same time that they undervalue interstate diversity, contemporary advocates
of strong national power seem to us to be overly sanguine about the normative
attractiveness of the policies that Congress is likely to promote with its spending
conditions. The view of the federal government as the inevitable purveyor and
protector of "good" social policies is an especially easy one for today's liberals to hold
because of the Democratic Party's dominance of Congress from 1955 to 1995. The
Democrats had a majority of the House for that entire period, and had a majority of the
Senate for all but six of those years." 0 Although the November 1994 election yielded a
Republican majority in the House that exists to this day,"'1 and a Republican majority
in the Senate that has existed for all but the period from May 2001 (Jim Jeffords'
defection) ' 12 through the November 2002 elections," 13 liberals may view the past seven

§ 623 (1994) (prohibiting employment discrimination on the basis of age).
107. Since 1996, Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Maine, Nevada, Oregon,
Washington, and Washington, D.C., have adopted laws legalizing the medical use of marijuana.
See Law, supranote 60, at 417 n.307. Compare CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.5 (West
Supp. 2002) (creating exception to California laws prohibiting possession and cultivation of
marijuana for seriously ill persons who use it for medical purposes), and ME. REV. STAT. ANN.
tit. 22 § 2383-B (West Supp. 2001) (making lawful the possession of marijuana for medical use
by individuals with certain serious diseases), with 21 U.S.C. §§ 801-863 (1994) (prohibiting
manufacture and distribution of various drugs, including marijuana), and United States v.
Oakland Cannabis Buyers' Coop., 532 U.S. 483, 486 (2001) (holding there to be no "medical
necessity exception" to the Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 801-971 (1994)).
108. See, e.g., N.Y. CONST. art. XVII, § I (providing that "[tihe aid, care and support of the
needy are public concerns and shall be provided by the state and by such of its subdivisions, and
in such manner and by such means, as the legislature may from time to time determine"); see
also Helen Hershkoff, Welfare Devolutionand State Constitutions,67 FORDHAM L. REV. 1403
(1999) (discussing history and judicial interpretation of Article XVII).
109. See, e.g., New Jersey Coalition Against War in the Middle East v. J.M.B. Realty Corp.,
650 A.2d 757, 760 (N.J. 1994) (stating that Article I of New Jersey Constitution confers on
"citizens an affirmative right of free speech that [is] protected not only from governmental
restraint-the extent of First Amendment protection-but from the restraint of private property
owners as well").
110. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, HISTORICAL STATISTICS OF THE
UNITED STATES, COLONIAL TIMES TO 1970, pt. 2, at Y204-10 (1975) [hereinafter HISTORICAL
STATISTICS] (1955-1970 statistics); BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE,
STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES, 2000, at 281 tbl. 460 (120th ed. 2000)
[hereinafter STATISTICAL ABSTRACT] (1971-1999 statistics). The Republican Party had a
majority in the Senate from 1981-1987. Id.
11. STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 110 at 281 tbl. 460. See also, Editorial, Protest
Vote: An Angry Electorate Hands the Republicans a Landslide, PITTSBURGH POST-GAZETTE,

Nov. 10, 1994, at C2, availableat 1994 WL 9663339.
112. See Katharine Q. Seelye with Adam Clymer, Balance of Power: The Power Shift;
Senate Republicans Step Out and Democrats Jump In, N.Y. TIMES, May 25, 2001, at Al
(observing that Jefford's departure from the Republican Party to become an independent "tips
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years as nothing more than an unfortunate (and surely short lived) aberration. Because
recent events are more salient than those of long ago, it may be easy for liberals to
forget that the Republican Party, too, has4 had periods when it has controlled both

houses of Congress for several decades."t
Given the unpredictability of national elections over the long-term, the rational and
risk-averse position, even for those who believe there are "right answers" to important
questions of social policy, is to favor states' rights and judicially enforced limits on
Congress's spending power. If some measure of state autonomy exists, liberals and
conservatives alike can expect there to be at least one state with laws that will reflect
one's own views on certain social issues, even when both houses of Congress are
controlled by the party one opposes. Liberals, however, rarely seem to appreciate that
judicial enforcement of states' rights provides them this long-term benefit.
If all this is right, then Dole should strike its present-day supporters (who we
assume are disproportionately liberal nationalists) as bad constitutional doctrine
because it enables Congress to use the carrot of federal funds to induce states to adopt
a raft of policies likely to be favored by conservative Republicans and hated by liberal

Democrats. Consider, for example, the following conditional spending schemes: (1)
Congress conditions grants for state law enforcement on a state's enactment of rightto-carry laws and on enactment, and enforcement, of the death penalty; (2) Congress
conditions Head Start funds on a state's prohibiting affirmative action even by private
educational institutions; and (3) Congress conditions a package of funds designed to
promote child welfare (perhaps in health and education) on a state's prohibiting
homosexual couples from adopting.
Each of these statutes would very likely pass muster under Dole. The general
welfare, clear statement, and independent constitutional bar prongs would be satisfied
with ease. So long, then, as the magnitude of funds at stake is not so great as to pass
the point at which pressure becomes compulsion, all comes down to relatedness. And
Congress can make a strong argument that, in each case, the condition is related to the
expenditure: in hypothetical (1), the expenditures and the condition each serve a
purpose in reducing crime; the expenditures and condition in (2) each serve an interest
in promoting equal educational opportunity; and, the expenditures and the condition in
(3) each promote the well being of children. To be sure, the premises upon which these

the fragile 50-50 power balance in the Senate to a 50-49 Democratic edge"); see also
STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note I 10, at 281 tbl. 460.
113. See Alan Fram, Senate passes jobless-pay bill; The House was due to act today on the
measure; About 750,000 people are facing an end to the aid, PHIL. INQUIRER, Jan. 8, 2003 at A3
("The fall elections turned a narrow Democratic edge in the Senate into a 51-48-1 GOP majority,
giving Republicans the control they lost when Sen. James Jeffords of Vermont left the GOP to
become an independent in 2001.").
114. HISTORICAL STATISTICS, supranote 110, at Y204-10. See also Adam Clymer, Theorists
Look at '94 Voting: Was It Major or Minor Trend?, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 4, 1995, at 8 (noting that

Republican victory of 1894 ushered in a third of a century of Republican congressional
dominance); Michael Wines, Donkey Drop;Bradley'sExit Is Not Justthe Democrats'Problem,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 20, 1995, § 4, at I ("Republicans had ruled politics for 30 years, and

Democrats were a husk of a party, too feeble even to repudiate the Ku Klux Klan, only eight
years before Franklin D. Roosevelt founded a political dynasty in 1932.").
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arguments of relatedness rely are, to say the least, contestable. But the Court is likely
to defer to Congress's assessment.
The judicial enforcement of states' rights, including judicially enforced limits on
Congress's spending power, would at least sometimes require congressional supporters
of homogenization in these areas to secure a federal constitutional amendment to that
effect. For an outlier state (such as Vermont in the case of same-sex civil unions, 15 or
Massachusetts in the case of the death penalty' 16), the advantage of that requirement is
clear: It will usually be easier to assemble the coalition of thirteen states necessary to
block an amendment to the United States Constitution" 17 than to garner the simple
majority in either the House or Senate necessary to block a congressional enactment.
B. Conceptual Infirmities
The examples of possible federal legislation discussed at the end of the previous
section are designed, of course, to provoke the reader's intuition that Congress should
have less power to achieve substantive ends than Dole permits. Admittedly though, we
are not optimistic that this brief discussion will have changed the minds of many not
already persuaded. After all, one could reasonably object on policy grounds to any of
the statutes we have hypothesized without believing that the objectionable legislation
would exceed Congress's appropriately broad constitutional authority.
That the unwisdom of a congressional action does not entail its
unconstitutionality" 8 is no doubt true. Nonetheless, there are good reasons of
constitutional method to be suspicious of the particular shape that contemporary
conditional spending doctrine takes, even if you believe that Congress does enjoy
constitutional power to achieve a state of affairs, say, in which, nationwide, affirmative
action is abandoned, concealed weapons are permitted, homosexuals are barred from
adopting children, and capital punishment is everywhere imposed. That is, even if the
Constitution is best interpreted to confer upon Congress sufficient power to set national
policy on matters such as these, Dole is the wrong way to effectuate that authority.
At least three reasons to doubt Dole's soundness, each independent of the
substantive results that the test would seem to permit, stand out. First, Dole coheres
poorly with the body of current federalism doctrine. As everyone knows, the
Hamiltonian conception of the spending power provides Congress a means to achieve
ends that it could not achieve through other means. That is not by itself conceptually
problematic: laws, like other types of norms commonly proscribe particular means to
desired objectives without condemning the objectives themselves. For example, our
culture allows individuals to seek to amass great personal wealth, while prohibiting

115. See Ness, supra note 98, at AI (observing that July 1, 2000 "was the date when
Vermont became the first and only state to give legal status to gay and lesbian couples").
116. See, e.g., SNELL, supra note 96, at 3 tbl. 1 (listing capital offenses, if any, by state).
117. Article V of the U.S. Constitution tequires the consent of two-thirds of both houses of
Congress to propose amendments, and the subsequent consent, by the legislature or by a
convention, of three-fourths of the states for ratification. An amendment also can be proposed by
a national convention called by Congress pursuant to "the Application" of the legislatures of
two-thirds of the states. U.S. CONST. art. V.
118. This is plainly one of the Supreme Court's most oft-referenced principles. For a
randomly selected example see Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 728-30 (1963).
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only certain paths to that goal. But to police means rather than ends presupposes that
the means permitted will differ from the means prohibited on grounds that matter. To
allow Congress to achieve a given end, x, by means of conditional spending but not by
the means, say, of direct regulation or of commandeering can make sense, then, only if
the former means better serves ends that the Constitution can be reasonably understood
to care about: ends such as promoting human liberty, welfare, dignity, or the like. We
will seek to demonstrate, however, that, over a nontrivial range of cases, Dole's way of
operationalizing the Hamiltonian conception of the spending power produces a state of
affairs in which the permitted route (spending) is not functionally superior to those
regulatory routes that the Court's interpretation of such other constitutional provisions
such as the Commerce Clause and the Tenth and Eleventh Amendments rules off

limits.,,9
If this is true, then two possibilities suggest themselves: either Dole itself is wrong,
or the Court has been wrong in foreclosing those other means that prove functionally
equivalent to the Dole-sanctioned use ofthe spending power. But while many critics of
the Rehnquist Court's recent federalism decisions will be attracted to the latter
possibility, this line of argument is hard to sustain. For the internal tension that arises
between Dole and other aspects of the Court's federalism jurisprudence does not
depend upon the narrow particularities of recent innovations by the Rehnquist Court.
To the contrary, Dole allows extensive circumvention of whatever limitations exist on
other congressional powers. Thus, while it is true that the practicalsignificanceof this
circumventionist potential increases as the fetters imposed on other congressional
powers are drawn tighter, it is thefact of federalism-based limitations on congressional
power, and not their precise content, that renders Dole anomalous. This anomaly,
therefore, is one conceptual strike against the Dole test.
But if Dole fits uncomfortably within one body of law within which it is situatedthat body whose subject matter is described by federalism-it fits just as
uncomfortably within a second body of law-that body whose structureis defined by
the unconstitutional conditions problem. The unconstitutional conditions problem is
said to arise whenever government conditions a benefit on the offeree's waiver of a
constitutional right.120 Familiar instances involve abortion funding,' 21 land use
exactions, 122 conditions on public employment, 23 plea bargaining,' 24 and so on. The
conditional spending problem is just another example of this phenomenon, for it
involves the federal government's conditioning the benefit of federal funds on an
offeree state's waiver of one of its sovereign prerogatives (such as the prerogative to
set whatever minimum drinking age it prefers). This is well known. And, equally well
known is that Dole does not so much as nod to this fact. 125 That is, Dole proceeds as

119. See infra Part IV.
120. See, e.g., Kathleen M. Sullivan, UnconstitutionalConditions, 102 HARv. L. REv. 1413,
1421 (1989).

121. See, e.g., Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991); Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492
U.S. 490 (1989); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977).
122. Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994); Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S.
825 (1987).
123. See, e.g., United States v. Nat'l Treasury Employees Union, 513 U.S. 454 (1995).
124. See, e.g., Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357 (1978).
125. See, e.g., Thomas R. McCoy & Barry Friedman, ConditionalSpending: Federalism's
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though the Court's own resolution of other unconstitutional conditions cases has
absolutely no bearing on the conditional spending problem.
This is worrisome, for there is reason to expect that some of the same general
principles or considerations will prove at least relevant in helping to resolve cases that
share the structure ofthe unconstitutional conditions problem, even if those cases arise
in distinct doctrinal contexts.' 26 Surely the possibility cannot sensibly be dismissed out
of hand. That Dole wholly fails to inquire into such principles-and, as we explain
later, 127 adopts standards entirely at odds with those that appear to underlie other
manifestations of the unconstitutional conditions problem--constitutes additional
reason to doubt that Dole gets things right.
In these two respects, the particular shape of the Dole test is troubling when viewed
with an eye toward the overall coherence or topology of constitutional doctrine. But,
Dole does not any better even when viewed entirely on its own terms-when assessed,
that is, not as a component within a vast and complex web of constitutional law but as
though in a doctrinal vacuum. This third problem, very simply, is that Dole relies on
concepts-most notably "coercion" or "compulsion"-that are, at best, ill-suited for

judicial administration and, at worst, incoherent. 28 For all these reasons, even if Dole
does not grant Congress too much power absolutely (as we believe it does), it remains
doubtful that the particular way in which this doctrine allows Congress effectively to

set national policy is defensible. It should be reformed.
III. SHORT-TERM PROSPECTS
The criticisms of Dole presented in Part II above are not wholly new. We and many
others have scrutinized and criticized Dole at length en route to proposing alternatives
to its seemingly toothless and largely problematic test. Despite Dole's many and
obvious weaknesses, however, there is reason to fear that its short-term prospects are
good, barring the departure of Chief Justice Rehnquist or one of the current
"Nationalist Four." None of the nationalist justices presumably is willing to narrow
congressional power nor, therefore, to add bite to the Dole doctrine. And Chief Justice
Rehnquist, normally a defender of states' rights, may also not be eager to abandon

Dole, given pride of authorship and his attraction to the "greater includes the lesser"
argument at the center of Dole.12 9 For these reasons, most academic commentators

Trojan Horse, 1988 SuP. CT. REv. 85, 87.
126. This is a fairly weak assumption. It does not depend upon the far more controversial
supposition that unconstitutional conditions cases can be resolved solely by application of
general principles without regard for context-specific considerations.
127. See infra Part V.C.4.
128. Cf Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854-55 (1992) (explaining that a prior
case should be overruled if, among other things, it proves "unworkable").
129. For a discussion of Rehnquist's attraction to the greater-includes-the-lesser reasoning,
see, for example, Baker, ConditionalFederalSpending, supra note 16, at 1914-15; Lynn A.
Baker, The Majority Opinion in Romer v. Evans, 68 U. CoLo. L. REv. 387, 390-91 (1997).
Nonetheless, Rehnquist's largely unnoticed conversion in commercial speech cases suggests
that his commitment to the greater/lesser may be weaker than is commonly supposed. One of
Rehnquist's most notorious applications of the principle that the greater power includes the
lesser came a year before Dole in Posadasde PuertoRico Assocs. v. Tourism Co., 478 U.S. 328
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0
have speculated that Dole is secure.13
We agree that the Court is unlikely to change or abandon Dole in the near future.
The spending statute now winding its way though the courts that many Court watchers view
as resting on the most shaky constitutional footing' 31 is the institutionalized persons
section of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000
("RLUIPA").132 We analyze RLUIPA in Part llI.B, concluding that the Court is not
likely to exploit the RLUIPA litigation as an opportunity to change its spending
33
doctrine regardless of whether it upholds or strikes down the Act.

(1986), a case challenging Puerto Rico's prohibition of casino advertising. In his last opinion as
an associate justice, Rehnquist led a bare five-member majority in upholding the advertising ban,
reasoning in part that "the greater power to completely ban casino gambling necessarily includes
the lesser power to ban advertising of casino gambling." Id.
at 345-46. Commentators excoriated
this reasoning. See, e.g., Philip B. Kurland, Posadas de Puerto Rico v. Tourism Company,
"'Twas Strange, 'Twas Passing Strange; 'Twas Pitiful, 'Twas Wondrous Pitiful, " 1986 Sup. CT.
REV. 1,
and the Court renounced it a decade later. See 44 Liquormart Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517
U.S. 484, 511-13 (plurality opinion). In the years following Posadas, Rehnquist maintained an
uncharacteristically low profile, neither confessing error in that case nor seeking to defend it.
Indeed, it is difficult to discern just what his current view of commercial speech is. In just the
past two Terms, for instance, he signed on to one case that invalidated advertising restrictions
that would have been upheld on a greater/lesser rationale, see Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly,
533 U.S. 525 (2001) (striking down state restrictions on tobacco advertising), while dissenting
from a second, see Thompson v.Western States Medical Center, 535 U.S. 357 (2002) (dissenting
from Court's upholding FDA restrictions on advertising of pharmaceutical compounding). For
an argument that Rehnquist was closer to being right in Posadas than have been his critics, and
that the greater/lesser intuition does have significant force in commercial speech cases (even
though the greater power does not "necessarily" include the lesser) see Mitchell N. Berman,
Commercial Speech and the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine: A Second Look at "the
Greater Includes the Lesser," 55 VAND. L. REV. 693 (2002).
130. See, e.g., Daniel 0. Conkle, CongressionalAlternatives in the Wake ofCity ofBoerne v.
Flores: The (Limited) Role of Congress in Protecting Religious Freedom from State and Local
Infringement, 20 U. ARK.LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 633, 675 (1998); Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr.,

Listening to the "Sounds of Sovereignty" but Missing the Beat: Does the New Federalism Really
Matter?, 32 IND. L. REV. 11,
17-18 (1998); Daniel J. Meltzer, The Seminole Decision andState
Sovereign Immunity, 1996 SuP. CT. REV. 1, 52 n.240.
131. We exclude from consideration here the Children's Internet Protection Act ("CIPA"),
Pub. L. No. 106-554, § 1712, 114 Stat. 2763A-335 (2000), which requires public libraries to
use internet filters as a condition for the receipt of certain federal subsidies. As mentioned
earlier, see supra notes 37-41 and accompanying text, the Court will resolve a challenge to CIPA
this Term. See Am. Library Ass'n v. United States, 201 F. Supp. 2d 401 (E.D. Pa. 2002),
probable jurisdiction noted, 123 S.Ct. 551 (2002). We put this aside because, although the
"independent constitutional bar" prong of Dole makes this nominally a spending case, we (and
others) expect the Court to analyze and decide the case on substantive First Amendment
grounds. See, e.g., Linda Greenhouse, Justices to Review Internet Pornography Filters, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 13, 2002, at A24 ("[T]he government must still defend the law in basic First
Amendment terms. The main argument in the administration's appeal... is that the lower court

was fundamentally mistaken in framing the issue as one of speech in a public forum and in
viewing the libraries as surrogates for the First Amendment interests of their patrons.").
132. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc.
133. Another challenge under the spending power that might well reach the Court in the next
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few years would involve § 666 of the federal bribery statute, 18 U.S.C. §666 (2000). Subsection
(a)(1) of the statute "makes it a federal offense for an agent of an organization or a state, local,
or tribal governmental body or agency that receives more than $10,000 in federal funds in a year
to solicit,demand, accept,or agree to accept anything of value with the intent to be influenced
or rewarded in connection with any business, transaction, or series of transactions of the entity
valued at $5000 or more." United States v. Sabri, 183 F. Supp. 2d 1145, 1148 (D. Minn. 2002)
(summarizing 18 U.S.C. §666(a)(1)) (emphasis in original)). Subsection (a)(2) is a
complementary provision that makes it a federal crime for any person to "corruptly give[],
offer[], or agree[] to give anything of value to any person, with intent to influence or reward"
such an agent under similar circumstances. 18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(2).
Several federal courts that have ruled on the constitutionality of § 666 to date have
undertaken an analysis under Dole, sometimes simultaneously questioning whether such an
analysis was appropriate. See, e.g., United States v. Lipscomb, 299 F.3d 303, 321 (5th Cir. 2002)
("[A]Ithough we may debate whether the § 666 peg fits the conditional-grant hole, I shall test it
under the four prongs of Dole."); United States v. McCormack, 31 F. Supp. 2d 176, 188 (D.
Mass. 1998) ("Of the four limits [on the spending power] established in Dole, limit (3)requiring that the conditions be related to the federal interest in particular national projects or
programs-provides the most plausible attack on § 666(a)."); United States v. Cantor, 897 F.
Supp. 110, 113 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (discussing Dole, but concluding that §666 "does not impose a
condition on the receipt of federal funds" and that "the conduct prohibited by § 666 [is not] so
remote from the federal interest in protecting federal funds from the effects of local bribery
schemes as to exceed the scope of Congressional spending power....").
Several federal courts have held § 666(a)(2) to exceed Congress's authority under the Dole
doctrine. See, e.g., Sabri, 183 F. Supp. 2d at 1156 ("[E]ven if one could describe the federal
funds disbursed.., as the 'financial inducement' by which Congress bargained for federal
jurisdiction over offenses traditionally within the purview of state and local governments, that
bargain surely is 'so coercive as to pass the point at which pressure turns into compulsion."')
(citation omitted); McCormack, 31 F. Supp. 2d at 189 (finding the conduct at issue to be clearly
"not 'related to a legitimate national problem' because it is not directed towards protecting the
integrity of federal funds" and holding it unconstitutional to prosecute the defendant under §
666); Lipscomb, 299 F.3d at 328-29 ("Some district courts have tested § 666 against the Tenth
Amendment, treating the statute as an emanation of the spending power, and have come to
varying conclusions. Additionally, four of our fellow appellate courts have examined the sweep
of § 666, either as a statutory matter or a constitutional one, and are also divided.") (footnotes
omitted).
We do not believe that § 666 is a conditional spending statute, however, and we thus do not
believe an analysis under Dole is appropriate for determining the constitutionality of that statute.
Cf.Sabri, 183 F. Supp. 2d at 1156 ("Section 666 plainly is not a 'condition' statute within the
reasoning of Dole and cannot be justified under that decision as a valid exercise of Congress's
power under the Spending Clause.").
As the Court itself has observed on multiple occasions, a conditional grant of federal funds to
the states is in the nature of a contract: in exchange for federal funds, a state agrees to give
something up. See, e.g., Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 640 (1999)
("When Congress acts pursuant to its spending power, it generates legislation 'much in the
nature of a contract: in return for federal funds, the States agree to comply with federally
imposed conditions."') (quoting Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S 1, 17
(1981); see also id.at 655 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (same); Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch.
Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 286 (1998) (observing that a law that "conditions[s] an offer of federal
funding on a promise by the recipient . . . amounts essentially to a contract between the
Government and the recipient of funds."). So one must ask what is the quo that the state
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Before engaging RLUIPA, however, we discuss in Part III.A a non-spending34
decision that the Court handed down in January 2003, Pierce County v. Guillen.
Guillen was the first case in which a court (here, the Supreme Court of Washington)
employed Dole to strike down a federal statute as exceeding Congress's spending
power. 135 The United States Supreme Court granted cert and then unanimously upheld
the statute as a valid exercise of Congress's commerce power. 36 As we explain briefly,
we find the Court's Commerce Clause analysis questionable. More significantly for
present purposes, we suggest that the Court's unanimous willingness to resolve the
case on dubious-and substantially underdeveloped-Commerce Clause grounds may
indicate that the justices are ill-disposed to tinker with existing Spending Clause
jurisprudence.
A. Pierce County v. Guillen
The dispute in Guillen arose when certain Washington State motorists involved in
traffic accidents requested accident reports and other materials and data held by county
agencies related to the traffic history of the sites of their accidents. 37 The motorists
sought the information in part in order to pursue tort claims that the relevant city and
county governments were negligent in their maintenance and operation of the
intersections at which the accidents occurred. 38 Pierce County refused to provide the
requested reports and data in reliance in part on a federal statute,139 23 U.S.C. § 409, as
amended in 1995, which states:
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, reports, surveys, schedules, lists, or
data compiled or collected for the purpose of identifying, evaluating, or planning
the safety enhancement of potential accident sites, hazardous roadway conditions,

relinquishes for all the federal quid to which § 666 attaches? State permission for the federal
government to impose criminal penalties on some of its agents and on private individuals who
bribe such agents? That, we think, is the only possible answer, but such permission is not
something within a state's power to give. Either Congress has the power to enact a given
criminal law (most likely under its Commerce authority) or it doesn't. And if it doesn't, then
New York teaches us that the state's consent doesn't change anything. See New York v. United
States, 505 U.S. 144, 182 (1992) ("Where Congress exceeds its authority relative to the States,
... the departure from the constitutional plan cannot be ratified by the 'consent' of state
officials."). A discussion of whether § 666 is a legitimate exercise of Congress's power under
the Commerce Clause is beyond the scope of this Article.
For present purposes, it is important only to note that we believe that a Spending Clause
analysis of § 666 should provide the Court no opportunity to reconsider existing spending
doctrine.
134. 123 S.Ct. 720 (2003).

135. Guillen v. Pierce County, 31 P.3d 628, 650-51 (Wash. 2001). For an early, brief
discussion of the potential importance of this case, see Michael C. Dorf, What an Auto Accident
Decision

Teaches

about

Federalism,

http://writ.findlaw.com/dorf/ 20011015.html.
136. 123 S.Ct. 720 (2003).
137. Guillen, 31 P. 3d at 632-638.
138. Id. at 632-38.
139. Id. at 632, 634-35.

FINDLAW'S

WRIT,

Oct.

15,

2001,

at

2003]

GETTING OFFTHE DOLE
or railway-highway crossings, pursuant to sections 130, 144, and 152 of this title
or for the purpose of developing any highway safety construction improvement
project which may be implemented utilizing Federal-aid highway funds shall not
be subject to discovery or admitted into evidence in a Federal or State court
proceeding or considered for other purposes in any action for damages arising
from any occurrence at a location mentioned or addressed in such reports, surveys,
schedules, lists, or data. 4

Because the accident reports and other materials that the plaintiffs sought had been
collected by the relevant county as part of an application to the state of Washington for
federal hazard elimination funds under 23 U.S.C. § 152,' 4' the county argued that they
were privileged under § 409. The question for the Washington Supreme Court was
whether the collecting of certain reports and other materials for this statutorily
specified purpose rendered them privileged even if those reports and other materials
142
had been compiled for other purposes, such as routine law enforcement.
To understand the import of the question, consider the following example. A local
police officer prepares (compiles) an accident report as he is required to do under longstanding state law. At a later point in time, that report is collected by a state authority
pursuant to 23 U.S.C. § 152 in order for the state to determine the twenty intersections
in the state where safety improvements are most needed. 43 The state authority
prepares a report discussing those twenty intersections, and uses the report and the data
on which it was based to set its priorities for spending its annual allotment of federal
highway safety funds. Plainly, the report prepared by the state pursuant to § 152 would
be covered by the § 409 privilege. The question before the state court, however, was
whether the original accident reports-reports that (by hypothesis) would have been
prepared even in the absence of the federal scheme, and which were not prepared
pursuant to § 152-would also be covered by the privilege once they were collected

140. 23 U.S.C. § 409 (1995).
141. Guillen, 31 P.3d at 634.
142. Id. at 64446.
143. Section 152 states in relevant part:
Each State shall conduct and systematically maintain an engineering survey of all
public roads to identify hazardous locations, sections, and elements, including
roadside obstacles and unmarked or poorly marked roads, which may constitute a
danger to motorists, bicyclists, and pedestrians, assign priorities for the correction
of such locations, sections, and elements, and establish and implement a schedule
of projects for their improvement.
23 U.S.C. § 152(a)(l).
Notice that this provision is stated as an unconditional mandate: apparently, a state's
obligation to conduct and maintain an engineering survey of the sort described exists
independently of that state's pursuit or receipt of federal funds. If this is the correct
understanding of § 152, then the mandate seemingly violates the anticommandeering rules of
New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) and Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898
(1997). To save § 152, it could be read, then, as a spending provision that conditions certain
federal highway funds on a state's evaluation of its roads. This is how the Supreme Court
seemed to view the statute in Guillen. See Pierce County v. Guillen, 123 S.Ct. 720, 724-25
(2003).
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pursuant to § 152 in order to generate the report of state-wide highway safety
priorities.
The Washington Supreme Court held that they were. 14 Under the statute's plain
language, it reasoned, materials or data that have been "collected" for a statutorily
specified purpose are covered by § 409.145 Whether the materials or data had been
originally compiled for distinct purposes appears irrelevant.146 Moreover, the history of
the evolution of§ 409 bolstered this interpretation. When initially enacted in 1987, that
section did not contain the words "or collected."' 147 Accordingly, the court observed,
"most state courts restricted the application of the federal privilege" to materials and
data "that had been specifically created for the purpose of applying for federal safety
improvement funding or implementing a funded project."148 Congress amended § 409
in 1995 by adding the words "or collected" after "compiled" specifically in response to
49
these narrow decisions and in order to "clarify" the intended scope of the privilege.
And Congress described the privilege's scope as follows:
It is intended that raw data collected prior to being made part of any formal or
bound report shall not be subject to discovery or admitted into evidence in a
Federal or State court proceeding or considered for other purposes inany action
for damages
arising from any occurrence at a location mention[ed] or addressed in
50
such data.'
For these reasons, the Washington Supreme Court agreed with Pierce County that any
reports or data collected for the statutorily specified purposes became fully
privileged.' 5'
But Pierce County's victory on the question of the scope of the privilege afforded
by § 409 quickly turned pyrrhic. For the Washington Supreme Court proceeded to hold
that when construed so broadly the § 409 privilege violated Dole's relatedness
requirement:
We find that no valid federal interest in the operation of the federal safety
enhancement program is reasonably served by barring the admissibility and
discovery in state court of accident reports and other traffic and accident materials
and "raw data" that were originally prepared for routine state and local purposes,
simply because they are "collected," . . . among other reasons, pursuant to a
federal statute for federal purposes.'52

144. Guillen, 31 P.3d at 646.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Surface Transportation and Uniform Relocation Assistance Act of 1987, Pub. L. 100-17,
Title I, § 132(a), 101 Stat. 170 (1987).
148. Guillen, 31 P.3d at 641.
149. Id. at 644.
150. H.R. REP. No. 104-246, at 59 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. (109 Stat.) at
651.
151. Guillen, 31 P.3d at 644.
152. Id. at 651 (emphasis in original).
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The court therefore held § 409, as amended, to exceed Congress's spending power. 113
It concluded, as well, that § 409 exceeded Congress's commerce power because such
an expansive privilege "cannot reasonably be characterized as an 'integral part' of the
Federal-aid highway system's regulation."' 5 4 Lastly, relying heavily on its construal of
recent Rehnquist Court federalism decisions as displaying a "fundamental respect for
state sovereignty,"' 55 the court reasoned that § 409 "cannot be characterized as a valid
exercise of any power constitutionally delegated to the federal government"' 5 6 because
Congress lacks "power to intrude upon the exercise of state sovereignty in so
fundamental an area of the law as the determination by state and local courts of the
discoverability and admissibility of state' and local materials and data relating to traffic
and accidents on state and local roads."'
Three justices of the Washington Supreme Court disagreed with the majority's
interpretation of § 409. As Justices Madsen and Johnson and Chief Justice Alexander
read the privilege, an individual report originally compiled for an ordinary state or
local law enforcement purpose was not covered by § 409 merely because it was later
collected, along with other reports or data, for the purpose of applying for a share of
the state's federal safety-improvement funds.'5 All that the 1995 amendment clarified,
in the view of the concurring justices, was that if these reports were subsequently
"collected" pursuant to § 152 or another specified provision of federal law, the
collection of reports would not itself be discoverable.15 9
In other words, as the concurring justices read the legislative history, in amending §
409 in 1995, Congress was reacting against judicial decisions that permitted plaintiffs
"to gain information that was 'collected' by an agency for purposes of preparing an
application for federal funding from the agency that 'collected' the information."' 160 By
adding "or collected" to "compiled," under this view, Congress simply wanted to
ensure that a plaintiff could not exploit the state's action of collecting reports to save it
from doing its own work in litigation against the state or any of its political
subdivisions. It would not follow, Madsen concluded, that plaintiffs should be
handicapped when "seeking information or reports from
their original source, such as
6
accident reports from a law enforcement agency."' '
Reversing the Washington Supreme Court, the United States Supreme Court upheld
§ 409 in a unanimous decision issued on January 14, 2003.162 In a short opinion by

153. See id. at 655.
154. Id. at 654 (quoting Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314, 328 n.17 (1981)).
155. Id. at 653.
156. Id. at 655.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 657 (Madsen, J., concurring).
159. Id. at 658 (emphasis added).
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. 123 S.Ct. 720 (2003). Oral argument in the case had been only 10 weeks before, on
November 4, 2002.
On August 19, 2002, the authors of this Article filed an Amicus Brief in the U.S. Supreme
Court in support of Respondents in Guillen. See 2002 WL 1964091. The authors received no
monetary contribution to, or financial compensation for, the preparation and submission of that
brief.
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Justice Thomas, the Court interpreted § 409 as the Solicitor General advocated,163 and
much as the concurring justices at the state court had, explaining that § 409
protects all reports, surveys, schedules, lists, or data actually compiled or collected
for § 152 purposes, but does not protect information that was originally compiled
or collected for purposes unrelated to § 152 and that is currently held by the
agencies that compiled or collected it, even if the information was at some point
"collected" by another agency for § 152 purposes.'"
Thus construed, the Court thought that the statute passed muster under the Commerce
Clause with ease. Indeed, its opinion proceeds as a straightforward syllogism. First,
"under the Commerce Clause, Congress 'is empowered to regulate and protect the
instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons or things in interstate commerce,
even though the threat may come only from intrastate activities.'" 65 Second, "both the
original § 409 and the 1995 amendment can be viewed as legislation aimed at
improving safety in the channels of commerce and increasing protection for the
instrumentalities of interstate commerce."' 66 Therefore, "they fall within Congress'
Commerce Clause power."'' 67 In light of this disposition, the Court noted in a footnote,
"we need not decide whether [§ 409] could also be a proper exercise of Congress'
authority under the Spending Clause ... "168
69
We think this is a questionable analysis, all the more remarkable for its brevity.1
Some readers of the Court's opinion may follow along without resistance. Surely other
readers, however, will feel a nagging, if hard to articulate, disquiet. As a first pass,
such readers might be drawn to something like the following objection: "But § 409
isn't a regulation of the channels or instrumentalities of interstate commerce; it's a
regulation of state court procedure!" An objection of this sort, it seems to us, really
contains two analytically distinct elements, each of which has significant (if not
ultimately dispositive) force.
The first element of this objection draws a distinction between what is being
regulated and what such regulation isfor. Hornbook law holds that, after Lopez, the
Commerce Clause allows Congress to regulate "three types of activities":' 70 the

163. Guillen, 123 S.Ct. at 730.
164. Id. (emphasis in original). The Court elaborated:
Under this interpretation, an accident report collected only for law enforcement purposes
and held by the county sheriff would not be protected under § 409 in the hands of the
county sheriff, even though that same report would be protected inthe hands of the Public
Works Department, so long as the department first obtained the report for § 152 purposes.
Id.
165. Id. at 731 (quoting United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558 (1995)).
166. Id. at 732.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 732 n. 9.
169. The Court's entire Commerce Clause analysis comprises seven sentences of a
seventeen-page slip opinion. Id. at 731-32.
170. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 261 (2d ed.

2002). See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558 ("[W]e have identified three broad categories of activity that
Congress may regulate under its commerce power.").
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channels of interstate commerce, the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, and
intrastate economic activities that, in the aggregate, substantially affect interstate
commerce. But § 409 did not regulate instrumentalities or channels, in the sense that
these are not the things upon which the statute operated. It seems more accuratecertainly no less accurate-to describe § 409 as a regulation of state court procedure
adoptedfor thepurpose of protecting instrumentalities and channels. That might be a
permissible use of the commerce power. But its permissibility is not so obviously
established, either by the Lopez dictum that the Guillen Court quotes or by
17 the
previous decisions that Lopez had cited, as to be assumed without discussion. 1
The second point that our imagined objection is meant to capture emerges after its
semicolon: It is not only that § 409 does not regulate instrumentalities or channels but
that what it does regulate is the rules of evidence to be applied in state court
proceedings involving causes of action brought solely under state law. Even insofar as
Commerce Clause precedent permits Congress to regulate some things other than
instrumentalities and channels when the aim is to protect instrumentalities or channels,
that precedent is not indifferent to what those other things, matters, or subjects of
regulation are. To the contrary, a large number of opinions authored by the States'
Rights Five have strongly suggested that the Constitution imposes special constraints
upon federal legislation that intrudes upon integral areas of historical state
sovereignty.172 If this is so, then it is not quite enough that "Congress could reasonably

171. The first premise of what we have called the Guillen syllogism quotes Lopez for the
proposition that "Congress is empowered to regulate and protect the instrumentalities of
interstate commerce, or persons or things in interstate commerce, even though the threat may
come only from intrastate activities." See supra note 165 and accompanying text. That statement
in Lopez was immediately followed by the following string cite: "See, e.g., Shreveport Rate
Cases, 234 U.S. 342 (1914); Southern R. Co. v. United States, 222 U.S. 20 (1911) (upholding

amendments to Safety Appliance Act as applied to vehicles used in intrastate commerce); Perez
v.United States, 402 U.S. 146, 150 ("[Flor example, the destruction of an aircraft (18 U.S.C. §
32), or . , . thefts from interstate shipments (18 U.S.C. § 659)")." Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558

(quotation edited for form).
The legal proposition stated in Lopez, however, is not identical to the proposition implicitly
assumed by the second premise of the Guillen syllogism-and which is necessary to support the
Guillen holding-namely, that Congress may regulate things other than instrumentalities or
channels in order to protect instrumentalities or channels. That is, "regulate and protect" need
not mean "regulate or protect." Furthermore, as the parenthetical that the Lopez majority
provided to describe the holding of Southern Railway and its very brief quotation from Perez
suggest, neither of those cases obviously supports the critical proposition of law that the second
Guillen premise presupposes. The Shreveport Rate Cases are no more helpful. Those cases
rested on the proposition that "Congress in the exercise of its paramount power may prevent the
common instrumentalities of interstate and intrastate commercial intercourse from being used in

their intrastate operations to the injury of interstate commerce." 234 U.S. at 353 (emphasis
added).
172. Then-Justice Rehnquist's plurality opinion in National League of Cities v. Usery, 426

U.S. 833, 852 (1976) (invalidating federal legislation because it "operate[s] to directly displace
the States' freedom to structure integral operations in areas of traditional governmental
functions"), is the most obvious point of reference, especially given his and Justice O'Connor's
refusal to accept the legitimacy of Usery's subsequent overruling in Garcia v. San Antonio
dissenting);
Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S. 528 (1985). See id. at 580 (Rehnquist, J.,
id. at 589 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). See also, e.g., United States v. Morrison 529 U.S. 598,
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believe that" privileging § 152 data in the relatively modest way that § 409 (as
construed by the Court) did "would result in more diligent efforts to collect the
relevant information, more candid discussions of hazardous locations, better informed
decisionmaking, and, ultimately, greater safety on our Nation's roads. 1 73And the fact
that § 409 proceeds by the specific means of regulating the rules of evidence to be
applied in state court proceedings involving causes of action brought solely under state
law would seem nonetheless to be a matter of constitutional concern.
To be sure, the Court gestures in the direction of this worry when acknowledging in
a footnote that "Respondents contend in passing that § 409 violates the principles of
dual sovereignty embodied in the Tenth Amendment."' 7 4 But its immediately
following assertion, that this contention did not merit discussion because "[tihe court
below did not address this precise argument, reasoning instead that the 1995
amendment to § 409 was beyond Congress' enumerated powers,"' 175 seems less than
wholly candid. For one thing, the Washington Supreme Court did devote an entire
section of its opinion-separate from its Commerce Clause, Spending Clause, and
Necessary and Proper Clause sections-to a discussion of "State Sovereignty." 76 Yet
more fundamentally, the implication ofthe Guillen footnote that the Commerce Clause
and Tenth Amendment inquiries are independent of each other seems inconsistent with
the Court's explanation in New York, that in a case
involving the division of authority between federal and state governments, the two
inquiries are mirror images of each other. If a power is delegated to Congress in
the Constitution, the Tenth Amendment expressly disclaims any reservation of that
power to the States; if a power is an attribute of state sovereignty reserved by the

615 (2000) (criticizing an argument insupport of federal legislation on the basis that it could "be
applied equally as well to family law and other areas of traditional state regulation"); Lopez, 514
U.S. at 564 (invalidating the Gun-Free School Zone Act in part because, under the government's
theories, "it is difficult to perceive any limitation on federal power, even in areas such as
criminal law enforcement or education where States historically have been sovereign."); id. at
concurring) (arguing that although the limits of the Commerce Clause
579-80 (Kennedy, J.,
presents "questions of constitutional law not susceptible to the mechanical application of bright
and clear lines[,] . . at the least we must inquire whether the exercise of national power seeks to
intrude upon an area of traditional state concern").
173. Guillen, 123 S.Ct. at 731-32.
174. Id. at 732 n.10.
175. Id. at 732 n.10.
176. See Guillen v. Pierce County, 31 P.3d 628, 655 (Wash. 2001). Moreover, toward the
end of that section, the state court stated:
If this state court has misconstrued the United States Constitution's limitations
upon the federal government's power to intrude upon the exercise of state
sovereignty in sofundamental an area of law as the determination by state and
local courts of the discoverability and admissibility of state and local materials
and data relating to traffic and accidents on state and local roads, we are

confident that the United States Supreme Court will so instruct ....
Id. (emphasis added).
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Tenth Amendment, it is necessarily a power the Constitution has not conferred on
Congress.177

For this reason, the state court's conclusion that §409 exceeded Congress's commerce
power need not emerge separate and distinct from a conclusion that the statute
"violates the principles of dual sovereignty embodied in the Tenth Amendment." To
the contrary, the state court opinion is most fairly read, in our view, to reason that §
409 was not a valid exercise of the commerce 78
power precisely because of the way it

intruded upon core areas of state sovereignty.1
Our point is not that the Court's bottom-line holding that §409 was a valid exercise
of the commerce power was wrong. We are agnostic on this question 79 pending a full

exploration of the sort that is beyond the scope Of this Article. Our point is only that

the Commerce Clause question is far more complex than the unanimity and brevity of
the Guillen Court's analysis would suggest. That all nine justices were content to
proceed in this way might indicate an affirmative wish to steer clear of the Spending
Clause thicket. At the least, Guillen strongly undermines any guess that members of
the present Court are actually eager to revisit Dole.
B. RLUIPA
Although the Guillen Court escaped the need to apply or reconsider Dole by
choosing to uphold § 409 on Commerce Clause grounds, 80 the Court is unlikely to
find a similar avenue of avoidance open to it if and when it entertains a challenge to
the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of2000 ("RLUIPA").'81 The
spending power basis for the Act is important only to the institutionalized persons
sections. In essence, that portion of the Act seeks to provide more protection to the
religious exercises of prisoners in state and local institutions than they receive under
existing Supreme Court doctrine.
Under the Supreme Court's decisions in Turnerv. Safley 8 2 and O 'Lone v. Estateof
Shabazz, 8 3 regulations in state and local prisons, including those that impinge on the
prisoners' free exercise of religion, are subject to a "reasonableness" test: "When a
prison regulation impinges on inmates' constitutional rights, the regulation is valid if it
is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests."'18 4

177. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 156 (1992).
178. See Guillen, 31 P.3d at 651-54.
179. In the interest of full disclosure, however, we note that in our Amicus Brief filed with
the Court in Guillen we argued that "[n]o matter how this Court ultimately resolves the various
ambiguities in § 409, as amended ....
enactment of that provision was not within Congress's
power under the Commerce Clause." Amicus Brief of Law Professors Lynn A. Baker and
Mitchell N. Berman In Support of Respondents, 2002 WL 1964091, at *22.
180. Guillen, 123 S.Ct. at 732. See also discussion supra Part IlI.A.
181. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc (2000).
182. 482 U.S. 78 (1987).
183.482 U.S. 342 (1987).
184. Turner,482 U.S. at 89.
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Under RLUIPA, however,
No government shall impose a substantial burden on the religious exercise of a
person residing in or confined to an institution, as defined in section 2 of the Civil
Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act .... even if the burden results from a rule
of general applicability, unless the government demonstrates that imposition of the
burden on that person-(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental
interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling
governmental interest.
...This section applies in any case in which--() the substantial burden is
imposed in a program or activity that receives Federal financial assistance .... 18
In the words of one commentator, "RLUIPA replaces minimal scrutiny under
Turner and O'Lone with the compelling interest and least restrictive means tests. The
this strict scrutiny 'even if the burden results from a
Act also displaces Smith, applying
86
rule of general applicability." 1
Does this restriction on state and local governments exceed Congress's power under
Dole? Several courts have ruled on this question to date and all have found the statute
to be a legitimate exercise of Congress' spending power. I8 7 A plausible case can be
made, however, that this portion of the statute fails scrutiny under any one of three
aspects of the Dole doctrine: the clear-notice requirement, 8 8 the relatedness test, 189 or
the noncoercion requirement.190
As we have seen, Dole requires that "if Congress desires to condition the States'
receipt of federal funds, it 'must do so unambiguously . . ., enabl[ing] the States to
exercise their choice knowingly, cognizant of the consequences of their
participation.'"1 9' Possibly, however, RLUIPA does not provide this clarity of notice.
Suppose that a state prisoner challenges a practice of a work program instituted at his
prison as substantially burdening his religious exercise, and that the state department of
prisons received federal financial assistance for building improvements at a different

185. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-i (2000).
186. Heather Guidry, Comment, If at First You Don't Succeed...: Can the Commerce and
Spending Clauses Support Congress's Latest Attempt at Religious Freedom Legislation?, 32
CUMB. L. REv. 419, 423 (2001-02).
187. See Johnson v. Martin, 223 F. Supp. 2d 820, 831 (W.D. Mich. 2002) (denying state's
motion for summary judgment); Charles v. Verhagen, 220 F. Supp. 2d 955, 966 (W.D. Wis.
2002) (granting prisoner's motion for injunctive relief); Gerhardt v. Lazaroff, 221 F. Supp. 2d
827, 849 (S.D. Ohio 2002) (denying defendants' motion to dismiss); Mayweathers v. Terhune,
No. CIVS961582LKKGGHP, 2001 WL 804140, at *5(E.D. Cal. July 2,2001), aff'dsub nom.,
Mayweathers v. Newland, 314 F.3d 1062, 1065 (9th Cir. 2002) (affirming lower court's denial
of defendant's motion to dismiss).
Two courts, however, recently have held the institutionalized persons sections of RLUIPA to
violate the Establishment Clause. See Gashiyah v. Dep't of Corrections, 2003 WL 1089526
(E.D. Wis. 2003); Madison v. Riter, 240 F.Supp.2d 566 (W.D. Va. 2003).
188. Dole, 483 U.S. at 207.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 211.
191. Id. at 207 (quoting Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981)).
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prison but none for the work program, and indeed none for the prison that operates the
challenged work program. Whether the prisoner can plausibly allege a violation of
RLUIPA would depend, then, on whether the "program or activity" that receives the
federal funds, and is thereby subject to RLUIPA's strictures, is the construction
program or the prison system as a whole. The plain language of the statute suggests the
former interpretation. After all, the latter interpretation would be tantamount to reading
"program or activity" to mean "department or agency," which is what the statute could
have said, but does not. On the other hand, because RLUIPA specifically
incorporates 192 the extremely broad definition put forth in the Civil Rights Restoration
Act of 1988 pursuant to which a "program or activity" encompasses "all of the
funding, 93
operations of" any government department or agency that receives federal
94
the latter interpretation is very possibly precisely what is intended.
Were the Court to hold, as is most likely correct, that RLUIPA unambiguously
makes every activity at each prison within a state subject to the compelling interest
requirement so long as the state department of prisons accepts some federal funding for
any purpose, the statute would raise very serious relatedness concerns. Dole requires,
recall, that the condition on federal funds not be "unrelated 'to the federal interest in
particular national projects or programs." ' 195 Yet surely the intuition is strong that
requiring all of a prison's programs to satisfy RLUIPA's compelling interest test is
unrelated to the federal interest in, say, eliminating prison overcrowding. Now, this
intuition might be defeated. It has been argued, for example, that all federal prison
money is partly motivated by an interest in promoting either rehabilitation or, at the
least, the humane treatment of inmates-interests that are also served by facilitating
greater religious exercise by prisoners. 196 But the Court might reject the premise (that

192. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(6) (2000).
193. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-4(a) (2000).
194. Although the statute employs several vague terms-for example, "substantial burden,"

"compelling governmental interest," and "least restrictive means"a-this should not run it afoul
of the unambiguousness requirement. Contracts frequently employ comparably loose terms,
without raising any notice problems. RLUIPA does give the states clear notice that receipt of
federal prison funds renders them subject to the command that they not impose what a factfinder
may determine, ex post, is a "substantial burden" unless the compelling-interest and leastrestrictive-means requirements are adjudged to be satisfied. Armed with this knowledge, a state
may choose to play things more or less close to the line. See Mayweathers v. Terhune, No.
CIVS961582LKKGGHP, 2001 WL 804140, at *3 ("Contrary to defendants' position, the court
concludes that RLUIPA's prohibition is clear. The Act bars the recipient of federal funds from
placing substantial burdens on an inmate's free exercise of religion absent a compelling interest
and the employment of the least restrictive means.").
195. Dole, 483 U.S. at 207 (quoting Massachusetts v. United States, 435 U.S. 444, 461
(1978) (plurality opinion)).
196. See Charles v. Verhagen, 220 F.Supp. 2d 955, 963 (W.D.Wis. 2002)("Congress can
rationally seek to insure that states receiving federal funds targeted at rehabilitating prisoners are
not simultaneously using those funds or other federal money to impede prisoners' exercise of
religion and its perceived rehabilitative effects."); Mayweathers, 2001 WL 804140 at *4
("RLUIPA's provisions are directly related to the rehabilitation of federal inmates housed in
state prisons."); 139 Cong. Rec. 26,410 (1993) (statement of Sen. Hatch) ("[E]xposure to
religion is the best hope we have for rehabilitation of a prisoner.") (commenting on the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act).
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is, it might conclude that some federal prison funds, the receipt of which would make
state prisons subject to the RLUIPA condition, do not promote interests in
rehabilitation or the like) and could conclude that this relationship is too tenuous in any
event. 197 In short, if RLUIPA is interpreted as a condition on any and all federal funds
received by a state or local government for any prison-related program, RLUIPA might
be held to fail Dole's relatedness prong.
Finally, the Court might find that the condition on federal funds imposed by
RLUIPA violates Dole's prohibition against impermissibly "coercive" conditions. The
Dole Court acknowledged that "in some circumstances the financial inducement
offered by Congress might be so coercive as to pass the point at which 'pressure turns
into compulsion." 198 The Court went on to focus on the percentage of federal funds at
stake and found that because the funds at issue-five percent of "certain federal
highway funds"-was a "relatively small percentage" the threat of withholding it did
not constitute impermissible coercion. 99 Under RLUIPA, however, seemingly 100
percent of all federal funds received by a covered institution would be subject to
withholding.200 If, as the very brief discussion of the matter in Dole suggests, the
coercion inquiry turns upon the percentage of federal programmatic funds that a state
would lose by failing to comply with a funding condition, the Court should hold that
the RLUIPA condition rises to the level of impermissible coercion. 2 1
To be sure, all of these possible objections apply as well to the civil rights statutes
upon which RLUIPA is modeled, most notably Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, which bars discrimination on the basis of race, color, or national origin by "any
program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance. 20 2 Some may suppose that
at least some members of the Court's states' rights majority-Justices O'Connor and
Kennedy being the most obvious bets-would be unwilling to strike down these core
antidiscrimination provisions, yet unable plausibly to distinguish RLUIPA, in which
event RLUIPA would be upheld. This may be right; we cannot know with any
confidence whether the Court would hold the Institutionalized Persons provisions of
RLUIPA to violate the Dole doctrine. What is important for purposes of this Article,
however, is that a Court willing (or even eager) to invalidate RLUIPA-perhaps

197. For discussion of how the Court could tighten Dole's relatedness prong, see infra Part
V.B.I.
198. Dole, 483 U.S. at 211 (quoting Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 590 (1937)).
199. Id.
200. Cf 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-l(b)(l) (2002).
201. If, instead, whether a condition is impermissibly coercive depends upon the percentage
of the funded program's budget that would be lost upon noncompliance, cf infra note 304,
RLUIPA would likely survive. Federal funds for prisons constitute only a tiny percentage of
state prison budgets. See, e.g., Mayweathers v. Terhune, No. CIVS961582LKKGGHP, 2001 WL
804140, at *5 n. I (E.D.Cal. July 2,2001), aff'd sub nom., Mayweathers v. Newland, 314 F.3d
1062 (9th Cir. 2002) (noting that the federal funding received by the California Department of
Corrections in 2001-2002 "amounts to a paltry 1.9 million dollars out of the Department's
annual budget of roughly 4.8 million dollars").
202. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2002). Similarly, Title IX bars programs or activities receiving
federal funds from discriminating on the basis of sex, and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act bars
such discrimination on the basis of disability. See 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a) (2002); 29 U.S.C. §
794(a) (2002).
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because it views the statute as a bald attempt by Congress to circumvent the Court's
free exercise cases 2 3 -plausibly could do so without abandoning or amending any
aspect of existing spending clause doctrine.
IV. EXPLOITING THE DOLE LOOPHOLE

Part II reviewed why the Court should get off the Dole. Part III, however, bolstered
the prevailing wisdom that, at least in the very near term, it probably will not. This Part
picks up a thread opposing that of Part II. Whereas some commentators (ourselves
24
included) have criticized Dole and proposed alternatives, others have applauded it. 0
Yet more significantly, some observers in this latter camp have urged not merely that
Congress should make broad use of its conditional spending powers, but that it should
employ its conditional spending power to effectively overturn Supreme Court decisions
that have restricted congressional power. 20 5 Just how that might work is the subject of
this Part.
That Dole stands in some sort of tension with whatever restrictions on congressional
power may otherwise exist was never a secret: allowing Congress to spend for
objectives that it could not pursue under its other enumerated powers at least partially
undermines the limitations upon those other powers. Indeed, this was obvious to the

203. See, e.g., Gregory S. Waiston, Federalismand FederalSpending: Why the Religious
Land Use andInstitutionalizedPersonsAct of2000 is Unconstitutional,23 HAW. L. REv. 479,
481 (2001):
Congress's overt circumvention of the Supreme Court's decision in City of Boerne
is transparently unconstitutional. While RLUIPA is based upon different
congressional powers, the result is the same as RFRA: a significant and undue
intrusion into the authority of the judiciary and the states in violation of
fundamental notions of separation of powers and federalism. Congress cannot
override the Supreme Court's explicit holding in City ofBoerne by simply drawing
on different congressional powers. RLUIPA, like its precedent RFRA, is patently
unconstitutional.
204. See, e.g., Chemerinsky, supra note 60; Ann Carey Juliano, The More You Spend, the
More You Save: Can the Spending Clause Save FederalAnti-Discrimination
Laws?, 46 VILL. L.
REv. 1111 (200 1); Earl M. Maltz, Sovereignty, Autonomy and ConditionalSpending, 4 CHAP. L.
REV. 107 (2001) (defending Dole on political process grounds); Rebecca E. Zietlow,
Federalism'sParadox: The Spending Powerandthe Waiver of Sovereign Immunity, 37 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 141 (2002); Jennifer Cotner, Note, How the Spending Clause Can Solve the
Dilemma of State Sovereign Immunityfrom IntellectualPropertySuits, 51 DuKE L.J. 713 (2001).
205. This argument prevailed with the enactment of RLUIPA. See supra Part III.B. See also,
e.g., Zietlow, supranote 204 (advocating broad use of the spending power to secure waiver of
state sovereign immunity); Julian Epstein, Evolving Spheres ofFederalismAfter United States v.
Lopez and OtherCases, 34 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 525, 553-54 (1997) (stating that Congress could
use conditional spending to achieve the objectives of the Gun-Free School Zones Act and the
Brady Act); Sheriffs Have Gun Point, COM. APPEAL (Memphis, Tenn.), Dec. 6, 1996, at A8,
availableat 1996 WL 13667664 (arguing that "[the Brady bill makes good sense" and that "[i]f
Congress wants universal cooperation by sheriffs, experience suggests that it has only to hold
hostage continued federal law-enforcement grants"); Cotner, see supra note 204, at 751
("Congress should adopt the conditional waiver plan advocated by this Note to circumvent the
Supreme Court's decisions in FloridaPrepaidand College Savings Bank.").
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Court back in Butler when it first confronted the need to choose between the
Madisonian and Hamiltonian views of the spending power, and even explains the
schizophrenic character of that decision-nominally adopting the Hamiltonian
conception, but ruling in seeming accord with the Madisonian. 20 6 But during the sixty
years following Butler this observation had more academic than practical significance.
The steady expansion of Congress's commerce power rendered the spending power's
circumventionist potential relatively inconsequential. 20 7 For this reason, Dole was of
no great moment back in 1987.
Its true importance became plain, though, as soon as the Rehnquist Court started to
impose constraints. 208 Indeed, mere days after the Court announced its decision in
Lopez,2 °9 the New York Times already reported that President Clinton was considering
conditioning federal education funds on each state's enactment of a state gun-free
school zone law that would replicate the provisions of the newly invalidated federal
law. 210 Congress ultimately decided against this strategy but only because it happened
upon an even more attractive
means of circumvention: adding a "jurisdictional
2t
element" to the statute.
Although not adopted, 212 this spending-based response to Lopez shows clearly just

206. Recent scholarship has challenged the Court's characterization of Hamilton's positionthat Congress may spend so long as it is for the General Welfare, unconstrained by other limits
to Article I powers. See David E. Engdahl, The SpendingPower,44 DUKE L.J. 1 (1994) (arguing
that Hamilton understood the spending power to permit Congress to spend for ends beyond those
authorized by other powers, but subject to the caveats that such expenditures could gain no
leverage from the Necessary and Proper Clause and could be frustrated in their objects by the
states); Jeffrey T. Renz, What Spending Clause?, 33 J. MARSHALL L. REv. 81, 103-06 (1999)
(describing this as the "weak" Hamiltonian position-subsequently championed by Story-and
distinguishing it from a "strong" Hamiltonian position that Article I, Section 8, Clause I
conferred on Congress power even to regulate-not just spend-for the general welfare). We
take no position on this historical controversy here. Whether what is commonly termed
"Hamilton's position" was really Hamilton's position is immaterial for our purposes.
207. In Professor Rosenthal's oft-quoted terms, "[l]f the front door of the commerce power is
open, it may not be worth worrying whether to keep the back door of the spending power tightly
closed." Albert J. Rosenthal, ConditionalFederalSpending andthe Constitution, 39 STAN. L.
REv. 1103, 1131 (1987).
208. This is not to suggest that nobody anticipated the difficulty. For a particularly prescient
analysis in the immediate wake of Dole, see Thomas R. McCoy & Barry Friedman, Conditional
Spending: Federalism'sTrojan Horse, 1988 SuP. CT. REv. 85.
209. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
210. See Todd S. Purdum, Clinton Seeks Way to Retain Gun Ban in School Zones, N.Y.
TiMES, Apr. 30, 1995, at Al.
211. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(2)(A) (2000) (criminalizing the possession near schools of guns
that have "moved in or that otherwise affects interstate or foreign commerce").
212. Conceivably, the bill could be revisited. The only court to have addressed the question
has held the modified § 922(q) constitutional. United States v. Danks, 221 F.3d 1037 (8th Cir.
1999). Many courts, however, have addressed the constitutionality of other statutes containing a
jurisdictional element, including, for example, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), which makes it illegal for a
felon to possess, "in or affecting commerce," a firearm. These courts overwhelmingly have held,
in response to post-Lopez attacks, that § 922(g)'s jurisdictional element makes it constitutional
under the Commerce Clause, e.g., United States v. Williams, 128 F.3d 1128, 1133-34 (7th Cir.
1997); United States v. Wells, 98 F.3d 808, 811 (4th Cir. 1996); United States v. Sorrentino, 72
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how simple the circumventionist method is. First, Congress must articulate a demand,
and do so in terms explicit enough to meet Dole's clear-statement requirement. This
proposed statutory response to Lopez, for example, would demand that states enact into
state law a criminal ban on the possession of guns within a specified distance of
schools. Second, Congress must identify a federal purpose or interest that the demand
serves. Here, let us suppose, the demand serves an interest in improving public

F.3d 294, 296 (2d Cir. 1995), and have held that evidence simply showing a gun has previously
traveled in interstate commerce is sufficient to satisfy the jurisdictional element, see, e.g., United
States v. Crump, 120 F.3d 462, 466 (4th Cir. 1997); United States v. Murphy, 107 F.3d 1199,
1211-12 (6th Cir. 1997); United States v. Garcia, 94 F.3d 57, 65 (2d Cir. 1996).
Commentators, on the other hand, vary in their opinions about the constitutionality of the
modified § 922(q). Cf.e.g., Ann Althouse, EnforcingFederalismAfter United States v. Lopez,

38 ARIz. L. REV. 793,805-06 n.99 (1996) ("It would clearly be inconsistent with the majority's
conception of the Commerce Clause in Lopez for the jurisdictional device to work."); Barry
Friedman, Legislative Findings and JudicialSignals: A Positive PoliticalReading of United

States v. Lopez, 46 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 757, 799 (1996) (labeling a "stretch" the position
"that simply because an article once traveled in commerce, Congress may regulate any activity
involving that article," and stating that this stretch "may be one the Supreme Court is ready to
eliminate"); Harry Litman & Mark D. Greenberg, FederalPowerandFederalism:A Theory of
Commerce-Clause Based Regulation of TraditionallyState Crimes, 47 CASE W. RES. L. REv.

921, 925 (1997) ("the revised statute is constitutional and will be upheld"); Deborah Jones
Merritt, COMMERCE!, 94 MICH. L. REv. 674, 697 (1995) ("It is unclear whether a
jurisdictional element... will resurrect the constitutionality of the Gun-Free School Zones
Act.").
We think there are good reasons to doubt the long-term prospects for the revised §922(q). As
most observers recognize, the jurisdictional element provides the flimsiest of fig leaves.
Virtually every gun travels in interstate commerce. As far as effective state power and
prerogatives are concerned to a state that is home to no firearm manufacture, there is literally no
difference between the version struck down in Lopez and the present version that incorporates
the jurisdictional element. To be sure, practical considerations are not all: different treatment of
functionally identical statutes could be justified if the difference was demanded by constitutional
text. But the text provides little or no support for the jurisdictional element. It is one thing to
interpret the Commerce Clause as granting Congress plenary power to regulate the movement of
things in interstate commerce. That Congress would enjoy equal power (indeed any power) to
regulate items merely because they have moved in interstate commerce (and not because, for
example, the regulation would substantially affect interstate commerce) is something else
entirely. And though some precedent may support the jurisdictional element, see, e.g.,
Scarborough v. United States, 431 U.S. 563 (1973); United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336 (1971);
Daniel v. Paul, 395 U.S. 298 (1969); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964), we think
that stare decisis has little force in this case. Among other things, after Lopez, the jurisdictional
element rule creates just the sort of doctrinal anomaly that justifies its being overruled. See
Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854-55 (1992).
In truth, we think, the jurisdictional element serves mostly to give the States' Rights Five
some breathing room by mitigating the impact of Lopez and Morrison while they work out a
coherent post-Lopez Commerce Clause jurisprudence. If they can craft a doctrine that adequately
serves state interests without causing the upheaval that Thomas's preferred solutionabandoning the substantial effects test-would engender, they could follow the logic of their
recent federalism cases and jettison the jurisdictional element. Were this to happen at all, and
were it to precede any significant change to Dole, then Congress could reconsider the Spending
Clause fix that Clinton had initially floated, see supranote 210.
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education. Third, Congress must identify a federal spending program that pursues that
same purpose and then attach the "demand" as a "condition" upon that spending
program. Doing all this should ensure that the condition on the federal grant is not
"unrelated 'to the federal interest in [the] particular national project[] or program[]'"
to which the condition is attached 213 or, put affirmatively, that the condition "bear[s]
some relationship to the purpose of the federal spending. 214 Fourth and finally,
Congress must set the amount of funding at risk at a level sufficient to secure state
acquiescence without running afoul of the coercion restriction. As Dole itself suggests,
this is not hard: although every single state acceded to the demand, the Court
considered the offer at issue in Dole "relatively mild encouragement," and dismissed
"the argument as to coercion... [as] more rhetoric than fact.' 5
Following this formula, plausible responses to each of the Court's recent federalism
decisions are easy to imagine. The command that states help administer the Brady Act,
21 6
for example, is plainly directed by a federal interest in reducing crime. After Printz,
therefore, Congress could attach the command as a condition on full eligibility for
federal grants to state and local law enforcement. 1 7 Additionally or alternatively,

213. Dole, 483 U.S. at 207 (quoting Massachusetts v. United States, 435 U.S. 444, 461
(1978) (plurality opinion)).
214. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 167 (1992).
215. Dole, 483 U.S. at 211; cf William Van Alstyne, "Thirty Pieces of Silver "forthe Rights
of Your People: IrresistibleOffers Reconsideredas a Matter of State ConstitutionalLaw, 16
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 303, 319-20 (1993) ("Congress sets the terms of its offers quite

knowingly-at just the 'right' level-to make them 'irresistible' and, accordingly, no state tends
very long to resist."). Dissenting from conventional academic wisdom, Rick Hills has argued that
"the evidence does not support the conclusion that the states are so dependent on federal revenue
that they cannot just say 'no' to federal grants." Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The PoliticalEconomy of
CooperativeFederalism: Why State Autonomy Makes Sense and "DualSovereignty" Doesn't,
96 MICH. L. REv. 813, 862-65 (1998). Perhaps not, but the sort of conditional grant Hills is

discussing is much narrower than we contemplate here. See id. at 859 (defining "conditional
grants" as funds Congress provides to the states "on the condition that the state spend the funds
in accordance with federal priorities"). Indeed, Hills acknowledges that the assumption that
states cannot resist the federal offer is stronger with respect to "the congressional practice of
imposing new 'cross-cutting' conditions on 'old' grant money" because states become addicted
to the funds initially and then find it politically impossible to discontinue participation later,
when more onerous conditions are added. Id. at 865 n.184. Of course, Hills's survey of the
terrain is not exhaustive: conditions can be attached when funds are initially offered (and thus
not fall into the second category Hills mentions) and yet do more than merely specify how
granted funds must be spent (and thus fall outside of Hills's initial definition). In any event, that
states do not always accede to federal conditions tells us little, for presumably Congress is
sometimes indifferent (or nearly so) regarding whether a state accepts the offered funds on the
specified condition. See supra Part II.A. (discussing conditions that serve to increase the
majority states' share of federal grants). The important question is whether Congress can
structure its conditional offers in a way that states find nonacquiescence practically impossible in
those situations in which Congress strongly prefers that states accept the condition.
216. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
217. It has been suggested to us that this option was considered but rejected out of fear not
that the Supreme Court would have struck it down but that many states would reject the
condition, thereby creating political pressure on the administration to backpedal.
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federal law enforcement grants could be conditioned on state enactment of an effective
civil damages remedy for victims of gender-related crimes of violence. Because
existence of such a remedy might deter some of the violence, relatedness appears
satisfied and Morrison218 circumvented.2 19
Or turn to the sovereign immunity cases. Abrogation of state sovereign immunity in
intellectual property disputes is plausibly driven by an interest in promoting privatesector innovation by increasing the expected value of intellectual property rights.
Accordingly, Congress could respond to Florida Prepaid220 by conditioning full
federal funding for university research on a state's waiver of its immunity in
intellectual property cases. 221 As another example, the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act ("ADEA") is designed to promote the dignity, and material and
psychological well-being of senior citizens. Naturally, abrogating state sovereign
immunity in suits alleging violations of the ADEA promotes the very same goals by
increasing the probability that states will comply with the ADEA requirements. A
plausible response to Kimel,222 then, would require states to waive immunity in ADEA
suits as a condition for receipt of all medicare funds for which the state is otherwise
eligible.223 Similarly, the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), along with its
abrogation of state sovereign immunity, aims broadly to improve the life prospects of
2 24
disabled persons. So Congress might circumvent Garrett
by conditioning some
portion of federal funds provided to assist disabled persons 225 on a state's waiver of
immunity in ADA suits.

218. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
219. This circumvention is hypothesized in Jesse H. Choper & John C. Yoo, The Scope of the
Commerce Clause after Morrison, 25 OKLA. CITY U. L. REv. 843, 857-58 (2000).
220. College Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666
(1999).
221. For a fuller discussion of possible ways Congress could respond to FloridaPrepaid,
including analysis of proposed bills, see, for example, Daniel J. Meltzer, OvercomingImmunity:
The Case of Federal Regulation of Intellectual Property, 52 STAN. L. REv. 1331 (2001);
Berman, Reese & Young, supra note 35. This particular Dole-inspired circumvention is
discussed id. at 1134-37.
222. Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000).
223. Shortly following Kimel, the Senate proposed a different sort of circumvention. The
Older Workers Rights Restoration Act of 2000, S. 3008, 106th Cong. (2000), followed the
model of the civil rights acts, see supra Part III.B., in providing that every state program or
activity that receives any federal financial assistance must waive its immunity in suits under the
ADEA (This bill died in committee but was reintroduced as The Older Workers' Rights
Restoration Act of 2001, S. 928, 107th Cong. (2001).). For an explanation of why this broad
"program or activity" approach is probably inconsistent with Dole, see Berman, Reese & Young,
supra note 35, at 1137-42.
224. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2000).
225. E.g., 20 U.S.C. § 1411 (2000) (Individuals with Disabilities Education Act); 29 U.S.C. §
3011 (2000) (Assistive Technology Act of 1998); 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (2000) (Grants to States for
Medical Assistance Programs).
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V. PREDICTING THE REHNQUIST COURT'S RESPONSE

Suppose Congress exploits the Dole loophole in one of the ways we have just
described or in any similar context to achieve an end that the Court had closed off by
an earlier pro-state decision, one interpreting, say, the Commerce Clause or the Tenth
or Eleventh Amendments. How might the Rehnquist Court respond to such an
assertion of congressional power?
We predict here that such a maneuver is unlikely to succeed and, furthermore, is
highly likely to provoke precisely the sort of change to Spending Clause jurisprudence
that nationalists will hate. First, we argue in Part V.A, the States' Rights Five would be
strongly disposed against such circumvention. In developing this argument, we
elaborate upon the notions of circumvention and exploitation that we have thus far
used unreflectively. Next, Part V.B shows that if a majority of the Court is committed
or strongly disposed to invalidate such circumvention, Dole could be "tightened"
sufficiently to render many circumventions impermissible and, indeed, to turn Dole
from a largely ineffectual doctrine into a markedly stringent one. Finally, supposing
that Congress were able to enact at least some circumvention statutes in forms
impervious even to a reinvigorated version of Dole, we argue in Part V.C that the
Court could well react by abandoning Dole or (what may be much the same thing for
advocates of expansive national power) supplementing it. Although we do not hazard a
guess as to what the Court would put in Dole's place, we survey a few possibilities.
Our aim is to show that replacements are possible and that they are likely to be
significantly more hostile to congressional power than is Dole itself.
A. The Impulse
1.A Brief Lesson from History
In 1918, in the famous (or notorious) case of Hammer v. Dagenhart, 226 the Court
struck down a federal statute that barred the interstate shipment of goods in the
production in which children under fourteen had been employed. Over a vigorous
dissent by Justice Holmes for himself and three other Justices, the Court insisted that
were it to uphold the ban, "all freedom of commerce will be at an end, and the power
of the States over local matters may be eliminated, and thus our system of government
be practically destroyed. 227 Congress reacted quickly. Turning from its Commerce
Power to the Taxing Power, it had within a year imposed a new 10 percent excise tax
on the net profits of mining and manufacturing companies that employed children
under specified minimum ages.228
The Child Labor Tax Act ("CLTA") appeared to be on solid constitutional footing
thanks to a number of Supreme Court decisions including, most notably, the sixteen
year-old precedent of McCrayv. UnitedStates. 229 McCrayhad involved a challenge to
a scheme of discriminatory federal taxation which taxed white oleomargarine at the
rate of one-quarter cents per pound but subjected yellow oleomargarine to a whopping

226. 247 U.S. 251 (1918).
227. Id. at 276.
228. Child Labor Tax Act, Pub. L. No. 65-254, 40 Stat. 1138 (1919).
229. 195 U.S. 27 (1904).
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tax often cents per pound. Responding to the taxpayer's complaint that the tax "is of
such an onerous character to make it manifest that the purpose of Congress in levying
it was not to raise revenue but to suppress the manufacture of the taxed article,"230 the
Court flatly rejected the legal premise "that the judiciary may restrain the exercise of a
lawful power on the assumption that a wrongful purpose or motive has caused the
power to be exerted." 231 Proceeding, then, to "put[] entirely out of view all
considerations based upon purpose or motive," the Court appealed to a single principle
en route to concluding that the legislation was a valid exercise of the taxing power:
"[l1t is self-evident that on their face [the acts] levy an excise tax. That being their
necessary 2 scope and operation, it follows that the acts are within the grant of
23
power."

These principles were confirmed in Doremus v. United States, a case decided a
week after the CLTA was passed.233 Citing McCray and other cases, the Court
reiterated
that the fact that other motives may impel the exercise of federal taxing power

does not authorize the courts to inquire into that subject. If the legislation enacted
has some reasonable relation to the exercise of the taxing authority conferred by
the Constitution,
it cannot be invalidated because of the supposed motives which
234
induced it.
And the "reasonable relation" the Court had in mind was simple: "Considering the full
power of Congress over excise taxation the decisive question
here is: Have the
23
provisions in question any relation to the raising of revenue?"
In light of this jurisprudence, Congress had some reason for surprise when, in
Bailey v. Drexel FurnitureCo. ,236 the Court struck down the CLTA by a vote of eight
to one. The heart of the Court's reasoning was contained in a proclamation of stirring
candor:
[A] court must be blind not to see that the so-called tax is imposed to stop the
employment of children within the age limits prescribed. Its prohibitory and
regulatory effect and purpose are palpable. All
237 others can see and understand this.
How can we properly shut our minds to it?
This is refreshing stuff, surely appealing to all readers who tire of the cant and
disingenuousness judges too often foist upon us. The problem, though, is that prior

230. Id. at 51. Presumably Congress sought to suppress yellow margarine, but not white,
because the former competed more effectively against butter because the color either confused
consumers or simply proved more appealing.
231. Id. at 56.
232. Id.
233. Doremus, 249 U.S. 86 (1919), was decided March 3, 1919, while the CLTA was passed
on February 24, 1919.
234. Id. at 93 (citing Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U.S. 107, 147, 153, 156 (1911); McCray
v. United States, 195 U.S. 27(1904); Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 533,541 (1869)).
235. Id. at 94.
236. 259 U.S. 20 (1922).
237. Id.
at 37.
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cases did not compel the Court to pretend that Congress's purpose was something
other than regulation. They dictated, rather, that the Court treat the purpose as legally
immaterial. On this point McCray had been unequivocal: "[T]he motive or purpose of
238
Congress in adopting the acts in question may not be inquired into."
McCray was, therefore, a difficult case to distinguish. And the Bailey Court's
attempt was weak. The oleomargarine tax at issue in McCray, it explained, did not
"show on its face as does the law before us the detailed specifications of a regulation
of a state concern and business with a heavy exaction to promote the efficacy of such
regulation."2 39 This was sophism. As far as animating regulatory purposes were
concerned, the CLTA and the earlier margarine tax were on identical ground. Both
taxes were obviously passed for the purpose of discouraging a certain practice that, for
different reasons, Congress disfavored. The Court would have had to be no less blind
to see this in McCray than in Bailey, and such a purpose was no more apparent "on the
face" of the CLTA than on the face of the Oleo Tax. But there was one respect in
which the motivation behind the CLTA was different: Congress sought not only to
regulate in ways that it could not achieve through its other Article I powers, but also to
circumvent a recent Supreme Court decision that specifically barred such regulation. A
reasonable lesson of Bailey, then, was that the Court would not tolerate circumvention
of its precise holdings.
If the Taft Court would not tolerate circumvention of this sort, it would seem odd to
expect anything different from the Rehnquist Court. That this Court is unusually guilty
of arrogating power to itself has become an article of faith in some circles, especially
after the suite of decisions culminating in Bush v. Gore.240 Others insist that the
Court's recent federalism decisions reflect merely its refusal to abdicate its
constitutional duty. 241 For present purposes, it is not necessary for us to choose sides in
this debate. We need only agree that the present Court is no less concerned than were
its predecessors to preserve judicial prerogatives. When the 103rd Congress enacted
The Religious Freedom Restoration Act ("RFRA") in a bid to circumvent Smith,242 for
example, the Court's rebuff was unequivocal.243 And there is little reason to dismiss
Boerne as exceptional. The States' Rights Five have made clear in a variety of contexts
that they will not allow their substantive doctrines to be evaded by niceties of

238. McCray, 195 U.S. at 59.
239. Bailey, 259 U.S. at 42.
240. 531 U.S. 98 (2000). For discussions of this theme, see Larry D. Kramer, The Supreme
Court 2000 Term, Foreword: We the Court, 115 HARV. L. REv. 4 (2001); Robert C. Post &
Reva B. Siegel, Protectingthe Constitutionfrom the People:JuricentricRestrictionson Section
Five Power, 78 IND. L.J. 1 (2003).
241. See, e.g., Baker, Revival ofStates'Rights,supranote 61, at 95 (contending that with its
recent federalism decisions "the Court has signaled a willingness to resume its too-long ignored
duty to enforce the Constitution's protections for state autonomy"); Steven G. Calabresi, "A
Government of Limited and EnumeratedPowers": In Defense of United States v. Lopez, 94
MICH. L. REv. 752, 752 (1995) (describing Lopez as marking a "long overdue revival of the
doctrine that the federal government is one of limited and enumerated powers").
242. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
243. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
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pleading. 2 " Surely they will be just as committed to ensuring that federalism does not
become an ingenious exercise in legislative drafting.
2. An Objection Considered
But maybe this conclusion is too quick. After all, repeatedly in cases that have
curbed congressional power, members of the States' Rights majority have taken pains
to note that current spending jurisprudence permits Congress to achieve the ends that
the invalidated legislation pursued.
In New York, for example, even while striking down the "take title" provision of the
Low-Level Radioactive Policy Amendments Act of 1985, the Court specifically
upheld, as a straightforward conditional exercise of Congress's spending power,
"monetary incentives" under which states that achieved a series of milestones in
establishing waste disposal sites would receive payments from a dedicated federal
fund.245 And five years later, briefly concurring in Printz, Justice O'Connor
reconfirmed her acceptance of conditional spending. Insisting that the Court's
"holding, of course, does not spell the end of the objectives of the Brady Act,"
O'Connor explained that, among other things, "Congress is... free to amend the
interim program to provide for its continuance on a contractual basis with the States if
it wishes. '246 Similarly, in that portion of Alden which sounded the same theme as
O'Connor's Printz concurrence-namely, that the Court's invalidation of federal
legislation did not circumscribe congressional power as much as the Court's critics
would charge-the majority dropped a "cf" cite to Dole in observing that, "subject to
constitutional limitations .... the Federal Government [does not] lack the authority or
means to seek the States' voluntary consent to private suits. ' 247 Based on evidence
such as this, some scholars have supposed that, far from viewing a possible spendingbased circumvention with hostility, the States' Rights justices would in fact welcome
it.248

We do not think so, for the particular uses of the spending power that we have
hypothesized in Part IV do not appear to be what these justices meant to invite or to
authorize. Notice the words that commentators use to describe the sorts of statutes we
have discussed: exploit, evade, circumvent, loophole. 249 We think this nomenclature is

244. See, e.g., Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261,270 (1997) ("The real
interests served by the Eleventh Amendment are not to be sacrificed to elementary mechanics of
captions and pleading."); Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 566 (1992) ("Standing
is not 'an ingenious academic exercise in the conceivable') (citing United States v. Students
Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures, 412 U.S. 669, 688 (1973)).
245. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 171-72 (1992).
246. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898,936 (1997) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citing the
highway safety program, 23 U.S.C. § 402 (2000)).
247. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 755 (1999).
248. See, e.g., Zietlow, supra note 204, at 190-91 (claiming that the Court "virtually has
invited Congress to use its Spending Power to circumvent Tenth Amendment limitations").
249. See, e.g., Choper & Yoo, supra note 219, at 857 ("Given the broad sweep of the
spending power as currently construed, the federal government would quite clearly have the
ability to evade the direct limits on its Commerce Clause powers."); Norman Redlich & David
R. Lurie, Federalism:A Surrogatefor What Really Matters, 23 OHlo N.U. L. REv. 1273, 1283
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not accidental. Instead, it suggests a useful distinction: the States' Rights may have
intended to invite Congress to avoid some of the consequences of the Court's decisions
by using the spending power in a way that would comply with Dole;250 they did not
intend Congress to evade or circumvent its holdings by exploiting Dole.
Precisely what distinguishes avoidance from evasion and mere rule compliance
from rule exploitation are nice questions.231 But for present purposes exquisite
precision is not required, for the root ideas are easy enough to grasp. Start with the idea
of a loophole. No rule perfectly fits the considerations that generate it. Relative to its
underlying reasons, every rule is overinclusive or underinclusive, or both. As a first, if
rough, cut, then, let us stipulate that "loophole" describes the space in which the rule
permits conduct that its own underlying considerations, if directly enforced, would
prohibit.252 It is that place where the letter of the rule underenforces the spirit. Dole

n.60 (1997) ("As commentators have noted, the Court's current Spending Clause jurisprudence
appears to offer a significant potential loophole to the reach ofNew York."); Angel D. Mitchell,
Comment, ConditionalFederalFunding to the States, 48 U. KAN. L. REv. 161, 168 (1999)
("Although the Court set forth this prohibition against congressional commandeering of the
states, it nevertheless preserved a method by which Congress may readily evade this prohibition
by simply exercising its spending power."); Brett D. Proctor, Note, Usingthe SpendingPower to
Circumvent City of Boeme v. Flores: Why the CourtShould Require ConstitutionalConsistency
in its UnconstitutionalConditions Analysis, 75 N.Y.U. L. REv. 469, 469-70 (2000) ("[T]he

spending power has been invoked repeatedly in recent years as the clearest, and perhaps only,
tool with which Congress might circumvent the Supreme Court's apparent willingness to enforce
federalism-based constitutional norms."); Kimberly Sayers-Fay, Comment, ConditionalFederal
Spending: A Back Door to EnhancedFree Exercise Protection, 88 CAL. L. REv. 1281, 1299
(2000) ("Depending on one's perceptions, Dole is either a crack in the constitutional foundation

or an opportunity begging to be exploited."); Ryan C. Squire, Note, Effectuating Principlesof
Federalism: Reevaluating the Federal Spending Power as the Great Tenth Amendment
Loophole, 25 PEPP. L. REv. 869 (1998).

250. It is possible that Justice Scalia, at least, does not truly mean to invite even this.
Consider this intriguing passage from Printzon the subject of whether Congress has engaged in
a historical practice of commandeering state or local officials:
The Government points to a number of federal statutes enacted within the past few
decades that require the participation of state or local officials in implementing
federal regulatory schemes. Some of these are connected to federal funding
measures, and can perhaps be more accurately described as conditions upon the
grant of federal funding than as mandates to the States; others, which require only
the provision of information to the Federal Government, do not involve the precise
issue before us here, which is the forced participation of the States' executive in
the actual administration of a federal program. We of course do not address these
or other currently operative enactments that are not before us; it will be time
enough to do so if and when their validity is challenged in a proper case.
Printz,521 U.S. at 917-18. One might read the last sentence as tipping Scalia's hand. See Baker,
Revival ofStates Rights, supranote 61 at 103. But if he means to hint that some of the measures
discussed earlier would not survive a proper challenge, it remains unclear whether that hint is

intended to cover the entire preceding sentence or just the measures referenced after the
semicolon.

251. For a provocative, if idiosyncratic, exploration, see LEO KATZ,
EVASION, BLACKMAIL, FRAUD, AND KINDRED PUZZLES OF THE LAW

ILL-GOTTEN GAINS:

(1996).

252. It is worth noting that this is apparently not the sense of loophole at work in Celestine
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creates a loophole because it is a judge-made rule designed to implement a standardlike constitutional norm. However that norm could conceivably be interpreted, there is
little doubt that the States' Rights Five understand it as designed to preserve a sphere
for the vibrant exercise of meaningful state sovereignty. Insofar as the particular
limitations set forth in Dole prove inadequate to that task-a prospect
there is every
254
253
-to that extent the doctrine contains a loophole.
reason to predict

Now, the Court might be willing to tolerate some statutes falling into the Dole
loophole. Loopholes are ubiquitous in law and not always filled. But two other
concepts become important: exploitation and circumvention. Sometimes actions fall
into loopholes, other times they are deposited there. Borrowing from Meir DanCohen's useful trope of an "acoustic separation" between conduct rules and decision
rules, 255 we might imagine that a loophole-containing rule was formulated as a decision
rule designed to adjudicate alleged violations of a conduct rule that was articulated in
the standard-like terms of the rule's animating considerations. Even were the decision
rule acoustically separated from the conduct rule's subjects-and thus the locations
and shapes of the decision rule's loopholes unknown-the conduct rule's addressees
might nonetheless sometimes act in ways that bring them within the loopholes. But
accidents of this sort could not be expected often. Because acoustic separation is a
fiction, however, the rule's addressees know just where the loopholes are and therefore
enter them far more frequently. We may say, accordingly, that one "exploits a
loophole" when she steers her behavior into that space where the hypothetical decision
rule safeguards conduct that the hypothetical conduct rule prohibits, and does so with
awareness or at least suspicion that the space is just of this sort. This, we think, is no
more than the common intuitive sense of what it means to exploit a loophole.
Third, and finally, circumvention occurs (as opposed, say, to mere, non-normatively
charged, avoidance) when one escapes the bite of any given rule precisely by
exploiting a loophole in the system, rather than by some other means. Put another way,
one circumvents Rule B when she achieves an outcome that Rule B is designed to
protect against and does so by exploiting a loophole in Rule A. And even though
persons will disagree about when the phenomenon occurs,256 we suspect that many will

Richards McConville, FederalFunding Conditions: Bursting Through the Dole Loopholes, 4
CHAP. L. REv. 163 (2001). McConville appears to treat each of the five Dole conditions as a
"loophole" through which to promote state interests as against national ones.
253. Dole did not purport to announce anything new. Not only did it merely identify
limitations that had emerged from previous Supreme Court spending decisions, see Dole, 483
U.S. at 207-08, it provided no reason to suspect that this common law process of doctrinemaking had reached a stable resting place. Indeed, the decision upon which Dole relied most
heavily made clear that the difficult task of articulating precise limits to the spending power was
ongoing. See Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 591 (1937) ("In such circumstances, if

in no others, inducement or persuasion does not go beyond the bounds of power. We do not fix
the outermost line. Enough for present purposes that wherever the line may be, this statute is
within it. Definition more precise must abide the wisdom of the future.").
254. Cf New York, 505 U.S. at 167 (explaining that it is necessary to limit conditional
spending lest "the spending power.., render academic the Constitution's other grants and limits
of federal authority").

255. See generally, Meir Dan-Cohen, Decision Rules and Conduct Rules: On Acoustic
Separation in CriminalLaw, 97 HARV. L. REV. 625 (1984).
256. Precisely because the reasons underlying a given rule are contestable, it will not always
be obvious to any given onlooker just where the loopholes are-where, that is, the rule's letter
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share the intuitive sense that there is something at least dodgy, and sometimes plain
wrongful, about it.25 7 Surely when viewed from a perspective internalto a particular
normative system, it is presumptively improper to exploit that system's loopholes to
circumvent others of its rules.
If this is right, then it misses our point to object that for one to engage in specified
conduct "only because the law allows it" is commonplace, indeed desirable.258
Consciously shaping one's conduct to the demands of the law is concededly what the
law desires. Consciously shaping one's conduct to comply with what one suspects are
the law's loopholes is not.259 More to the point, for Congress to shape its policy to
what it suspects are Dole's loopholes is not what the States' Rights Five desire. Note
this telling recent observation by Justice Kennedy, joined by the Chief Justice and
Justices Scalia and Thomas: Because, under Dole,
Congress can use its Spending Clause power to pursue objectives outside of
Article l's enumerated legislative fields by attaching conditions to the grant of
federal funds .... the Spending Clause power, if wielded without concern for the
federal balance, has the potential to obliterate distinctions between national and
local spheres of interest and power by permitting the Federal Government to set
traditional state concern, areas which
policy in the most sensitive areas of
260
otherwise would lie outside its reach.
This is a revealing passage. We read it to indicate that at least these four Justices
recognize that merely nominal compliance with Dole's strictures might not be enough
to maintain the "distinctions between national and local spheres of interest and

underenforces its spirit-nor whether the loopholer acted inadvertently or exploitatively. Still
less, then, could all reasonable onlookers always be in agreement. But sometimes they will be.
257. It is probably true that courts often tolerate exploitation of loopholes. But we suppose
that any such tolerance usually occurs when the reviewing court did not create the loophole in
the first place. Where a legislature or agency has created the loophole, a common (but not
invariable) judicial reaction is to enforce the letter, not the spirit, and leave it up to the rule
maker to close the loophole if it can and so wishes. Matters are very different where, as in Dole,
the Court itself inadvertently created the loophole in the exercise of its power to make
constitutional doctrine. Of course, one might be tempted to respond that what we have called the
Dole loophole is not really a creation of the Court but, rather, the direct and inescapable force of
the Constitution itself. We do not doubt that the Constitution does itself create loopholes. But
given the richness of interpretive resources at the judiciary's disposal, we cannot agree that this
is one of them. The particular requirements that emerge from Dole-especially, that the
condition not be unrelated to the federal interest in the spending program to which it is attached
and that it not be impermissibly coercive-are no more constitutionally compelled than would be
a doctrine that closed the loophole by, for example, interpreting the Spending Clause, in
conjunction with the Tenth Amendment, to disallow spending conditions that "unduly interfere
with state sovereignty."
258. See, e.g., KATZ, supra note 25 1, at 12 ("Why exactly should we disapprove of someone
for doing something only because of the law?") (emphasis in original).
259. For a persuasive argument to this effect, see Dan M. Kahan, Ignorance of Law Is an
Excuse-but Onlyfor the Virtuous, 96 Micf. L. REV. 127 (1997).
260. Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 654-55 (1999) (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting) (internal quotations omitted).
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power"-distinctions that they, along with Justice O'Connor, plainly deem essentialand, therefore, that they will expect Congress to be guided when exercising its
spending power not only by the letter of Dole but also by an adequate "concern for the
federal balance" (adequate, presumably, by these Justices' lights). 261 How much
clearer a signal could they send that they do not intend to sit idly by if Congress,
insufficiently motivated by concern for the federal balance, consciously exploits
Dole's imperfections to trench upon sensitive areas of traditional state concern-such
as those areas that recent precedent has preserved against other sorts of national
intrusion?
Of course, even if the States' Rights Five would look with disfavor upon a
maneuver by Congress to exploit the Dole loophole so as to circumvent one of the
Court's recent decisions, that is not enough to establish that it would do something
about it. The reason loopholes exist, after all, is that it is often difficult to craft judicial
doctrine that both is administrable and closely tracks the underlying policy
considerations. Closing a doctrinal loophole almost always comes at the cost of
creating overenforcement; sometimes that cost is thought too high. So the question
becomes whether the Court could find a way to repulse Congress at a cost it finds
tolerable.262
B. Tightening Dole
The first possible route to invalidating a circumventionist statute is to tighten Dole
itself. "Rational basis with bite" provides a useful (though imperfect) 263 analogy. Just
as the Court in Cleburne264 (and this very Court in Romer)265 maintained nominal
fidelity to the rational basis test while applying it with new-found stringency to strike
down discrimination that a majority evidently found obnoxious, perhaps a majority of
the present Court could apply Dole with greater bite without formally changing or
adding to any of its requirements. The relatedness and coercion prongs of the Dole test
are the most obvious candidates for tightening.266 Each of these prongs could be

261. Recall those passages from recent federalism decisions that some commentators have
read as authorizing any legislation that complies with Dole. See supranotes 245-48. We can see
now that these passages are most safely interpreted to mean that Congress may realize the ends
that the stricken legislation pursued by using its spending power in a way that complied with
constitutional strictures, but not to mean that Congress should feel itself free to pursue those
ends in any way that existing judge-made spending doctrine permits, insofar as those two things
may differ.
262. Cf Choper & Yoo, supranote 219, at 858 ("the Court may find it difficult to develop
more limiting standards for the Spending Clause-such as by attempting to narrow the nexus it
requires between federal spending programs and their related conditions").
263. The analogy is imperfect because "rational basis with bite" involves applying the
standard-like terms that constitute the test-"rational" and "substantial"-with greater rigor,
whereas the more interesting ways to tighten Dole involve reconceptualizing the test's
constituent concepts, as we will explain.
264. Cleburne v. Clebume Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
265. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
266. Perhaps the "general welfare" requirement should be added to this list. Given that the
Court had questioned in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 90-91 (1976) (per curiam), "whether

'general welfare' is a judicially enforceable restriction at all," Dole, 483 U.S. at 207 n.2, this
prong probably has the least bite of all. Yet the most obvious tightening would involve the
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applied with greater bite than was applied in Dole itself.
1. Relatedness
That the relatedness requirement could be applied more or less rigorously is
obvious and was plainly recognized in Dole itself by both the majority and the
principal dissent. But just how strictly it was applied in Dole and what it would mean
to apply it more strictly are rather less obvious.
After observing that previous "cases have not required that we define the outer
bounds of the 'germaneness' or 'relatedness' limitation on the imposition of conditions
under the spending power," the Dole majority concluded that the condition that a state
impose a minimum drinking age of twenty-one did in fact "relate[] directly to the
purpose of the expenditure to which it is attached" and, therefore, that it was
unnecessary for the Court to determine how directly related the condition and the
expenditure need be.267 Justice O'Connor, in dissent, took issue with the majority on
just this score, deeming "the Court's application of the requirement that the condition
imposed be reasonably related to the purpose for which the funds are expended...
cursory and unconvincing," 268 and insisting that "establishment of a minimum drinking
age of 21 is not sufficiently related to interstate highway construction to justify so
conditioning funds appropriated for that purpose., 269 This was so, she explained,
because
if the purpose of [the condition] is to deter drunken driving, it is far too over- and
under-inclusive. It is over-inclusive because it stops teenagers from drinking even
when they are not about to drive on interstate highways. It is under-inclusive
because27teenagers pose only a small part of the drunken driving problem in this
Nation. 0
In short, the relationship between the condition and the purpose of the federal
expenditures was too "attenuated or tangential. 27'
All these modifiers-directly, reasonably, sufficiently, attenuated, tangential-make
clear that the relatedness requirement could be applied more or less stringently. That is,
the requirement could be operationalized to make it easier or harder to satisfy.
Unfortunately, the sheer variety of these modifiers and the wholly unsatisfying
analyses in which they feature leave entirely unclear precisely how the standard could
be applied with greater or lesser bite.27 2 Take the majority's assertion that a requirement

Court's either substituting its own judgment on an ad hoc basis as to whether a particular
condition did or did not advance the general welfare or specifying standards or a definition to
distinguish "general" welfare from "particular." It would be hard to invigorate this prong in
either of these ways without acknowledging that the rules have changed. We therefore pursue
this line of thought in the next section. See infra Part V.C.2.
267. Dole, 483 U.S. at 208-09 n.3.
268. Id. at 213.
269. Id. at 213-14.
270. Id. at 214-15.
271. Id. at 215.
272. Cf Proctor, supra note 249, at 481-82 (observing that the relatedness "requirement is
commonly viewed as the most important of all the Dole criteria" but that "[i]ts precise content
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of direct relatedness, whether or not constitutionally compelled, was "satisfied in this
case in any event." 273 Why so? And if so, what would an indirect relationship look
like? Imagine a federal statute that required states to criminalize drunk driving as a
condition for receiving their full allotment of federal highway funds. Surely this seems
"directly related to one of the main purposes for which highway funds are expendedsafe interstate travel., 274 A minimum drinking age promotes the same purpose one step
removed: it reduces drunk driving by reducing the number of persons who may legally
drink. To be sure, it is perfectly reasonable to suppose that reducing the number of
legal drinkers (especially among young people) reduces the total amount of drunk
driving. But because one more causal link is involved the relationship between the
condition and the spending purpose in the actual statute is at least somewhat less direct
than it is in the hypothetical statute. So if the actual statute is not as directly related to
the spending program's purpose as it could be, what makes it directly related at all, as
opposed to "indirectly related"? That is, what determines where on the continuum
between direct and indirect the critical line gets drawn? 275 The majority offers no hint.
Unfortunately, while the majority's analysis is unsatisfying, Justice O'Connor's is
simply confused. In concluding that the "relationship between the supposed purpose of
the expenditure.., and the drinking age condition" is not "reasonable[]," 276 O'Connor
relies heavily on notions of under- and overinclusiveness. That the condition is in fact
under- and over-inclusive in just the ways she claims is undeniable. But so what? If
South Dakota had prevailed against the United States and retained its minimum
drinking age of nineteen, and if eighteen year-olds had challenged the law on equal
protection grounds, does anyone doubt that the plaintiffs would have been laughed out
of court notwithstanding that the same under- and overinclusiveness would be present?
Or suppose that after Dole Congress finds that many teenagers are drinking and driving
despite the nationwide minimum drinking age of twenty-one. In an effort to reduce
teenage drinking, and thereby to promote highway safety, Congress authorizes funds to
subsidize state-run educational programs designed to urge teenagers to abstain from
alcohol. As a means to promote safe highway travel, this spending program would be
infected by just the same over- and underinclusiveness that tainted the condition
upheld in Dole. And yet this statute would pass the test that O'Connor ultimately
endorses: "Congress has no power under the Spending Clause to impose requirements
on a grant that go beyond specifying how the money should be spent., 277 Both of these
points suggest that determining the constitutional sufficiency of the relationship

today is unclear").
273. Dole, 483 U.S. at 208 n.3.
274. Id. at 209.
275. Indeed, concerns like this have persuaded various of the States' Rights Justices in at

least some contexts to eschew tests that depend at all upon "directness" inquiries. See, e.g.,
Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 818 (2000) (plurality opinion) ("Whether one chooses to label

this program 'direct' or 'indirect' is a rather arbitrary choice, one that does not further the
constitutional analysis.").
276. Dole, 483 U.S. at 214 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
277. Id. at 216 (quoting Brief for the National Conference of State Legislatures as Amici
Curiae). We assume that O'Connor's proposed test incorporates the negative implication.
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between condition and expenditure by reference to the under- and overinclusiveness of
means to end is mistaken.278
If cashing out Dole'srelatedness requirement by reference to degrees of directness
between the condition and the "purpose" of the expentidture seems unpromising, and
by inquiry into magnitudes ofover- and underinclusiveness positively misguided, there
may be another possibility. 279 Start with the commonplace idea that every
governmental action, like all purposive action, serves a chain of purposes or
interests.280 Consequently, two governmental actions (be they expenditures,
regulations, requests, proclamations, etc.) are related more or less closely in inverse
proportion to the number of purposive links each must serve before their two chains
coincide.
This perhaps obvious point, like many points of comparable intuitiveness, may be
brought home more clearly with a graphical representation. The notion of relatedness
that Justice O'Connor invokes is famously represented, thanks to Tussman and
tenBroek, by Venn Diagrams. 28 That is the classic way to represent the relationship
between sets. It is not, however, an apt way to depict the relationship among actions
and purposes. A family tree is. Consider, then, this highly schematic view of a tiny
piece from a hypothetical tree depicting actions and purposes of the federal
government (the actions represented by the shaded rectangles). (See FIGURE 1).

278. Not too surprisingly, then, the cases that Dole relied upon for its relatedness
requirement-Massachusetts v. United States, 435 U.S. 444,461 (1978) (plurality opinion), and
Ivanhoe Irrigation Dist. v. McCracken, 357 U.S. 275, 295 (1958)-invoked the barest dueprocess-style notion of reasonableness; they lend little or no support for the Dole majority's
seeming interest in directness of relationship or O'Connor's focus on equal-protection-like
closeness-of-fit.
279. Others have argued that the Court might hold that the broad "program or activity"
language of Titles VI and IX runs afoul of the relatedness requirement. See, e.g., Berman, Reese
& Young, supranote 35, at 1137-42; Conkle, supranote 130, at 675-76. Although we continue
to think that is possible, see supra note 202 and accompanying text, our analysis here is very
different. We here explore ways to make the relatedness prong tighter than it was in Dole. It is
not at all clear that it requires any tightening of that requirement as it was applied in Dole in
order to hold Congress not entitled to restrict the behavior of every program or activity of an
institution as a condition of that institution's receiving federal funding.
280. This familiar point is nicely made in John Hart Ely, Legislative andAdministrative
Motivation in ConstitutionalLaw, 79 YALE L.J. 1205, 1217-21 (1970).
281. See Joseph Tussman & Jacobus tenBroek, The EqualProtectionof the Laws, 37 CAL. L.
REV. 341, 347 (1949).
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FIGURE I
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The family tree metaphor is appropriate. For one thing, a given purpose might be said
to generate or sire the subordinate purposes that serve it. More significantly, the
distance between actions as measured by the connecting branches seems to capture our
intuitive sense of the closeness of their relationship. A federal request that states raise
their minimum drinking age, for example, is more closely related to a federal
regulation requiring all new cars to be outfitted with ignition locks that will not open
unless the operator passes a breathalyzer test than to a federal law imposing criminal
penalties upon accidental discharge of a firearm. And each of these actions is more
closely related to the other two than to, say, federal funding of the Kennedy Center for
the Performing Arts, which presumably serves purposes at some distant remove in the
complete tree.
Given this general way to think about the relationships among governmental actions
like expenditures and conditions (the relationship is closer the fewer the purposive
links that connect them), and given the particular way that this chart characterizes
actions and the hierarchy of purposes they subtend, it becomes clear that the
relatedness requirement could be applied more stringently than it was in Dole itself.
Indeed, the directness language of Rehnquist's majority opinion provides a clue, for
the relatedness prong could be reformulated to require that the expenditure and the
condition be so closely related that the purpose each "directly" (or immediately) serves
be the same. 282 Under this formulation of the rule-what we might term, with a nod to
the "least restrictive means" test from First Amendment jurisprudence,283 a "most
direct relationship" test-Congress would be permitted to condition funds for highway
improvements on a state's agreement to undertake a specified schedule of road
maintenance because each would promote the immediate federal purpose in improving
roadway conditions, but Congress could not condition the same funds on a state's
enacting any specified minimum drinking age because that condition serves the distinct
immediate purpose of reducing drunk driving. This formulation, in short, dictates a
different result on the very facts of Dole. It is, therefore, unmistakably a tightening.
Although we do believe that the twin notions (a) that governmental actions serve a
chain of nested purposes and (b) that the conceptual structure of these purposes is best
represented by a tree, provide a coherent and sensible way to think about how closely
or distantly particular governmental actions are related, we hasten to acknowledge that
trying to turn this appreciation into a determinate and administrable judicial rule
confronts severe, possibly intractable, difficulties. 284 We do not pursue these concerns
here, though, for a variety of reasons, not the least of which being that we are
emphatically not recommending that the Court should tighten Dole in this fashion.
However useful or illuminating this way of conceiving the relationship between

282. Continuing the familial metaphor, this would be to require that the expenditure and
condition be "siblings."
283. See, e.g., Sable Communications v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989).
284. Perhaps the most obvious challenges involve how to choose among competing plausible
formulations of purposes and, relatedly, how thinly to slice the purposive chain. And even once
the nodes in the tree are set, the problem of measuring distance remains, for the tree depicts
topological relations but not geometric ones. Therefore, the fact that funding highway
improvements is five links removed from both imposing criminal penalties for accidental
discharge of a firearm and asking states to enact a specified minimum drinking age should not
entail that each relationship is identically close (or distant).
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expenditure and condition may be for some purposes, we do not think it makes sense
as a test of constitutionality. In fact, one of the signal benefits of this conceptualization
and graphic representation is that they help show why this is so. 28 5 Be that as it may, so
long as the Court requires that each spending condition "bear[s] some relationship to
the purpose of the federal spending,, 286 this discussion shows how that relationship
could be conceived and articulated to give Dole greater bite.
2. Coercion
The Dole Court's treatment of coercion is nearly as confusing as its treatment of
relatedness. 287 As a purely nominal matter, it is not even clear whether the Court meant
to prohibit all coercive offers or just some subset of them. The Court's observation
"that in some circumstances the financial inducement offered by Congress might be so
coercive as to pass the point at which 'pressure turns into compulsion,"' 288 suggests the
latter: some coercion is permissible so long as the coercion is not so great in magnitude
as to constitute compulsion. But the Court's subsequent approval of Justice Cardozo's
remark that "'to hold that motive or temptation is equivalent to coercion is to plunge
the law in endless difficulties,', 289 suggests the former: a too-quick finding of coercion
would create difficulties only if such a finding would require the law's invalidation.

285. Two points, the first practical, and the second theoretical. First, the tree makes clear why
the Dole approach to relatedness becomes easier to satisfy the more Congress does. Whenever
Congress desires to induce a given behavior from the states, all it must do (as far as the
relatedness requirement is concerned) is look up the tree for the purpose that such behavior
would serve and then look down from that purpose for a spending program that also serves it. As
Congress expands its spending to serve more and more low-level interests (that is, immediate
interests as opposed to ultimate ones), it becomes increasingly unlikely that any demand would
be designed to promote an interest that is not already being promoted by a federal funding
program. The perverse consequence of this rule designed to protect state prerogatives, then, is
that congressional power begets congressional power.
Second, regardless of how extensive federal spending is or becomes, a test which requires
that a condition serve the same purpose as the expenditure to which it is attached invites cynical
or self-defeating legislation. Suppose that in the shadow of the Second Amendment, Congress
has identified only two means to pursue its interest in reducing firearm accidents: asking states
to impose their own stringent limits on gun ownership, and funding state-administered firearm
safety classes. What the diagram shows, were it not clear enough already, is that conditioning
the latter on a state's acquiescence in the former is an all-or-nothing strategy. If a state declines

the federal request then the federal interest will not be advanced in that state at all, even though
(what is not always the case) the condition and the expenditure are in fact fully independent
means to realize the purpose that they share.
286. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 167 (1992).
287. Still, the Court should not be criticized too heavily for this. As one philosopher has
noted, "In concept, dimensions, and the realities of phenomena, coercion is indeed laden with
ambiguity, complexity, and elusive ingredients." Samuel Dubois Cook, Coercion and Social
Change, in NOMOS XIV: COERCION 107, 115 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Chapman eds.,
1972). For a recent effort by one of us to unravel some of these complexities, see Mitchell N.
Berman, The Normative Functionsof Coercion Claims, 8 LEGAL THEORY 45 (2002).
288. Dole, 483 U.S. at 211 (quoting Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 590 (1937)).
289. Id.(quoting Steward, 301 U.S at 589-90).
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Putting nomenclature aside, though, the Court's general idea is clear enough. In one
common sense of the term, coercion stands as an antonym of sorts for freedom or
voluntariness: 2g9 When one is "coerced" (or "compelled") to do x, one does not do x
"voluntarily" or of one's own "free will." And it is this sense that Dole has in mind:
Congress has not impermissibly coerced 29' "the States to enact higher minimum
drinking ages than they would otherwise choose" because "the enactment
of such laws
292
remains the prerogative of the States not merely in theory but in fact."
Yet if the general idea is clear enough, its specification is not. For what it might
mean for a state to accept a condition involuntarily is highly ambiguous. Because this
is well-worn ground,293 we will be brief.

Consider the different ways to make sense of involuntary or compelled conduct by
individuals. 294 Sometimes we say that an individual acted "involuntarily" or was
compelled to act as she did when her conduct was not preceded by volition at all, as
when A forcibly propels B's arm into C. 295 Were B subsequently charged with an
assault on C, she would be acquitted precisely on the ground that her conduct was not
voluntary. Likewise if B moved her arm as a consequence of hypnosis or while sleep
walking.

296

But this is only one sense of involuntariness and the least interesting at that.
Consider another familiar situation in which B is said to be compelled to accept a
condition: when in response to a credible threat of death. If B slaps C in response to
A's threat to kill B if she does not, we would have no difficulty in adjudging B's action
"compelled" or "involuntary," not the product of mere "encouragement" or

290. An example of this sense of coercion is emphasized in, for example, J. Roland Pennock,
Coercion: An Overview, in NOMOS XIV: COERCION, supra note 287, at 1. There is a distinct
sense of coercion in which A coerces B when presenting a certain sort of wrongful proposal.
One of us has argued that the Court should revise its conditional spending jurisprudence to
operate upon this sense of coercion--one that looks to the character of Copgress's conductrather than the other sense of coercion-that looks to the voluntariness of the state's choice.
Although this revision would still use the word "coercion," the underlying concept would be
different. We therefore treat this proposal as an alternative to the Dole test not as a tightening of
it. See infra Part V.C.4.
291. The phrase "impermissible coercion" is intended to meet the ambiguity we have just
noted. If the constitutional line is drawn between coercion and compulsion, then read
"impermissible" as a modifier: coercion is okay, impermissible coercion (i.e., compulsion) is
not. If the line is drawn between encouragement and coercion, then read "impermissible" as a
characterization not a qualification: coercion is impermissible.
292. Dole, 483 U.S. at 211-12.
293. See, e.g., McConville, supra note 252, at 172-83; Donald J. Mizerk, Note, The Coercion
Test and Conditional Federal Grants to the States, 40 VAND. L. REv. 1159 (1987); Sayers-Fay,
supra note 249, at 1299-1301.
294. This discussion is indebted to Alan Wertheimer's illuminating analysis. See ALAN
WERTHHEIMER, COERCION 192-201 (1987). It also draws from Berman, Reese & Young, supra
note 35, at 1152-54.
295. We anticipate that some readers may resist calling this coercion, deeming only
"compulsion" apt. For what it is worth, though, theorists often do classify this as a form of
coercion. See, e.g., Michael D. Bayles, A Concept of Coercion, in NOMOS XIV: COERCION,
supra note 287, atl6, 17.
296. See, e.g., Model Penal Code § 2.01 (2001).
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"temptation." Surely B had "no choice" but to slap C. As a conceptual matter, though,
if perhaps not a normative one, this situation is readily distinguishable from the first.
To return to the criminal law, B will still be acquitted, but this time thanks to the
affirmative defenses of necessity 297 and duress; 298 her conduct is sufficiently voluntary
to satisfy the actus reus requirement.
Extreme situations like this, however, do not exhaust the range ofcases in which we
commonly seek to excuse, or at least explain, our actions on the grounds of having had
"no choice" in the matter--cases in which one's conduct is not the product of one's
own "prerogative." For our limited purposes, one example-the destitute widow
hypothetical-should suffice. Suppose that a wealthy bachelor offers to house and feed
a destitute widow and her three children in exchange for periodic sexual intimacies
(with the widow, not the children).299 Suppose too that the bachelor is no more
obligated to these unfortunates than is anyone else and -that the widow's best
alternatives would be extremely hard on her and her family but far from threatening
death. The widow accepts. Feeling a mix of sorrow, anger, and degradation, however,
she might find herself explaining, to herself or to others, that she really had "no
choice" but to accept. It seems to us that this is an eminently plausible claim. And yet
the widow surely had more choice than the gunman's victim did. She might even
acknowledge that, yes, she could have chosen to reject the bachelor's offer in a way
that B, in the earlier hypothetical, could not.
If all this is so, at least two distinct, but not mutually exclusive, ways to make sense
of the widow's claim suggest themselves. The underlying thought might be, first, that
her choice predicament was so unfair, her options so far from what the society might
deem minimally normatively acceptable, as to justify our thinking her choice not
"really" voluntary. Second, regardless of the fairness of her choice predicament, there
is a possible sense in which the widow's decision to accept did not issue from the
exercise of her own subjective decisional autonomy but, rather, from the demands of
to do that the choice was
rationality itself. Acceptance was so plainly the only thing
300
not hers, but was instead made for her by circumstances.

297. See id. § 3.02 (1)(a) ("Conduct that the actor believes to be necessary to avoid a harm or
evil to himself or to another is justifiable, provided that the harm or evil sought to be avoided by
such conduct is greater than that sought to be prevented by the law defining the offense
charged.").
298. See id. § 2.09 (1) (extending an affirmative defense to an actor who was coerced to
commit an offense "by the use of, or a threat to use, unlawful force against his person or the
person of another, that a person of reasonable firmness in his situation would have been unable
to resist").
299. This hypothetical is raised in Commonwealth v. Minarich, 498 A.2d 395, 402 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1985).
300. This is a subtle and potentially controversial take on what "no choice" could mean and
might therefore warrant more fleshing out. Perhaps part of what it means to choose among
alternatives includes the idea of exercising one's individuality. That is, the act of choosing both
expresses and partially constitutes an agent's uniqueness. What makes a choice my choice is, in
part, precisely that it is mine, and not, for example, yours or everyone's. But if everybody (at
least every sane and rational human being) would make the same choice then that distinction
cannot be drawn: "my choice" becomes, in a sense, simply "the choice." And we could perhaps
go even further: if the notion of a choice includes the notion that there exists an opportunity
(even a need?) for an agent to do the choosing (that is, if there exists "a choice" to be made
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This brief discussion suggests, then, that we might usefully distinguish four sorts of
claimed involuntariness or unfreedom that might arise in response to behavior of
another: when the claimant's conduct is "non-volitional" in the sense of having been
produced by "no choice at all"; when she has "no practical choice" but to do as she
does because doing otherwise would be in a literal or figurative sense suicidal; when
she has "no fair choice" because we think the range of alternatives she faced was
unacceptably narrow as a normative matter; and when she has "no rational choice"
because only one alternative is consistent with the minimum demands of instrumental
rationality. This is not an exhaustive division of the terrain but it is at least a plausible
start.
Of these four ways to cash out the notion of being compelled to accept a condition
attached to a spending program, it is not entirely clear on the face of Dole which
Rehnquist intended. The first possibility can be ruled out as being simply inapposite
when transferred from the domain of human action to that of state action. States cannot
be physically manipulated by other states nor are they subject to reflexive or
convulsive action. 30 1 Whatever Rehnquist may have had in mind (even if inchoately),
most lower courts seem to read Dole as implicating the "no practical choice"
conception of what it means to be impermissibly coerced: if a state could reject the
condition and still survive essentially as a state, then acceptance of the condition is
freely chosen and the condition is not impermissibly coercive.30 2 Indeed, this seems the
conceptualization most faithful to the precedents upon which Dole relies. 30 3 If this is
so, then the ways to tighten the coercion prong become plain. It is not only a matter of
the Court's being disposed to find impermissible coercion present at some less onerous
point on a single continuum of pressure like that measured by the barometric scale
(though the Court could, of course, change its views in just this way). Rather, or more
interestingly, the Court could adopt a different conceptionof what it means for a state
to be presented with "no choice." 304 The Court could reconceptualize the coercion

between A and B only when "my choosing" A over B would reflect my choosing A over B), then
the lack of the opportunity for the exercise of individual agency entails that there is in fact no
choice to be made; the act that the presentation of alternatives calls for is not, properly speaking,
a "choice" but rather, say, an "identification" of the correct alternative.
301. Cf Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 590 (1937) ("Nothing in the case
suggests the exertion of a power akin to undue influence, if we assume that such a concept can
ever be applied with fitness to the relations between state and nation.").
302. See Nevada v. Skinner, 884 F.2d 445,448 (9th Cir.) ("According to the coercion theory,
the federal government may not, at least in certain circumstances, condition the receipt of funds
in such a way as to leave the state with no practical alternative but to comply with federal
restrictions.").
303. Steward, 301 U.S. at 586 ("There must be a showing in the second place that the tax and
the credit in combination are weapons of coercion, destroying or impairing the autonomy of the
states."). See also id. at 593 (observing, after concluding that the tax was not coercive, that, "The
statute does not call for a surrender by the states of powers essential to their quasi sovereign
existence.").
304. Lower courts have noted and criticized Dole's seemingly exclusive focus on the
percentage of programmatic funds as the window into impermissible coercion, wondering why
the relevant metric might not be, for example, total dollars or dollars as a percentage of the
offeree state's budget. See, e.g., Skinner, 884 F.2d at 448. The deeper point, naturally, is that a
choice among these or any other measures would be arbitrary without an understanding of what
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prong as providing that a spending condition is impermissibly coercive if it presents a
state with either no rational choice or nofair choice but to accept, 30 5 even if it leaves
the state with a practical choice not to.

3. Prospects
We have spent some time exploring what it might mean for the Court to preserve
Dole but apply it with greater bite. It seems that, in theory, the test's bite could be
varied in two principal ways: by assessing the purposes served by the condition and the
expenditure to which it is attached at stages of greater or lesser immediacy; and by
conceptualizing impermissible coercion as occurring when Congress presents the states
with a conditional funding offer that they have no fair choice or no rational choice but
to accept, even when the states do enjoy a practical choice not to. In both respects the
Dole test could be applied with greater rigor than the Court applied it to the facts of
that case. That is to say, the Court could maintain at least nominal fidelity to the Dole
test but operationalize the relatedness and impermissible coercion prongs in ways such
that the statute at issue in Dole would have failed both of them. The drinking age
condition could be held insufficiently related to the expenditure of highway funds
because although each serves an interest in reducing the number of highway accidents,
the condition does so via the more immediate purpose of reducing the number of
intoxicated drivers on the roads whereas the expenditure does so via the immediate
purpose of, for example, improving the road surface. And the condition could be found
impermissibly coercive on the grounds that the states have no rational choice but to
accept given the amount of money at stake and the relatively slight importance to a
state of maintaining a minimum drinking age under twenty-one.
The true question, though, is not simply whether the Dole test is amenable to being
applied with bite and a bite forceful enough to have produced a different result in Dole.
Rather, having determined that the test could be ratcheted up in a manner that would
enable a Court bent on invalidating a circumventionist statute to do so without
jettisoning Dole, the more important question becomes whether this possibility is
realistically to be anticipated. 3°
Toughening the coercion prong is, we think, unlikely. Very simply, the no-rationalchoice and no-fair-choice constructions of impermissible coercion are just too
amorphous to be judicially administrable. It is virtually unimaginable that Justice

it means for a state to have "no choice" but to accept a condition and thus to be impermissibly
coerced into it.
305. A decade prior to Dole, one scholar objected that "[d]ebating whether conditions on
federal grants... 'coerce' the state is an unhelpful anthropomorphism.... The question. .. is
not whether federal requirements overbear on a hypostasized state 'free will,' but whether they
unduly compromise a normative political conception of state autonomy." Richard B. Stewart,
PyramidsofSacrifice?Problems ofFederalismin MandatoryState Implementation ofNational
Environmental Policy, 86 YALE L.J. 1196, 1254 (1977). We share this aversion to inquiries that
depend at all on notions of a state's free will (or on anyone's "free will" for that matter). Still,
Stewart's proposal could be recast in "no choice" terms, in particular as asking whether a
conditional offer was coercive because it gave a state "no fair choice" but to accept.
306. For a political-science-inspired discussion that would bear on this question, see Mark
Tushnet, supranote 6, at 61-62.
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Scalia, for instance, would agree to this formulation. °7 Giving significant teeth to the
coercion prong is a theoretical but not practical possibility.
Tightening the relatedness prong, in contrast, is feasible. And it would give Dole
real bite. Consider the circumventionist response to Printz.30 8 Requiring background
checks for gun purchases and providing funds for the hiring of additional police
officers both serve an interest in reducing violent crime. But the condition does so via
an immediate goal of keeping firearms away from felons while the expenditure does so
by increasing the prospects of apprehending criminals and thereby improving
deterrence. Because the immediate purposes behind the condition and the expenditure
are not the same, the two might be held insufficiently related. A College Savings
Bank30 9 circumvention would fare similarly. Reducing bars to vindicating intellectual
property rights promotes the progress of science and the useful arts by increasing
expected returns on successful innovations. Funding research promotes scientific and
artistic progress by reducing the costs to the would-be innovator: different immediate
purposes adopted to serve the same slightly more ultimate purpose.
3
Our hypothetical exploitations of Dole to circumvent Kimel3 '° and Garrett
' would
also be at risk. Sure, the condition that states waive immunity in ADEA cases, like the
medicare program, serves an interest in promoting the overall well being of senior
citizens. But the condition does so by increasing employment opportunities for the
elderly; medicare does so by safeguarding seniors' access to healthcare. And while we
earlier suggested that the ADA is designed to promote the interests of disabled
persons, it does so by pursuing a more immediate purpose-namely, "to provide a

307. Scalia's hostility to standards is well known. See, e.g., Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654,
697-734 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56
U. CHI. L. REv. 1175 (1989). For the most recent installment in this ongoing harangue, see
Devlin v. Scardelletti, 122 S. Ct. 2005, 2013-17 (2002) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Evan Caminker
has pointed out to us that Scalia's assertion for the Court in College Savings Bank v. Florida
PrepaidPostsecondaryEducation Expense Board, 527 U.S. 666, 687 (1999), that "where the
constitutionally guaranteed protection of the States' sovereign immunity is involved, the point of
coercion is automatically passed-and the voluntariness of waiver destroyed-when what is
attached to the refusal to waive is the exclusion of the State from otherwise lawful activity"
might be viewed as adopting a "no fair choice" conception of coercion. That is to say, that a
threat by Congress to bar states from engaging in specified sorts of commercial ventures unless
they agree to waive sovereign immunity in certain types of suits arising from such ventures is
coercive because this is not a "fair choice" to put to the states. We are not sure that Scalia is
thinking in "no fair choice" terms; he might be better understood as viewing the hypothetical as
presenting "no constitutionally acceptable choice." See infra note 372. In any event, College
Savings Bank shows at most that Scalia is prepared to operationalize "no fair choice" judgments
into categorical rules, not that he would sanction such judgments on an ad hoc basis, and
conditional spending does not provide a hospitable context for any such categorical rules. Surely
it is not plausible that all conditional offers of funds present the offeree state with "no fair
choice," and it is not the least bit clear how Scalia might sensibly articulate the subset of
conditional funding proposals for which the "no fair choice" conclusion would be categorically
apt.
308. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
309. College Say. Bank, 527 U.S. at 666.
310. Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000).
311. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2000).
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clear and comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against
individuals with disabilities."3' 1 2 If the federal expenditures to which the waiver
condition is attached aim to benefit disabled people through a different immediate
mechanism, then the condition could be held insufficiently related.
Nonetheless, this tightening may not give Dole quite so much bite as would be
needed to strike down all possible exploitations of the Dole loophole. Consider the
Morrison circumventions. Imagine that Congress conditioned federal funds for local
law enforcement on a state's adopting an effective civil damages remedy for the
victims of such violence. Because the expenditure and the condition are each designed
to advance an immediate interest in deterring violence, it may be hard to credibly
maintain that the relationship between the condition and the spending program could,
let alone should, be any closer.31 3
C. Alternatives to Dole
Suppose the Court does not choose to reinvigorate Dole by tightening relatedness in
the way we have discussed. Perhaps one or more of the States' Rights Five would
disfavor this form of tightening as simply too stringent, or as raising problems of
administrability comparable to those that, we think, will deter it from tightening the
coercion prong. Or suppose the Court finds itself confronted with a circumventionist
spending statute that it cannot dispose of consistent with even an invigorated
application of the Dole test.
We think it would still be premature for self-congratulations by the statute's
drafters. For any such congratulations to be in order, one must assume that a majority
of the Court either would be content to let such a statute stand or would be unable to
craft a doctrine up to the task of defeating it. We gave reasons to doubt the first
possibility in Part V.A. Here we give a reason to doubt the second. That reason, in
short, is that there already exists a growing menu of possible Dole alternatives. We
identify some of them here. 314 Our goal is not to assess each in detail or to champion

312.42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(l) (2003).
313. One might be tempted to object that the expenditures are designed to deter violence
generally whereas the condition is designed to deter gender-related violence in particular, in
which case the "most direct relationship" test is not satisfied. That is a tough question. We are
disposed to believe that this objection errs by confusing different framings with different steps in
a causal chain, but believe too that defending this judgment would demand more space than can
be justified here.
314. This is not an exhaustive survey of extant proposals. Ilya Somin, for example, has
recently argued that even unconditional grants of federal funds to the states and their
subdivisions are unconstitutional (unless properly predicated on Congress's power to enforce the
Reconstruction Amendments) because they threaten the values underlying federalism and are
inconsistent with both the text of the Spending Clause and the original intent. Ilya Somin,
Closing the Pandora's Box of Federalism: The Case for Judicial Restriction of Federal
Subsidies to State Governments, 90 GEO. L.J. 461 (2002). He recognizes, however, that
immediate judicial implementation of a categorical ban on all offers of federal funds to the states
would be unworkable and therefore proposes that the Supreme Court work toward this goal
incrementally. See id.
at 497-502.
Although an evaluation of Somin's argument is beyond the scope of this Article, it is worth
questioning here at least one part of his analysis. Somin contends that Dole "need not pose a
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one or another. Our more modest ambition is to give credence to the idea that if a
majority had sufficient will to strike down a circumventionist statute it could find a
way to do so.
1. Return to Madison
The most obvious possibility-and the most staggering-would be to return to the
Madisonian idea that Congress may not spend to achieve ends it could not achieve
through its other enumerated powers. This alternative would spell a revolution in
federalism sufficient to make all the other Rehnquist Court's federalism decisions
appear mere frivolities by comparison. Although the scope of the imaginable is ever
changing, we think that this falls outside.315
2. Giving Meaning to the "General" Welfare
Under current doctrine, the requirement that federal funds be spent only for the
general welfare is essentially empty. 316 But it was not always thus. In founding thought,
some argue, the qualifier "General" had meaning: it enabled Congress to provide for
the welfare of the nation generally, but not for the particular welfare of a single state or
region. 31 7 Were the Court to readopt this view, the narrow holding of Dole might
survive (the national highway system presumably serving the general welfare) but
surely some circumventions would not-not because of anything objectionable about
the conditions themselves but because the spending programs as a whole would fall.
For example, because federal expenditures to aid local education and local law
enforcement might not promote the general welfare,318 our hypothetical Lopez and
Morrison circumventions would be at risk. To be sure, we would not bet on this sort of

barrier" to his proposal because that decision "did not consider the danger that even
unconditional and wholly noncoercive grants to state governments pose to federalism." Rather,
he says, "[tihe sole point at issue [in Dole] was whether or not the conditions South Dakota was
required to meet were 'so coercive as to pass the point at which pressure turns into
compulsion."' Id.at 488. See also id. at 489 (asserting that pre-Dole cases "also failed to
consider the possibility that federal grants may be constitutionally dubious even if not
coercive"). Somin's view that a prohibition on impermissibly coercive spending conditions,
instead of constituting a de facto fifth -prong, is the entirety of the Dole test strikes us as
inexplicable.
315. Perhaps this reflects a failure of imagination on our part, for other scholars have not
only imagined it, but urged it. See, e.g., John C. Eastman, Restoring the "General" to the
General Welfare Clause, 4 CHAP. L. REv. 63, 66-71 (2001); Richard A. Epstein, Standing and
Spending-The Role ofLegal andEquitablePrinciples,4 CHAP. L. REv. 1, 2 (2001).
316. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1,90-92 (1976); supra text accompanying notes 22-24
& 34.

317. See, e.g., United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 87 (1935) (Stone, J., dissenting) ("The
power to tax and spend is not without constitutional restraints. One restriction is that the purpose
must be truly national."); Eastman, supranote 315.
318. As Eastman puts it, Congress "has only the power to spend for the 'general' welfare and
not for the special welfare of particular regions or states, even if the spending was undertaken in
all regions or all states and therefore might be said to enhance 'general' welfare in the
aggregate." Eastman, supranote 315, at 65.
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revision being adopted, nor do we recommend it.319 We mention this possibility only to
challenge what may be a complacent assumption that an utterly toothless "general
welfare" requirement is inescapable. 32 °
More significantly in our view, the "general welfare" requirement could be rendered
meaningful even without trying to recover the precise historical distinction between
general and particular. One possible approach is suggested by Donald Regan's
marvelous essay on the commerce power. 321 Regan's suggestion is simply stated:
"[W]hen we are trying to decide whether some federal law or program can be justified
under the commerce power, we should ask ourselves the question, 'Is there some
reason the federal government must be able to do this, some reason why we cannot
leave the matter to the states?', 3 22 Were this the critical inquiry, Regan explains, Lopez
was probably rightly decided-there being no reason why the states were incompetent
to address the problem of guns near schools-notwithstanding the palpable
inadequacies of the Court's opinion.323 Whatever may be said for this approach-and

319. For some arguments about why this distinction is unworkable, see Chemerinsky, supra
note 60, at 92-93.
320. Another proposal in a related vein is Laurence Claus's recent suggestion that
congressional authorization to provide for the "generalwelfare" be read together with the other
provisions of Article I, Section 8, Clause 1-namely, that Congress may provide for "the
common defense," and that "all Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uniform throughout the
United States"--to ensure that federal taxing and spending decisions not discriminate in the
distribution of burdens and benefits to the people of the United States by reference to what Claus
terms "the political identities of their states." Laurence Claus, "Uniform Throughout the United
States": Limits on Taxing as Limits on Spending, 18 CONST. COMMENT 517, 520
(2001)(emphasis added). This means, according to Claus, that
congressional spending via state grants must always be part of a federal spending
program which will proceed in all states for the benefit of their populations
whether state governments choose to participate or not. State governments may be
offered the option of spending federal funds in accordance with the policy
requirements of a federal program, but only where the federal government can and
will implement the program directly should state governments choose not to do so.
Id. at 546. Thus, "Congress can never validly give states a choice between affording their
citizens the benefit of federal money and declining to implement a federal regulatory scheme."
Id. at 547. An assessment of this proposal is beyond the scope of this Article.
321. Donald H. Regan, How To ThinkAbout the FederalCommerce PowerandIncidentally
Rewrite United States v. Lopez, 94 MICH. L. REV. 554 (1995). As Regan explains, inspiration
for this approach comes from the sixth of the Virginia Resolutions, approved by the
Constitutional Convention, which provided:
That the National Legislature ought to possess the Legislative Rights vested in
Congress by the Confederation; and moreover, to legislate in all cases for the
general interests of the union, and also in those to which the States are separately
incompetent, or in which the harmony of the United States may be interrupted by
the exercise of individual Legislation.
Id. at 555-56 (quoting JAMES MADISON, NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF
1787, at 380 (W.W. Norton & Co. ed., 1966)):
322. Id. at 555.
323. The principal inadequacy, in our view, being the Court's suggestion, strongly
reinforced in Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000), that the permissibility of Commerce Clause
regulation should depend upon whether the activity being regulated was itself commercial in
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we are disposed to think there is much to recommend it-it is readily transferred to the
spending power too:324 expenditures and conditions thereto being constitutional only
when some general interest of the union lies behind them-interests that would include
overcoming collective action problems. 325 Moreover, the general welfare requirement
might be thought to give the approach greater textual support as a limitation on the
spending power than on the commerce power.

3. O'Connor and the "Regulatory Spending"/"Reimbursement Spending"
Distinction
In her dissent in Dole, Justice O'Connor claimed to concur in the nominal fourprong test set out by the Dole majority,326 but added that she would apply their
"germaneness" requirement differently, 327 ultimately reaching a different result in the
case.328 In fact, however, as suggested earlier,329 O'Connor would have imposed a
substantially different germaneness requirement. The Dole majority was concerned
only that a funding condition not be "unrelated 'to the federal interest in particular
national projects or programs,"' 330 and seemed to cash out this requirement in terms of
degree of directness. O'Connor, in contrast, would have operationalized the
germaneness requirement in terms of acceptable degrees of over- and
underinclusiveness. How much over- or underinclusiveness O'Connor would tolerate
is unclear. 33' Arguably, though, she may be intending to require a "substantial
relationship" between the funding condition and the proclaimed federal interest.332

character. As we discuss above, Guillen is in arguable tension with this aspect of Morrison.See
supranotes 170-73 and accompanying text. If the activity being regulated should be commercial
for purposes of the "substantial effects" prong of post-Lopez Commerce Clause jurisprudence,
why ought not a similar restriction apply to the first two prongs of that doctrine?
324. Cf Regan, supra note 321, at 613 (opining that "an essay could be written about the
spending power much like this essay about the commerce power, justifying most, if not all, of
what Congress has done by reference to the general interests of the union or state incapacity").
325. Tellingly, the StewardCourt relied upon precisely this sort of problem in upholding the
federal unemployment compensation scheme created by the Social Security Act. See Steward
Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 588 (1937):
But if states had been holding back before the passage of the federal law, inaction
was not owing, for the most part, to the lack of sympathetic interest. Many held
back through alarm lest, in laying such a toll upon their industries, they would
place themselves in a position of economic disadvantage as compared with
neighbors or competitors.
326. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 213 (1987) (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("I agree
that there are four separate types of limitations on the spending power."). Conspicuously,
O'Connor made no reference to the de facto fifth prong, coercion. See infra text accompanying
notes 340-41.
327. Dole, 483 U.S. at 212-13.
at 212-13,218.
328. Id.
329. See supra Part V.B.I.
330. Dole, 483 U.S. at 207 (quoting Massachusetts v. United States, 435 U.S. 444, 461
(1978) (plurality opinion)).
331. See supratext accompanying notes 276-78.
332. Cf, e.g., Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979) (invalidating New York law
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O'Connor explicitly traced the jurisprudential roots ofher germaneness requirement
to the distinction that the Court drew in United States v. Butler, between "a statute
stating the conditions upon which moneys shall be expended and one effective only
upon assumption of a contractual obligation to submit to a regulation which otherwise
could not be enforced. 3 33 Thus, she would interpret the Spending Clause to afford
Congress no power "'to impose requirements on a grant that go beyond specifying how
the money should be spent,"' unless
the condition "'falls within one of Congress'
334
delegated regulatory powers."'
It is not clear what O'Connor means by a condition that specifies "how the money
should be spent," however. For example, she asserts that the condition at issue in Dole,
"that a State will raise its drinking age to 21," is not "a condition determining how
federal highway money shall be expended. 335 Yet she also contends that a condition
prohibiting members of a state Highway Commission from "tak[ing] any active part in
political management or in political campaigns" if their "principal employment is in
connection with [an] activity which is financed in whole or in part by loans or grants
made by the United States or by any Federal agency 3 36 is a permissible "condition
relating to how federal moneys [are] to be expended. 337 Unfortunately, O'Connor fails
to explain why the latter condition is not instead a "regulation" on the extracurricular
activities of the employees of various state and local agencies, and therefore beyond
the scope of Congress's spending power and other delegated regulatory powers.338 Nor
does she elaborate on the difference she sees between the relationship this condition

giving unmarried mothers, but not fathers, a veto power over the adoption of their child, and
finding this classification not substantially related to the state's proclaimed interest in promoting
adoption); Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 770-71 (1977) (invalidating Illinois law prohibiting
illegitimate children from inheriting from their fathers through intestate succession because the
state "failed to consider the possibility of a middle ground between the extremes of complete
exclusion and case-by-case determination of paternity"); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197
(1976) (gender-based classification must be "substantially related" to achievement of the
objectives invoked to defend it); id. at 201-02 (finding "an unduly tenuous 'fit"' between the
protection of public health and safety and a law providing different minimum drinking ages for
men and women); cf.also JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 64044 (6th ed. 2000) (discussing standard of intermediate review in equal protection cases).
333. Dole, 483 U.S. at 216 (quoting United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 73 (1936)).
334. Id. (quoting Brief for the National Conference of State Legislatures et al. as Amici
Curiae at 19-20).
335. Id. at 218.
336. Oklahoma v. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n, 330 U.S. 127, 129-30 n.1 (1947)
(quoting Hatch Act § 12(a), 5 U.S.C. § 118K(a) (1940), repealedby Federal Election Campaign
Act Amendments of 1976, § 201, 90 Stat. 475).
337. Dole, 483 U.S. at 217.
338. Compare O'Connor's discussion of the condition at issue in Dole:
The only possible connection, highway safety, has nothing to do with how the
funds Congress has appropriated are expended. Rather than a condition
determining how federal highway money shall be expended, it is a regulation
determining who shall be able to drink liquor. As such it is not justified by the
spending power.
Id. at 218.
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and the drinking age restriction each have with "the expenditure of funds for highway
construction. 339

O'Connor also does not discuss the role, if any, that "coercion" would play under
her analysis. The Dole majority was explicit that "in some circumstances the financial
inducement offered by Congress might be so coercive as to pass the point at which
'pressure turns into compulsion,"' and emphasized that the legislation at issue in that
case would withhold from a noncomplying state only five percent of its otherwise
obtainable allotment of federal highway funds.34 ° O'Connor, in contrast, never
expressed any concern with the amount of federal money that a state would forego if it
chose not to comply with an attached condition. Thus, she apparently would find
equally unproblematic (1) legislation that would withhold a state's entire yearly
allotment of federal highway funds if any employee of a state or local agency, whose
principal employment is in connection with any activity which is financed in whole or
in part by those funds, takes any active part in political management or in political
campaigns and is not removed from his office or employment within thirty days ofthe
political activity; and (2) identical legislation that would withhold highway funds from
a state only in "an amount equal to two years' compensation at the rate such officer or
employee was receiving at the time of such violation. 3 41 Obviously, the first
enactment provides states a significantly greater incentive to comply with the funding
condition than the second does.
Finally, O'Connor never details the normative underpinnings of her proposed test
beyond an expressed concern with "the Framers' plan," 342 "the meaning of the
Spending Clause,"343 and the precedent established by the Court in Butler.3 4 Despite
these flaws, however, the test O'Connor outlined in her Dole dissent makes substantial
progress toward workable principles for cabining Congress's spending power.
The test proposed by one of us (Baker) in 1995 sought to build upon the best
elements of O'Connor's test while remedying some of the problems with that test
outlined above. 345 Baker's proposed test can be concisely stated: those offers of federal
funds to the states which, if accepted, would regulate the states in ways that Congress
could not directly mandate, will be presumed invalid.346 This presumption will be
rebutted upon a determination that the offer of funds constitutes "reimbursement
spending" rather than "regulatory spending." "Reimbursement spending" legislation
specifies the purpose for which the states are to spend the offered federal funds and

339. Id.
340. Cf Oklahoma, 330 U.S. at 129-30 n.l.
341. Id.
342. Dole, 483 U.S. at 217.
343. Id.
344. See id.
345. For an extended discussion of this test, see Baker, Conditional Federal Spending, supra

note 16, at 1962-78. For Berman's reservations, see Berman, supra note 61, at 55-57.
346. By regulations that Congress could "directly mandate" is simply meant regulations that
Congress could enact pursuant to the direct regulatory powers granted it by the Reconstruction
Amendments and the provisions of Article I other than the Spending Clause of Section 8, Clause
1. It does not include those regulations that Congress could currently enact pursuant to the
Spending Clause, of course, because the test seeks to redefine the scope of the spending power,
and must therefore start from the assumption that the limits of that power are undefined.
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simply reimburses the states, in whole or in part, for their expenditures for that
purpose. Most "regulatory spending" legislation thus includes a simple spending
component which, if enacted in isolation, would be unproblematic under the proposed
test.
In seeking to distinguish between reimbursement spending and regulatory spending
legislation, the proposed test, like the Dole test, imposes a type of "germaneness"
requirement on conditional offers of federal funds to the states. In contrast to that in
Dole, however, the germaneness inquiry under the proposed test has two separate
parts, and a challenged condition will be found
"germane" and subsequently sustained
347
if it meets the requirements of either part.
The germaneness requirement of the Dole test focuses solely on the relationship
between the funding condition and "the federal interest in particular national projects
or programs," and is met if the condition is not "unrelated" to some "federal
interest. ' 348 Moreover, the Court's notion of a permissible "federal interest" is
seemingly boundless, expressly including even those regulatory objectives that
Congress cannot achieve directly.349 Under the first part of the proposed test's
germaneness inquiry, in contrast, the notion of a "federal interest" is strictly and
unambiguously limited by Congress's regulatory powers other than the spending
power, and a funding condition will be found to be germane under this part whenever
its regulatory effects are ones that Congress could otherwise achieve directly.
The second part of the germaneness inquiry under the proposed test is embodied in
the distinction between "reimbursement spending" and "regulatory spending," and
applies only to those conditional offers of federal funds which, if accepted, would
regulate the states in ways that Congress could not directly mandate. It focuses on the
relationship of the funding condition to both the purpose for which the funds are
offered and the amount of money at issue. A condition will be found to be germane
under this portion of the proposed test's inquiry only (1) if it specifies nothing more
than how-that is, the purpose for which-the offered funds are to be spent and (2) if
the amount of money offered does not exceed the amount necessary to reimburse the
state for its expenditures for the specified purpose. 350 The germaneness requirement set
out in Dole, in contrast, permits conditions that do much more than specify the purpose
for which the states are to spend the offered funds, and imposes no clear limits on the

347. It should also be noted that the germaneness inquiry under the Dole test is but one of
five (mostly toothless) prongs that must be met if the legislation is to be sustained. The two-part
germaneness inquiry under the proposed test, in contrast, is that test's only prong.
348. Dole, 483 U.S. at 207 (quoting Massachusetts v. United States, 435 U.S. 444, 461
(1978) (plurality opinion)).
349. See id. ("[O]bjectives not thought to be within Article I's 'enumerated legislative
fields,' may nevertheless be attained through the use of the spending power and the conditional
grant of federal funds." (citation omitted)).
350. Thus, the proposed test would require Congress to disaggregate offers of federal funds
for different purposes even if the offers are all reasonably related to a single, general federal
interest in eradicating poverty or drug abuse, for example. Congress would not need to enact
separate legislation for each offer of funds, however. It could include them as separate
provisions of the same statute, so long as it makes clear which condition(s) attach to each offer
of funds.
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amount of money that may be made contingent on a state's compliance with a given
condition.35'
In order to understand why the proposed test seeks to distinguish between these two
forms of legislation, and would invalidate only the regulatory spending type, consider
the following pair of hypothetical enactments. In each case, if a state accepts the offer,
352
the statute would regulate it in ways that Congress could not directly mandate.
(A)Any state receiving federal Death Penalty funds ("Funds") must have the death
penalty available for first-degree murder convictions; participating states shall
receive Funds in the amount of their demonstrated cost of executing those
sentenced to death for first-degree murder.
(B) Any state receiving federal Law Enforcement funds ("Funds") must use the
Funds to provide "beat cops" who will daily patrol the state's urban neighborhoods
on foot, and must demonstrate its depth of commitment to the national fight
against crime by having the death penalty available for first-degree murder
convictions; participating states shall receive Funds in the amount of $1.00 per
resident according to the most recent federal census.353
Statute A is an example of reimbursement spending legislation. It simply specifies
the purpose for which the states are to spend the offered funds (here, executing those
sentenced to death for first-degree murder) and, critically, offers states an amount of
money no greater than that necessary to reimburse them for their expenditures for the
specified purpose. Statute B, in contrast, is regulatory spending legislation that has
both reimbursement and regulatory spending components. The reimbursement
spending component is the offer of Law Enforcement funds, whose purpose and
authorized use are limited to reimbursing the states for some portion of their (or their
localities') cost of employing police to patrol the state's urban neighborhoods daily on

351. See Dole, 483 U.S. at 208-09. See also supra Part V.B. 1.
352. In Lopez, the Court suggested that state and local "criminal law enforcement" was
beyond the regulatory powers granted Congress under the Commerce Clause. See United States
v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 564 (1995).
353. Cf 42 U.S.C. §§ 13,701-13 (2000) ("Violent Offender Incarceration and Truth-inSentencing Incentive Grants"). This Act appropriates $8 billion over six years to be distributed
to states that, inter alia, demonstrate that their correctional policies and programs "provide
sufficiently severe punishment for violent offenders, including violent juvenile offenders," id. §
13,703(a), and have in effect laws which require that persons convicted of violent crimes serve
not less than 85 percent of the sentence imposed, id. § 13,704(a).
The Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994,42 U.S.C. §§ 13,701-14,223
(2000), also includes the Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexually Violent
Offender Registration Program, id. § 14,071, which stipulates that any state that, within three
years from the date of the Act's enactment, does not have a federally approved registration
program for individuals who are convicted of sexually violent offenses or crimes in which the
victim was a minor, shall not receive ten percent of the federal funds that would otherwise be
allocated to it under §3756 of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 42
U.S.C. § 3711-97 (2000). See 42 U.S.C. § 14,071 (g)(2)(a) (2000). For examples of the formula
that the federal government currently uses to distribute "law enforcement" funds to the states,
see 42 U.S.C. §§ 13,706, 13,754 (2000).
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foot. 35 4 The regulatory spending component, which renders the entire statute
impermissible under the proposed test, is the statute's additional requirement that
states receiving these Law Enforcement funds also have the death penalty available for
first- degree murder convictions.
Both Statute A and B provide states an incentive to make the death penalty
available for first-degree murder convictions. From the perspective of a state that, prior
to these federal enactments, preferred not to have the death penalty available for firstdegree murder convictions, however, Statute A is surely preferable. Under Statute A,
the cost to a state of not complying with the condition attached to the offered funds is
much lower than it is under Statute B. Although a noncomplying state foregoes federal
reimbursement for the costs of executing individuals it convicts of first-degree murder
and sentences to death, it incurs no such costs. Thus, the major cost of Statute A to
such a state is an opportunity cost: 35 5 a portion of the federal fisc is being used to
subsidize a project-executing individuals that other states have convicted of first
356
degree murder and sentenced to death-from which the state will not directly benefit
(and by which it will in fact be burdened) 35 7 instead of a project that the state would
prefer. The cost of Statute B to a non-complying state, in contrast, is (a) the
opportunity cost represented by that portion of the federal fisc-including its own

354. Typically, municipal law enforcement is funded primarily by each locality and has
historically constituted approximately five percent of all local expenditures. See U.S. Advisory
Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, Significant Features of Fiscal Federalism,
Revenues and Expenditures, vol. 2, at 149 (tbl. 79) (1992) (local expenditures by function, 19481990); id. at 119 (tbl. 61) (local revenue by source, 1948-1990); see also CLAYTON P. GILLETrE
& LYNN A. BAKER, LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 225-373 (2d ed. 1999)
(discussing legal relationship between states and their subdivisions); OSBORNE M. REYNOLDS,
JR., HANDBOOK OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW 76-137, 156-83 (2d ed. 2001).
355. See, e.g., PAUL A. SAMUELSON & WILLIAM D. NOROHAUS, ECONOMICS 137 (17th ed.
2001) (emphasis omitted):
The immediate dollar cost of going to a movie instead of studying is the price of a
ticket, but the opportunity cost also includes the possibility of getting a higher
grade on the exam. The opportunity costs of a decision include all its
consequences, whether they reflect monetary transactions or not.
Decisions have opportunity costs because choosing one thing in a world of scarcity
means giving up something else. The opportunity cost is the value of the most
valuable good or service forgone.
356. Although a noncomplying state will not benefit directly insofar as it will not receive any
of the federal funds conditionally offered under the legislation, it may benefit indirectly if, for
example, the increase in the number of states in which the death penalty is available for firstdegree murder convictions has a deterrence effect which results in a decrease in the number of
murders committed even in the noncomplying state.
357. Such legislation may burden a noncomplying state in two ways. First, some portion of
the federal funds which the legislation distributes to states that comply with the attached
condition(s) will have been contributed by taxpayers who reside in the noncomplying state and
who will therefore receive no direct benefit from this use of their tax dollars. Second, a
substantial proportion of the residents of the noncomplying state are presumably opposed to the
availability of the death penalty (which is why the state has declined the offer of federal funds),
and may be displeased or even distressed that their tax dollars are being used to subsidize an
activity-the execution of individuals convicted by other states of first-degree murder-which
they consider unwise or immoral.
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contributions-which is being used to provide a benefit solely to other states, as well
as (b) foregone desired Law Enforcement funds for which the state would have been
eligible had it been willing to waive its Tenth Amendment right not to administer the
death penalty.
Of course, reimbursement-spending legislation such as Statute A will also impose
costs on noncomplying states. These opportunity costs, which all conditional offers of
federal funds impose, may give states some (likely small) incentive to conform with
the conditions imposed by reimbursement-spending legislation. But regulatory
spending enactments such as Statute B impose costs in addition to these opportunity
costs, and thus typically provide states a greater incentive to conform. This in turn
means that regulatory spending legislation is more likely than reimbursement spending
legislation to yield interstate homogeneity and a concomitant reduction in aggregate
social welfare. In the end, the normative distinction to be made between
reimbursement and regulatory spending is one of degree rather than kind.
Thus, the problem is to decide where, on the continuum of incentives to conform
that conditional offers of federal funds always provide the states, mere
"encouragement" ends and "coercion" begins. In Dole, the Court simply stated that it
would draw the line at the point where the "pressure" exerted by the financial
inducement "turns into compulsion., 358 The Court never defined "compulsion" or
"pressure," explained how one should or could consistently distinguish between the
two, nor provided any example of an impermissibly "coercive" offer of federal funds
to the states.
The test proposed by Baker accepts the Dole Court's sense of "coercion" as "too
much pressure," and, seeks to capture the distinction between impermissible
"coercion" and permissible "encouragement" in its distinction between
"reimbursement spending" and "regulatory spending" legislation. The test would draw
a line between conditional offers of federal funds that impose opportunity costs on
noncomplying states (permissible reimbursement-spending legislation), and offers that
impose both opportunity costs and additional costs on noncomplying states
(impermissible regulatory spending legislation).359 Concededly, the line that Baker's

358. Dole, 483 U.S. at 211 (quoting Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 590
(1937)).
359. It should be noted that there is an interesting relationship between the "germaneness"
and "coercion" inquiries under the proposed test: the central distinction between
"reimbursement spending" and "regulatory spending" legislation embodies both the second
portion of the proposed test's germaneness inquiry and its entire coercion inquiry. Offers of
federal funds to the states that take the form of regulatory spending legislation signal both (1)
that noncomplying states will bear costs in addition to the opportunity costs that all federal
funding statutes impose (and the offer of funds is therefore, by stipulation, "coercive"); and (2)
that Congress is using its spending power to circumvent simultaneously the limitations of its
regulatory powers (under Article I and the Reconstruction Amendments) and the Article V
amendment process (thus the condition on federal funds is not sufficiently "germane"). Offers of
federal funds to the states which, if accepted, would regulate them in ways that Congress could
directly mandate, or which take the form of reimbursement spending legislation, involve
funding conditions that are always both "germane" and not "coercive" under the proposed test.
Under the Dole test, in contrast, the "germaneness" and "coercion" inquiries are completely
unrelated, and apparently are to serve as their own normative justifications. CompareDole, 483
U.S. at 207-09 (discussing "germaneness" inquiry) with id.
at 211-12 (discussing "coercion"
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proposed test would draw between reimbursement spending and regulatory spending
legislation may not always comport with our intuitive or subjective notions of when
"coercion" begins: the "additional costs" that render a statute impermissible regulatory
spending legislation may sometimes seem insignificant in amount. Against this
imperfection, however, one must weigh the test's substantial advantages: the line the
test would draw between "coercion" and "encouragement" is bright, straight, and
readily and consistently drawn, and the test will afford the states principled and
predictable protection from federal regulation to a greater extent than existing doctrine
does.360
4. Coercion of a Different Color
We observed earlier 361 that Dole conceived of impermissible coercion by Congress
as a correlative of involuntariness or unfreedom by the states: Congress may not coerce
the states to comply with a spending condition where coercion means applying so
much pressure-as measured by the disagreeableness to the states of doing without the
offered benefit-that the states have no choice but to accept. We observed too that
difficulties inherent in the notion of "no choice" make this approach hard to
operationalize. Because the states will never have no choice at all but to accept,
because it is almost unimaginable that a state will have no practicalchoice but to
accept, and because other conceptualizations of"no choice" seem unadministrable or
misguided, it is unclear what basis can exist upon which a court could conclude that the
pressure exerted by any given conditional spending offer was "too much." One lesson
would be to abandon all inquiries into coercion.
As we have just seen, however, this conclusion is not inevitable. Adopting a
somewhat minimalist approach that denies any need to fully theorize the notion of"no
choice but to accept,"3 62 the Baker test accepts the core idea underlying the Dole

inquiry).
360. Perhaps the clearest evidence that Baker's test will constrain Congress's spending power
more than existing doctrine does is provided by a consideration of the federal legislation at issue
in Dole. Assuming arguendo, as the Dole Court did, see 483 U.S. at 206, that the 21st
Amendment precludes Congress from regulating drinking ages directly, the condition on funds at
issue in Dole is presumed to be invalid under Baker's test: the test presumes invalid any
conditional spending legislation that seeks to regulate a state that accepts the proffered funds in a
way that Congress could not directly mandate. One then proceeds to determine whether the
statute constitutes "reimbursement spending" legislation and therefore rebuts the presumption of
invalidity. Under the challenged statute, the states receiving federal highway money must not
only spend that money on maintaining and improving the highways within their borders (the
"reimbursement spending" portion of the statute), they must also prohibit the purchase or public
possession of alcoholic beverages by anyone less than twenty-one years old. This additional,
regulatory component of the statute renders it regulatory rather than reimbursement spending,
and the conditional offer of federal funds would therefore be found unconstitutional under
Baker's test. For further discussion of how various enactments would fare under Baker's test and
under the Dole doctrine, see Baker, ConditionalFederalSpending, supranote 16, at 1978-88.

361. See supra Part V.B.2.
362. On judicial minimalism, see generally CASS R.
JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME COURT (1999).
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Court's concern with "coercion"-namely, that the national government should not be
allowed to put "too much pressure" on a state to accept a condition attached to the
offer of federal funds-and then seeks to craft a doctrine that could effectuate this
intuition without having to rely upon ad hoc gestalt judgments by each reviewing
court. To that end, Baker proposes that courts conclusively presume that a spending
condition exerts too much pressure when that condition threatens to impose costs on a
non-accepting state beyond the opportunity costs that an offeree inescapably incurs by
declining an offer. Admittedly, this test can only imperfectly operationalize the
intuitive line between impermissible coercion and mere permissible encouragement,
but offers substantial benefits in terms of administrability.
There is yet another possibility, though. Appealing loosely to the Dworkinian
distinction between concepts and conceptions,36 we might say that Part V.B.2 brought
into question the Dole concept of coercion (an offeror-the federal government in
these cases--engages in impermissible coercion when it confronts its offeree-here,
the states-with a deal that the latter has "no choice" but to accept) by challenging the
usefulness of any one of its possible conceptions (no choice simpliciter, no practical
choice, no fair choice, no rational choice). If this is right, then before we give up on
coercion tout court (as many courts have seemingly done), 3 " or embrace a potentially
very rough proxy (as the Baker test would do),365 we might consider whether there
exists any other concept of coercion (that is, a concept that does not turn upon the
freedom6 or voluntariness of the offeree's choice) that could do appropriate normative
36
work.

Consider this scenario: Cain and Abel have agreed to write a law review article
together and have divided responsibilities between them. When Abel is out of town,
Cain calls him, threatening to enter Abel's office and rearrange the books unless Abel
promises to write all Cain's footnotes. Abel does not much care how his books are
organized but, being a generous soul, agrees nonetheless. It seems implausible to claim
that Abel accepted involuntarily. Nor does there seem to be a meaningful sense in
which Abel had no choice but to accept.3 67 Given the "too much pressure" concept of
coercion we have been working with, it would follow that no coercion is present here.

363. RONALD M. DwoRKN, TAKING RiGHTS SERIOUSLY 134-36 (1978). The appeal is loose
because we are agnostic regarding whether the two distinct senses of coercion that we will soon
invoke are better understood as distinct concepts or simply as different functions that coercion
talk serves.
364. See supranotes 53-59.
365. See supraPart V.C.3.
366. The classic theoretical discussion of the optimal precision of legal rules is Issac Ehrlich
& Richard A. Posner, An EconomicAnalysis ofLegal Rulemaking,3 J. LEGAL STUD. 257 (1974);
see also Ian Ayres, PreliminaryThoughts on Optimal TailoringofContractualRules, 3 S.CAL.
INTERDIS. L.J. 1 (1993); Colin S. Diver, The OptimalPrecisionofAdministrativeRules, 93 YALE
L.J. 65 (1983); Gillian K. Hadfield, Weighing the Value of Vagueness:An Economic Perspective
on Precisionin the Law, 82 CAL. L. REv. 541 (1994); Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards:
An EconomicAnalysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557 (1992).

367. This is a slight overstatement, for Abel's lack of choice would be consistent with
determinism. We can ignore this possibility, though, because the very inquiry into whether a
given individual had "no choice" in a particular circumstance presupposes either that
determinism is false or that the sense of choice on the table is not the one that determinism
denies.
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But this is mistaken. On a familiar account, coercion is the making of a conditional
threat to perform an act that would be wrongful to commit.368 Because it would be
wrongful for Cain to enter Abel's office without permission and rearrange Abel's
books (admittedly, not grievously wrongful), Cain has engaged in the moral wrong of
engaging in coercion notwithstanding that the prospect of the act threatened exerted
insufficient pressure upon Abel as to make his acquiescence involuntary or unfree. On
this view, what makes a proposal coercive is not that it puts "too much pressure" on
the offeree to accept but that, by threatening to inflict a wrong if the offeree does not
accept, it exerts a wrongful sort of pressure. To be sure, these two things will often
coincide-an offeree will often experience an offeror's threat to do something
wrongful as exerting so much pressure as to make his compliance feel unfree.
Nonetheless, the measure of coercion on this account is the characterof the pressure
exerted, not its magnitude.
This observation has suggested to one of us (Berman) a different way to analyze
unconstitutional conditions cases generally. 369 Applying this distinct sense of
coercion-a conditional proposal is coercive (within a given normative system) ifthe
act conditionally threatened would be wrongful (within that given system) if carried
out-to the particular problem of conditional federal spending, it follows that a
conditional spending proposal by Congress should be deemed unconstitutionally
coercive if carrying out the act threatened-that is, withholding some or all of the
specified federal funds-would be unconstitutional. Strikingly, this is the sense of
coercion at work in New York.37 ° The take-title provision "has crossed the line
distinguishing encouragement from coercion," the Court explains, 37' because it
threatens to impose a consequence-requiring that the states legislate in a certain
fashion-that would be unconstitutional as amounting to forbidden commandeering.372

368. See, e.g., Berman,supranote 287, at 53-55; Martin Gunderson, Threats andCoercion,9
CAN. J. PHIL. 247 (1979); Vinit Haksar, Coercive Proposals (Rawls and Gandhi), 4 POL.

65, 68-70 (1976).
369. The theory is set forth in Berman, supra note 61. The discussion in text presents an
extremely simplified version of the full theory.
370. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
371. Id. at 175.
372. In proceeding to observe that "[a] choice between two unconstitutionally coercive
regulatory techniques is no choice at all," id. at 176, the New York Court seems to unite these
two senses of coercion: the states have "no choice" but to accept precisely because Congress
may not impose upon them the consequence it threatens. Yet "no choice at all" is unhelpful
hyperbole. If A gives B the bad news that he, A, is determined either to pinch B's arm or to pull
B's hair, and adds (the good news?) that A will allow B to select which unpleasantness she
prefers to suffer, it would be a mistake to observe that B is confronted with "no choice at all." B
has a very clear and real choice: to suffer an arm-pinching or to suffer a hair-pulling. The same
is true of New York. So, in a more precise terminology, the Court may mean something like the
take-title provision gives the states "no fair choice." But notice that unfairness in this picture
simply means unconstitutionality: What makes the choice unfair is only that, as a matter of
positive law, the act threatened would be unconstitutional. It is therefore the unconstitutionality
of the act threatened, and not any extraconstitutional sense of unfairness, that is doing all the
work in the analysis. This suggests a third possibility: the take-title provision gives the states "no
constitutionally acceptable choice."
Now this formulation, finally, is precisely right (so long as we accept the Court's noTHEORY
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Moving away from the federalism context altogether, this is also the sense of coercion
that the Court deployed in Nollan v. CaliforniaCoastalCommission,373 a takings case
decided just three days after Dole. In that case, the Court struck down a state offer to
grant a land-use variance on the condition that the landowner convey a public
easement. Justice Scalia, writing for the Court, explained that the proposal was
coercive (a "plan of extortion" was his precise language) because it would have been
unconstitutional under these circumstances for the Coastal Commission to carry out its
threat not to grant the variance.374
One could accept that this rule-a conditional proposal is coercive (within a given
normative system) if the act conditionally threatened would be wrongful (within that
given system) if carried out-appeals to a coherent sense of coercion that is distinct
from the sense, or concept, intimated in Dole and embraced by the Baker test, and yet
suppose that it inescapably presents a slackening of Dole, not a tightening. Because
federal funds to the states are a gratuitous benefit, the argument goes, it cannot be
unconstitutional for Congress to withhold them. Under this test, then, conditional
spending plans would never be coercive.
Not so. To be sure, states have no constitutional right correlating with a federal duty
to disburse federal funds for local road construction or education or law enforcement
or for any other purpose. In this important sense, federal funds are indeed a "benefit"
as distinguished from an "entitlement." But they are not a benefit in the stronger sense
of being a boon that Congress may withhold for any reason or no reason at all.
Nothing is a benefit in this very strong sense. In particular, so the claim runs,
government may not withhold a benefit (that is, make any entity worse off than it
otherwise would be) for the purpose of punishing or discouraging the exercise of a
right. Call it a "penalty" when government withholds a "benefit" for these improper
reasons. If this is correct, then some conditional spending offers would prove coercive,
hence unconstitutional, 375 because they threaten to withhold a putative benefit under
circumstances in which what is being threatened is really imposition of a penalty.
Furthermore, the conditional spending offer at issue in Dole is probably an example of
just this sort of coercive proposal.
One may suspect that this approach proves too much because whenever the national
government withholds money from a state on noncompliance with a condition it acts
for the purpose of "punishing or discouraging" the state's right not to comply.

commandeering rule as a constitutional given). But it is also woefully unartful. Speaking in
terms of the states' choice situation adds nothing to the Court's far more direct point:
Because an instruction to state governments to take title to waste, standing alone,
would be beyond the authority of Congress, and because a direct order to regulate,
standing alone, would also be beyond the authority of Congress, it follows that
Congress lacks the power to offer the States a choice between the two.
Id. And the conclusion follows as an application of the principle, put forth in text, that it is
unconstitutionally coercive to threaten what it would be unconstitutional to do.
373. 483 U.S. 825 (1987).
374. Id. at 837. For development of this thumbnail sketch of Nollan and how its vision of
coercion compares to that advanced in Dole, see Berman, supra note 61, at 89-94; Berman,
supranote 129, at 733-35.
375. Actually, coercion is only a presumptive constitutional wrong-that is, an infringement,
not a violation. See Berman, supranote 61, at 21-22; Berman, supra note 287, at 49 n.14.
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However, a hypothetical contrasting case helps illustrate both that this suspicion would
be mistaken and that were the Court to adopt this different sense of coercion, the actual
statute at issue in Dole would probably prove unconstitutional.
Suppose that by 1984 every state had a minimum drinking age of twenty-one, save
South Dakota, whose drinking age was eighteen, and that every state had a minimum
driving age of eighteen, save North Dakota which limited driver's licenses to persons
over fifty-five. Wishing to induce a change in both state policies, Congress provided
that a state would lose five percent of its otherwise allocable highway funds if it
maintained a minimum drinking age under twenty-one, and would lose all of its
highway funds for maintaining a minimum driving age over eighteen. In each case,
Congress is threatening to withhold a benefit. But that alone cannot make either
proposal coercive. On the account just sketched, the proposal is coercive if carrying
out the threat would be unconstitutional, and carrying out the threat would be
unconstitutional if Congress would be withholding the offered benefit for the purpose
of punishing the state for, or discouraging it from, standing on its (presumed)
sovereign right to set a drinking or driving age as it wishes.
Imagine, then, that the two Dakotas reject the condition. Now what interests justify
Congress in withholding highway funds (five percent of funds in the case of South
Dakota, 100 percent in the case of North Dakota)? With respect to North Dakota, the
story might go like this. An unusually high minimum driving age leads to an unusually
small number of cars on the roads, and to a correspondingly small number of accidents.
Improving road conditions, therefore, could generate only a very small net reduction in
accidents and thus of injuries and deaths. Every federal dollar spent on North Dakota
road improvements, as a consequence, produces a much smaller social welfare benefit
in North Dakota than it does in the other states. So ifNorth Dakota (or any other state
for that matter) insists on maintaining an unusually high minimum driving age, federal
funds could produce a higher return in their next best use than in improving highways
in that state. Thus, even without denigrating a state's decision to maintain a very high
driving age, Congress might reasonably conclude that because the highways in such
states will be so underused the national interest is not well served by improving them.
In short, withholding the funds on failure of the condition need not serve any interest
in punishing North Dakota or shaping state behavior-withholding the funds does not,
that is, "penalize"
North Dakota-so the conditional threat to withhold such funds is
376
not coercive.
This story is rather less plausible with respect to South Dakota, however.3 77 To be

376. Note that whether the conditional spending proposal threatens a "penalty," hence is
"coercive," depends upon the purposes that the national government would have when carrying
out its threat not to provide the offered funds. It does not depend upon the purposes that the
national government has in extending the proposal. Naturally extending the proposal will be
animated, at least in part, by a purpose of inducing the offeree states to waive their (presumed)
sovereign right to legislate in a particular way. But it does not follow that carrying out the threat
would likewise be animated by that purpose. And the North Dakota hypothetical is intended to
be a case in point.
377. In the real world, of course, this story is not very plausible with respect to North Dakota
either. For one thing, Congress could incorporate annual highway miles driven into the ordinary
formula for allocating highway funds, in which case introducing driving age as a separate factor
would be redundant. In fact it does. See 23 U.S.C. § 104(b) (2000). But this driving age
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sure, improving road conditions and raising the minimum drinking age (from eighteen
to twenty-one) might each increase net social welfare. But that is not the issue. The
issue is whether the extent to which improving road conditions increases net social
welfare is itself contingent upon the minimum drinking age. Or, put another way, the
issue is whether the increasein highway safety that Congress would buy by giving a
state funds with which to improve its highways varies depending upon that state's
minimum drinking age, such that the higher a state's minimum drinking age (within
the relevant range), the greater is the increase in highway safety that federal highway
dollars purchase. Because if this is not the case, then withholding federal highway
funds on failure of the condition does not serve a legitimate federal interest except as
mediated by the forbidden purpose of punishing a state for its recalcitrance or (more
likely) of discouraging the recalcitrant state and others from refusing the federal
demand. That is, if $x spent on highway maintenance and construction would reduce
highway accidents (or injuries or accident costs) y amount if the state has a minimum
drinking age of eighteen and would reduce highway accidents (or injuries or accident
costs) by the same'y amount (albeit from a presumably lower baseline) if the state had
a minimum drinking age of twenty-one, then Congress's withholding of any part ofthe
$x upon the state's refusal to raise its drinking age could only be explained by a federal
interest in punishing the recalcitrant state or in discouraging other states from similarly
refusing the federal condition.
All of this is put conditionally. So, we must ask, what are the facts? Is the
incremental value of road improvements smaller in states with lower drinking ages, all
else being equal? A fully adequate analysis will be complex. But, we think, it is more
than incidental that nothing in Dole or the relevant legislative history suggests even
remotely that the answer is yes. And there is good reason to doubt it. 378 Assuming,
then, that federal highway funds would produce as great an increase in social welfare
when spent in South Dakota as when spent in a similarly situated state that differed
only in the respect that it had a higher minimum drinking age, for Congress to carry
out its threat not to provide South Dakota with its full allotment of funds would indeed
be constitutionally impermissible for serving an impermissible purpose, thus rendering
the conditional threat coercive.

hypothetical is designed merely to show that not all conditional spending proposals involve
threats to withhold federal funds under circumstances in which such withholding would be
undertaken for an improper reason. It illustrates that proposition by showing what form a
counterexample would take even if that counterexample could be challenged on other grounds.
In any event, any objection to the example could be met by tweaking the hypothetical. So, for
example, we could ask you to imagine that the technology necessary to measure annual highway
miles driven does not exist or is prohibitively expensive to employ.
378. For a somewhat cursory discussion, see Berman, supranote 61, at 37-40. To be sure, we
do not doubt that clever readers can hypothesize facts under which the increase in social welfare
that federal expenditures on highway construction and improvement purchase does vary in
inverse proportion to the minimum drinking age. Given such facts, the conditional funding
proposal at issue in Dole would not threaten a penalty, hence would not be coercive. But such
readers will also understand that the discussion in text is designed merely to illustrate how
conditional spending doctrine could operate upon a very different sense of coercion than Dole
adopted, and that the cogency of this different approach does not depend upon whether the
statute upheld in Dole was or was not coercive under this alternative conception of that concept.
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The upshot is that conditional spending programs could be distinguished from each
other on grounds of whether they are coercive if we adopt a different sense of coercion
than that featured in Dole-a sense that turns not on how onerous it would be for state
offerees if Congress carried out its threat to withhold federal funds but on whether
carrying out the threat would be wrongful in character because animated by the wrong
sorts of reasons. That the spending program upheld in Dole would most probably fail
this inquiry is strong evidence that a doctrine of this sort would constrain
congressional spending power more than existing doctrine does.379
Of course, precisely because this approach inquires into congressional purposes and
preferences its resolution will often be contestable. 380 Indeed, whether this inquiry is
sufficiently determinate in practice as to itself constitute an adequately administrable
judicial doctrine and, if not, whether an adequately administrable judicial doctrine can
be crafted to satisfactorily (albeit imperfectly) implement the understandings of
coercion and penalty just put forth, are important questions that the Court would have
to confront were it attracted to this alternative conceptualization.
D. Summary
Whereas Part IV examined how Congress might employ the spending power to
circumvent the Rehnquist Court's curtailments of congressional power, this Part has
explored what sort of parry such a thrust might provoke. We argued that no Court,
38
least of all the Rehnquist Court, should be expected to tolerate such circumvention. 1
Anticipating the possible objection that the Court could have no qualms about

379. It warrants mention, if not demonstration, that Statute B hypothesized in the previous
subsection, see supra text accompanying note 353, would probably be unconstitutionally
coercive under this approach, as would the condition imposed by the Jacob Wetterling Crimes
Against Children and Sexual Violent Offender Registration Program, see supra note 353. To
understand why the Violent Offender Incarceration and Truth-in-Sentencing Incentive Grants,
see id., in contrast, are probably not coercive, a little background is in order.
All federal spending is conditional: Congress offers $xon the condition that it be spent in a
particular way (e.g., to build roads) or in exchange for a particular good or service. Call the
condition, whatever it may be, y. But perhaps because the very notion of "spending" implies at
least some conditionality, the phrase "conditional spending" is ordinarily reserved for those
situations in which an additionalcondition is imposed, call it z. The conditional spending offer,
then, can be represented as "$x if and only ify +z." The statute at issue in Dole is the paradigm:
Congress offers $x if and only ify (the state uses that money for specified road improvements)
and z (the state establishes or maintains a minimum legal drinking age of 21 or higher). The
Violent Offender Incarceration and Truth-in-Sentencing Incentive Grants seem to be different.
Here Congress appears to be offering $x simply fory (juvenile sentencing policies that Congress
happens to favor). This is not "conditional spending" as that term is generally used and,
therefore, is not coercive because Congress will probably always genuinely prefer not to give out
money with the requested quid pro quo. If that is Congress's true preference, then in withholding
the offered benefit Congress is not acting with a purpose of punishing or discouraging the state
offeree's presumed right not to comply with the congressional request.
380. Some critics will go farther, contending that the inquiry is incoherent. We think this is
wrong, but cannot hope to develop the argument in this space.
381. The claim, it bears emphasis, is not that the Court should not tolerate such statutes as we
have imagined, but only that it would be mistaken to expect the Court to do so.
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Congress using the Court's spending doctrine as a blueprint from which to construct
legislation, we explained that, stated so categorically, this view errs by ignoring the
well-understood notion of a loophole, the related but not identical notion of exploiting
a loophole, and the widely shared normative principle that exploiting a loophole is
(frequently, at least) dirty pool.
We then argued that if the Court wants to strike down an exploitative spending
statute designed to circumvent one of the Court's federalism rulings, it would have a
variety of means at its disposal. First, the Court could very probably give Dole
significantly greater bite without ostensibly changing the test at all. The relatedness
and coercion prongs could each be tightened, but we think that such tightening is more
likely with the former. Relatedness could be tightened in a way that is articulable,
administrable and would prove fatal to most or all conceivable circumventions.
Second, if tightening relatedness were found unattractive or inadequate for whatever
reasons, the Court could replace or supplement the Dole test in any number of ways
that would constrain conditional spending much more than Dole does.
So Parts V.B and V.C reveal, in short, that conditional spending jurisprudence
could be much more restrictive of congressional power than it is at present. But they
reveal something much more important too. It is critical to recall that we reached this
consideration of alternatives by imagining that the Court (or, more precisely, a
majority thereof) was provoked to action by what it considered an affront to its
authority. An exploitation of the Dole loophole to circumvent an already announced
judicial decision throws down the gauntlet in a way unlikely to be ignored. A
circumventionist statute, therefore, is likely to provoke the Court to extend its states'
rights revolution to the spending power even when it might not otherwise have done
so, or at least to provoke an extension different in content than might otherwise have
382
come to pass.
This is not fanciful. For surely it is plausible that in other areas where this Court has
cut back on congressional power, it was provoked to do so by what it perceived as
particularly galling congressional effrontery. Garrett, for example, is arguably 383 a
straightforward application of Boerne, yet without RFRA's challenge to Smith, this
Court might have found a way to uphold the ADA under Section 5.384 Morrison is
arguably a straightforward application of Lopez, but had it not been for the GFSZA,
this Court-at least Kennedy or O'Connor, either of whom would have been enough-

382. See e.g., Conkle supranote 130, at 680 (noting "a distinct possibility" that the Court
might adopt new limits on the spending power "especially in the context of legislation that the
Court might regard as a congressional attempt to circumvent its decision in Boerne").
383. Also arguably not a straightforward application, essentially for reasons put forth by
Justice Breyer in dissent. For further development of this view, see, for example, Kramer, supra
note 240, at 145-53; Post & Siegel, supranote 240.
384. See Mark Tushnet, What Is the Supreme Court's New Federalism?,25 OKLA. CITY U.
L. REv. 927, 935 (2000):
I believe that the best account of Boerne is that the Court saw Congress's action in
rejecting the Court's interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause as a direct
challenge to the Court's authority-akin to a separation of powers concern-and
used available federalism doctrine as the hook on which to hang its distaste for
what Congress had done. Still, doctrine once articulated can take on a life of its
own.
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might have applied the pre-Lopez rational basis aggregation test to uphold VAWA. If
our prediction that Dole is secure at least through the very near term proves right, then
adoption of a circumventionist spending statute by the proponents of strong national
power could be such advocates' biggest mistake.
CONCLUSION

Whenever talk turns to what Congress could or should do in response to the
Rehnquist Court's cutting back of congressional power, the possibility of recourse to
the spending power comes quickly to everyone's minds, for the reigning precedent,
South Dakota v. Dole, has yet to be trimmed. Of course, Dole could be trimmed soon,
perhaps substantially curbing the appeal of any possible spending-based "fixes" to
recent federalism decisions. Yet the Court passed on an opportunity to revisit Dole this
very term in Guillen385 and, we think, is extremely unlikely to tinker with Dole either
later this Term when resolving the pending challenge to the Children's Internet
Protection Act, 386 or some distance down the road when considering RLUIPA. 387 If
this prediction proves correct, then proposals to exploit Congress's substantial power
of conditional spending to get around some of the recent limits imposed under the
Commerce Clause and Tenth, Eleventh, and Fourteenth Amendments will, if anything,
gain steam.
Accordingly, we then examined how spending power circumventions of various of
the Court's recent federalism decisions might work and argued that this is a risky
strategy. The risk is not simply that particular spending legislation may be struck
down. That its enactments might be invalidated is a risk Congress always takes. The
risk that ought to give Congress pause is that in striking down the circumventionist
legislation, the Court could invigorate Dole, or replace it, in ways that would prove
fatal to noncircumventionist uses of the spending power that would have sailed
through in the absence of any such change in judicial doctrine.
This cautionary note may seem to be against interest. Given our view that Dole is a
misguided and potentially harmful doctrine, we could be expected to stand among the
first to applaud its demise. Yet all depends upon what replaces Dole.And ill-conceived
congressional provocation is apt to engender just the sort of ill-conceived judicial
reaction from which sound constitutional doctrine is particularly unlikely to issue.

385. Pierce County v. Guillen, 123 S. Ct. 720 (2003).
386. Am. Library Ass'n v. United States, 201 F. Supp. 2d 401, 406-07 (E.D. Pa. 2002),
probablejurisdictionnoted, 123 S. Ct. 551 (2002).
387. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc (2000); see also supra Part III.B.

